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I. INTRODUCTION
The law begins and ends with human behavior. The ends of the law
focuses on human flourishing, and the means of the law is to channel
human conduct. The needs and wants of humans ground the norms of
the law, from the overarching to the secondary. Hence, for the law to be
suitable and effective, it must be based on a clear vision of the human
condition. Evolutionary psychology is a discipline that helps to meet
this requisite, for it is a powerful, but controversial, vehicle for analyzing
and understanding human behavior, and hence, legal and social
doctrine. The aim of this article is to demonstrate the potential
usefulness of evolutionary psychology. To achieve this, I discuss the
The author wishes to thank Stephen M. Colarelli, Jim Fanto and Owen Jones for
valuable comments on earlier drafts. Participants in the third annual SEAL (Society for
Evolutionary Analysis in Law) conference also contributed useful observations and
suggestions. Richard Torres (BLS 2003) and Michael Wigotsky (BLS/NYU 2005) provided
excellent research assistance. A Brooklyn Law School summer research stipend supported
this project.
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controversy over the discipline and identify the political roots of the
debate. In the end, I hope to show that evolutionary psychology
provides a valuable tool for those involved in the ordering of society.
While the basic blueprint of the engine of evolution was sketched by
Darwin well over a century ago,' in modem times it has been chiefly
restricted to the traditional inquiries of "neutral" science, until the last
few decades. After initial applications of the principles of evolution to
normative questions beginning in Darwin's lifetime,2 including Social
Darwinism, 3 most biologists and commentators retreated from the realm
of values in the face of withering, often fully justified, attacks by critics,
particularly after the eugenically-justified atrocities of World War II. 4
But then, in the late 1960's, the spotlight of evolutionary principles, later
under the label of sociobiology,5 was again turned to social issues. And
1 See CHARLES DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (1859). For a brief outline of
evolutionary theory, see, for example, WILLIAM H. CALVIN, THE CEREBRAL CODE 21-25
(1996); RICHARD D. ALEXANDER, DARWINISM AND HUMAN AFFAIRS 15-18 (1979).
2 See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 4-11 (rev. ed.
1955). Dennett holds out Thomas Hobbes as the first sociobiologist, two centuries before
Darwin. See DANIEL C. DENNETT, DARWIN'S DANGEROUS IDEA 453-55 (1995). Let us also not
forget Hume. See, e.g., DAVID HUME, ENQUIRIES CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING
AND CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 83-86 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 3d ed. 1975)
(post. ed. 1777).
3 See, e.g., MICHAEL RUSE, Evolutionary Biology and Cultural Values, in EVOLUTIONARY
NATURALISM 202, 208-09 (1995). See generally HOFSTADTER, supra note 2.
4 "[Tlhere have been few excesses of nineteenth-century capitalism or twentieth-century
militarism and fascism that have not had their biology-oriented partisans. Choose your
vileness, and there has been someone prepared to defend it in the name of evolution."
Michael Ruse, Evolutionary Ethics in the Twentieth Century: Julian Sorell Huxley and George
Gaylord Simpson, in BIOLOGY AND THE FOUNDATION OF ETHICS 198, 198 (Jane Maienschein &
Michael Ruse eds., 1999).
5 "Sociobiology is a school of thought which is centred [sic] on the idea that because the
perpetuation of genetic material is the driving force of evolution, many of the properties of
animals - indeed, the properties of all living things - including their social behaviour, must
be understood in that light." HENRY PLOTKIN, EVOLUTION IN MIND 62 (1997). For the three
strands of sociobiology, see id. at 75-88. See also CHARLES J. LUMSDEN & EDWARD 0.
WILSON, PROMETHEAN FIRE 23 (1983) [hereinafter PROMETHEAN FIRE] (Sociobiology "is
defined as the systematic study of the biological basis of all forms of social behavior
(including sexual and parental behavior) in organisms, up to and including man."); Paul
Thompson, Introduction to ISSUES IN EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS 1, 3 (Paul Thompson ed., 1995)
("Sociobiology is, in essence, the application of modern evolutionary theory to the
investigation and explanation of, as well as the integration of knowledge about, the social
behavior of animals including humans."); Edward 0. Wilson, The Morality of the Gene, in
ISSUES IN EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS, supra, at 153, 155 [hereinafter Wilson, Morality of the Gene]
("Sociobiology is defined as the systematic study of the biological basis of all social
behavior."). Sociobiology's "major research strategy in human studies has been to work
from the first principles of population genetics and reproductive biology to predict the
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once again, because of several factious conclusions and speculations of
some commentators, sociobiologists were attacked by an agitated
rhetoric accusing the discipline of promoting unacceptable normative
positions.6 Nevertheless, some reputable scientists were still not willing
to hoist the white flag. Partially repackaged in subsequent years under
such labels as evolutionary psychology, evolutionary biology, Darwinian
anthropology, behavioral biology, human ethology, and behavioral
ecology, among others, 7 the engine of evolution continues to be invoked
forms of social behavior that confer the greatest Darwinian fitness." EDWARD 0. WILSON,
CONSILIENCE 168 (1998) [hereinafter WILSON, CONSILIENCE]. "The predictions are then
tested with data taken from ethnographic archives and historical records, as well as from
fresh field studies explicitly designed for the purpose." Id. Long before the term
"sociobiology" was used by E.O. Wilson in 1975, Darwin himself attended to
sociobiological problems. See ERNST MAYR, ONE LONG ARGUMENT 155 (1991).
6 For a detailed recounting of the modem battle over sociobiology, see ULLICA
SEGERSTRALE, DEFENDERS OF THE TRUTH: THE BATTLE FOR SCIENCE IN THE SOCIOBIOLOGY
DEBATE AND BEYOND (2000). One commentator characterizes the attack on sociobiology as
one of "unparalleled vigor," see MICHAEL R. ROSE, DARWIN'S SPECTRE 168 (1998), while
another describes "a ferocity that is unusual even by the standards of academic invective,"
see STEVEN PINKER, HOW THE MIND WORKS 45 (1997). For a recent sample of the fireworks,
see Stephen Jay Gould, Darwinian Fundamentalism, N.Y. REV., June 12, 1997, at 34
[hereinafter Gould, Fundamentalism]; Stephen Jay Gould, Evolution: The Pleasures of
Pluralism, N.Y. REV., June 26, 1997, at 47; "Darwinian Fundamentalism": An Exchange, N.Y.
REV., Aug. 14, 1997, at 64 (letters from Daniel C. Dennett, Robert Wright, and Stephen Jay
Gould).
7 See, e.g., JOHN CARTWRIGHT, EVOLUTION AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 48-50 (2000)
(distinguishing Darwinian anthropology and other studies from evolutionary psychology);
FRANS DE WAAL, GOOD NATURED 12 (1996) [hereinafter DE WAAL, GOOD NATURED]
("behavioral ecology"); WILSON, CONSILIENCE, supra note 5, at 168 ("Sociobiology (or
Darwinian anthropology, or evolutionary psychology, or whatever more politically
acceptable term one chooses to call it). ); N.A. Chagnon & W. Irons, Preface to
EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY AND HUMAN SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, at xii (Napoleon A. Chagnon &
William Irons eds., 1979) [hereinafter EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY] ("Sociobiology, or as it is
sometimes labeled behavioral biology ...."); Owen D. Jones, Law and Evolutionary Biology:
Obstacles and Opportunities, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 265, 270 n.13 (1994) (The
term "sociobiology" has been eschewed because of its associations. "While other terms
have been considered, such as human ethology, behavioral socio-ecology, evolutionary
psychology, or biocultural anthropology, no general agreement has emerged."); Mary
Maxwell, Introduction to THE SOCIOBIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION 1, 22 (Mary Maxwell ed.,
1991) ("human ethology," "behavioral socioecology," and "biosocial anthropology");
Donald Symons, On the Use and Misuse of Darwinism in the Study of Human Behavior, in THE
ADAPTED MIND 137, 146 (Jerome H. Barkow et al. eds., 1992) ("human sociobiology, human
behavioral ecology, evolutionary biological anthropology, and ... Darwinian
anthropology"); Edward 0. Wilson, Forward to THE SOCIOBIOLOGY DEBATE, at xi (Arthur L.
Caplan ed., 1978) ("biosociobiology" and "social biology"). One commentator believes the
label "evolutionary psychology" is winning out over the others. See WILLIAM WRIGHT,
BORN THAT WAY 190 (1998). Irrespective of name changes, there have not been
"corresponding changes in outlook or research agenda." FRANS DE WAAL, THE APE AND
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in discussions of social questions.8 Legal scholars have also begun to use
Darwinism as an analytical mechanism.9 Though the conclusions are
usually toned down, they still draw much fire from critics. While some
insist that the principles of sociobiology are inapplicable to the human
condition,10 the louder, sometimes strident, critics contend that the
analysis is improperly reductionist and deterministic," and serves to
THE SUSHI MASTER 84 (2001) [hereinafter DE WAAL, SUSHI MASTER]. See generally
SEGERSTRALE, supra note 6, at 316-20.
The study of evolutionary principles from a legal viewpoint has similarly suffered a
title problem. One of the founders of the discipline, E. Donald Elliott, advances the label
"law and biology," though he believes "law and ethology" is more descriptive, but also
more confusing and unfamiliar. See E. Donald Elliott, Law and Biology: The New Synthesis?,
41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 595, 596-97 (1997). Elliot rejects "sociobiology" since law and biology
"is not the application of speculative evolutionary explanations to try to account for
specific behaviors (which is what I take sociobiology to be)." Id. at 597. 1 have a less
jaundiced view of the mission of sociobiology. Nevertheless, to avoid some of the
problematic karma of "sociobiology" I will use the term "evolutionary psychology" when
referring to the modem discipline alone.
8 For some of the leading recent evolutionary psychology tracts, see THE ADAPTED
MIND: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE GENERATION OF CULTURE (Jerome H. Barkow
et al. eds., 1992); DAVID M. BUSS, THE EVOLUTION OF DESIRE (1994) [hereinafter Buss,
DESIRE]; MATr RIDLEY, THE ORIGINS OF VIRTUE (1996) [hereinafter RIDLEY, VIRTUE]; MATr
RIDLEY, THE RED QUEEN (1993) [hereinafter RIDLEY, RED QUEEN]; ROBERT WRIGHT, THE
MORAL ANIMAL (1994). For a recent taxonomy, and brief introduction to the controversies,
see Erica Goode, Human Nature: Born or Unmade?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2000, at F1 (Science
Times). For more detail, see DAVID M. BUSS, EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY 3-32 (1999)
[hereinafter Buss, PSYCHOLOGY]. Ruse asserts that evolutionary psychology has become
downright fashionable among young scholars. See MICHAEL RUSE, MYSTERY OF MYSTERIES
123 (1999) ("What was for many years a quagmire to be avoided by all right-thinking
evolutionists has now become the area most attractive to bright students and others
determined to make their mark.").
9 "Law and biology scholars are beginning to incorporate and apply behavioral biology
principles to a wide variety of topics relevant to law. These include, for example,
aggression, cooperation, competition, risk assessment, relations between the sexes,
emotions, and deceptions and self-deceptions." Owen D. Jones, Law, Emotions, and
Behavioral Biology, 39 JURIMETRICS 283, 289 (1999) (footnote omitted). The Gruter Institute
for Law and Behavioral Research promotes the application of evolutionary principles to
legal questions. Its website is http://www.gruterinstitute.org. The Society for
Evolutionary Analysis in Law ("SEAL") was recently founded to facilitate discussions
among legal scholars with evolutionary interests. For an extensive, current list of
publications related to this subject, see the SEAL website, http://www.sealsite.org.
10 That the critics also objected to sociobiology on scientific grounds, see SEGERSTRALE,
supra note 6, at 17, 49.
1 One of the major attacks emphasizes reductionism and biological determinism, "the
twin philosophical stances with which this book is concerned, and to which, in the pages
that follow, we will return again and again." R.C. LEWONTIN ET AL., NOT IN OUR GENES 5
(1984) [hereinafter LEWONTIN, GENES]; see NILES ELDREDGE, THE PATrERN OF EVOLUTION 28-
29 (1999) (accusing the "ultra-Darwinians" of misguided reductionism); STEVEN ROSE,
LIFELINES: BIOLOGY BEYOND DETERMINISM (1997) (attacking sociobiology for determinism
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justify politically unacceptable, even outrageous, viewpoints, including
sexism, racism, and elitism.1
2
The attacks on the use of Darwinian tenets to analyze social
questions are, in my opinion, mainly misguided. 13 While it is not the
purpose of this article to counter the argument that evolutionary
principles are inapplicable to human behavior, nor is it within my
competence, it does strike me as prima facie implausible that the
principles would admittedly apply to the behavior of every organism on
earth except humans,14 and indeed, the reputable critics acknowledge,
and, especially, reductionism). Lewontin is himself a scientific reductionist, see RUSE, supra
note 8, at 169-70, and believes that, "[w]hatever the faults of reductionism, we have
accomplished a great deal by employing reduction as a methodological strategy," RICHARD
LEWONTIN, THE TRIPLE HELIX 110 (2000) [hereinafter LEWONTIN, TRIPLE HELIX]. Lumsden
and Wilson briefly respond to the criticism of reductionism by way of confession and
avoidance: Along with being reductionist by "breaking down complicated systems into
manageable components," sociobiology also, pursuant to the standard scientific method,
engages in "synthesis, in which the relation of the parts is also laid bare and the whole
system then reassembled either by direct experimentation or by theoretical simulation with
mathematical models." PROMETHEAN FIRE, supra note 5, at 172. For brief discussions of
types of reductionism, good and bad, see DENNETT, supra note 2, at 80-83; STEVEN PINKER,
THE BLANK SLATE 69-70 (2002), and for brief defenses of it, see Roger D. Masters, Is
Sociobiology Reactionary? The Political Implications of Inclusive-Fitness Theory, 57 Q. REV.
BIOLOGY 275, 276-77, 281-82 (1982); John Maynard Smith, Introduction to CURRENT
PROBLEMS IN SOCIOBIOLOGY 1, 2-3 (King's College Sociobiology Group eds., 1982); Pierre L.
van den Berghe, Sociology, in THE SOCIOBIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION, supra note 7, at 269, 276-
78. See generally SAHOTRA SARKAR, GENETICS AND REDUCTIONISM (1998); SEGERSTRALE,
supra note 6, at 284-89 (reductionism in sociobiology).
12 See infra discussion accompanying notes 241-54.
13 For general, sustained criticisms of sociobiology, see ALAS, POOR DARWIN (Hilary
Rose & Steven Rose eds., 2000); THE DIALECTICS OF BIOLOGY GROUP, AGAINST BIOLOGICAL
DETERMINISM (Steven Rose ed., 1982); PHILIP KITCHER, VAULTING AMBITION: SOCIOBIOLOGY
AND THE QUEST FOR HUMAN NATURE (1985); LEWONTIN, GENES, supra note 11 (the gist of
the critique appearing at 243-64); ROGER TRIGG, THE SHAPING OF MAN (1983). Midgley,
who identifies herself with the political left wing, notices the "extraordinary lengths" taken
by critics of sociobiology to "misrepresent[] one's opponent's statements in order to prove
that he does indeed belong to the dreaded opposition." MARY MIDGLEY, BEAST AND MAN,
at xx (1978). One sociobiologist declares that the debate with the critics is over, with the
sociobiologists having essentially won. See JOHN ALCOCK, THE TRIUMPH OF SOCIOBIOLOGY 4
(2001).
14 See id. at 223. Of course, there is the matter of the human brain, which makes us
"animals with a difference. And that difference arises, in part, as a result of enormous
flexibility based on the complexity of an oversized brain and the potentially cultural and
nongenetic basis of adaptive behaviors . STEPHEN JAY GOULD, Our Natural Place, in
HEN'S TEETH AND HORSE'S TOES 241, 243 (1983). Perhaps quantitative changes become
qualitative. See ROSE, supra note 6, at 151-66; Richard C. Lewontin, The Adaptation of
Populations to Varying Environments, 22 SPRING HARBOR SYMPOSIA ON QUANTITATIVE
BIOLOGY 395, 407 (1957), quoted in RUSE, supra note 8, at 155. "The strongest opponents to
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though typically downplay, a role for nature in informing human
behavior. Rather, after rehearsing the controversy, I here concentrate on
the reasons why the harshest critics tend to be from the political left, and
contend that Darwinism need not lead to the provocative political and
legal judgments assailed by critics. When properly understood and
situated in normative theory, the tools of sociobiology or evolutionary
psychology help to clarify the consequences and difficulties of certain
political and legal choices without insisting on any particular one.15
I begin with a brief introduction to the Darwinian theory of
evolution. Then I turn to the normative implications, if any, of the
existence of natural human behavioral dispositions.' 6 Does the finding
of natural dispositions lead sociobiologists to claims violative of Hume's
gap between fact and value? Are they biological determinists unwilling
to provide adequate room for the plasticity of human behavior? Do
observations on what had fitness value during the prehistoric evolution
of humans commit commentators to positions about what will or should
be fit in the future? Are cultural norms subject to evolutionary
constraints similar to those on biological transformations and, if so, what
is the normative significance of this? Next, I address the politics of
sociobiology. Here, I first examine the basic tenets of the leading
political orientations and compare them to Darwinian tenets, discussing
affinities and contrasts. I then consider the tactics of supporters of the
various political orientations that have been, and might be, embraced in
light of the lessons from Darwin. I conclude that in the political, moral,
social, and legal realms, an evolutionary analysis is here to stay, for it
provides an instructive, if not exhaustive, vision of the human condition.
II. EVOLUTIONARY THEORY
In the evolutionary game, 17 only those organisms that leave
descendants remain to play another round. The framework of the game
human sociobiology maintained the separateness of humans from other animals because of
language and culture." SEGERSTRALE, supra note 6, at 141-42.
15 "The critics of sociobiology employed a particular style of textual exegesis which I call
'moral reading', aimed at revealing the true meaning of sociobiology." Id. at 2. To critics,
that meaning was rooted in right-wing political ideology, protestations by sociobiologists
notwithstanding. Id. at 2-3.
16 For example, one might ground normative and legal arguments on the contention that
there are differences in the biological predispositions of men and women.
17 For the "game" perspective of evolution, see Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in
Law: An Introduction and Application to Child Abuse, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1117, 1129-55 (1997).
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is built on three pillars: variation, heritability, and differential fitness.
18
There must be variation among the traits on which the pressures of
evolutionary competition may operate. The variations must produce
differential fitness, allowing the forces of selection to favor those that are
better able to leave descendants. Finally, the selected traits must be
heritable to allow the descendants to share their strengths. 19  The
instrument of heritability is the individual gene.20 Each gene "seeks" to
persist into future generations through the organism it inhabits. In a
common metaphor, "[ain organism is in essence a gene's way of making
another gene." 21 An individual gene cannot do this alone, of course,
since it takes many genes to produce an organism, perhaps 30,000 to
40,000 for a human. Therefore the fitness of a gene is determined, at least
partially, by its ability to coordinate well with the other genes it finds
itself with in its particular genome. Like humans themselves, a gene,
irrespective of its individual virtue, is less likely to thrive if it does not
work well with the others it finds itself with in the struggle for survival
and reproduction. 22 The phenotype, the particular form and behavior of
18 See, e.g., DANIEL C. DENNETT, CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED 200 (1991); STEPHEN JAY
GOULD, BULLY FOR BRONTOSAURUS 11-13 (1991); MELVIN KONNER, THE TANGLED WING 17
(1982); FLORIAN VON SCHILCHER & NEIL TENNANT, PHILOSOPHY, EVOLUTION, AND HUMAN
NATURE 4-5 (1984); Richard C. Lewontin, Adaptation, SC1. AM., Sept. 1978, at 213, 220. The
elements may be variously characterized. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. DURHAM, COEVOLUTION:
GENES, CULTURE, AND HUMAN DIVERSITY 21-22 (1991); ROSE, supra note 11, at 181.
19 See, e.g., ROBERT TRIVERS, SOCIAL EVOLUTION 12 (1985). There are other tabulations of
the elemental processes of Darwinian evolution. See, e.g., William Irons, Natural Selection,
Adaptation, and Human Social Behavior, in EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY, supra note 7, at 4, 4-5
("inheritance, mutation, drift, gene flow (including isolation), and natural selection").
20 For introductions to modem evolutionary theory, see TIMOTHY H. GOLDSMITH, THE
BIOLOGICAL ROOTS OF HUMAN NATURE 23-45 (1991) [hereinafter GOLDSMITH, ROOTS];
MAYR, supra note 5; HENRY PLOTKIN, DARWIN MACHINES AND THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE
22-58 (1993); Timothy Goldsmith & Owen Jones, Evolutionary Biology and Behavior: A Brief
Overview and Some Important Concepts, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 131 (1999). For an interesting
framework with detail, see DENNETr, supra note 2, at 17-331. The primary target of
selection may be other than the gene. See infra note 233 (group selection); MAYR, supra note
5, at 117-18, 146-47, 152 (gene versus individual).
21 MELVIN KONNER, WHY THE RECKLESS SURVIVE 5 (1990); see PLOTKIN, supra note 5, at 93-
94.
22 Dawkins compares a gene to a rower in a boat. For the boat to win races, irrespective
of the rower's individual strengths, she must be able to cooperate with the other rowers on
board. See RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 38-39 (new ed. 1989) [hereinafter
DAWKINS, SELFISH GENE]. "To survive in the long run, a gene must be a good companion."
RICHARD DAWKINS, RIVER OUT OF EDEN 5 (1995) [hereinafter DAWKINS, RIVER]; see JOHN C.
AVISE, THE GENETIC GODS 107-11 (1998) (genes as "members of intraorganismal social
groups").
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an organism, develops from its genotype responding to environmental
factors.23
Not only must genes collaborate with the others it finds in its
genome, it must also compete with genes elsewhere. It must compete
with the other genes that may be substituted for it in its genome (say, the
allele(s) for blond hair versus brown hair), and with the other collections
of genes appearing in competing organisms (say, a cardinal versus a blue
jay). The competition is judged only by reproductive success, not simply
by survival or any other measure of achievement.24 Only those genes
that succeed in leaving descendants continue in play, the more of its
clones that appear in the gene pool, the better it has done in this game.
This is natural selection. Its relentless pressure informs both body and
mind.25 The two main parameters of success are the environment in
which the organism finds itself, and luck. For example, the human genes
23 Wilson defines the term "phenotype": "The observable properties of an organism as
they have developed under the combined influences of the genetic constitution of the
individual and the effects of environmental factors. (Contrast with genotype.)" EDWARD
0. WILSON, SOCIOBIOLOGY 591 (1975). He defines "genotype": "The genetic constitution of
an individual organism, designated with reference either to a single trait or to a set of traits.
(Contrast with phenotype.)" Id. at 585.
24 On the basis of this ultimate test of evolutionary success, reproduction, Alexander
posits that law "is to render finite the reproductive strivings of individuals and subgroups
within societies." ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 240 (emphasis omitted). From this he
predicts that "laws should be seen as constructed so as to regulate competitive striving,
and the severity of punishment is expected to reflect the severity of deleterious effects on
the reproduction of others." Id. at 24041 (pointing to murder, treason, and rape as the
most severely punished crimes). He also predicts that, sexual competition for mates being
more intense among men than women, "lawbreaking will occur more frequently among
males, which of course is already well known." Id. at 241. "Lawbreaking is also expected
to be concentrated at those periods in life, or those ages, when competitive striving is most
intense or most crucial." Id. at 242 (citing the concentration of lawbreaking in the age range
of seventeen to twenty-two, prime marriage years). Furthermore, among males
"[llawbreaking is expected to be higher in individuals or groups most inhibited from
climbing the ladder of affluence or using the system legally to accumulate resources," to
thereby make themselves more reproductively attractive. Id. at 243 (citing confirmatory
evidence). He also predicts "macho" behavior as more common within these inhibited
groups as an alternative strategy to making oneself sexually attractive. Id. at 244
(discussing supporting evidence); see also BuSS, DESIRE, supra note 8, at 209-10 (discussing
that "the greater risk taking ... should occur among men who are at the bottom of the
mating pool"); BUSS, PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 8, at 291-93 ("The 'Young Male Syndrome"').
25 "The mind is a system of organs of computation, designed by natural selection to
solve the kinds of problems our ancestors faced in their foraging way of life, in particular,
understanding and outmaneuvering objects, animals, plants, and other people." PINKER,
supra note 6, at 21. For a general discussion of adaptations, see Lewontin, supra note 18, at
219.
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for higher mathematical ability, if there are such, are not likely to
increase reproductive success in a stone age,26 nor will they help the
modern toddler who is struck down by a runaway truck.
Under a current, powerful metaphor, each gene in each organism is
selfish,27 interested only in itself. "Itself" includes its identical twins -
exact clones. If the clones survive in another organism, or genetic
vehicle, it survives. The critical fitness, then, is "inclusive." Because
close relatives of an organism share a high number of genes, inclusive
fitness favors the process known as "kin selection." 28 A gene, generally,
is fifty percent likely to have one of its clones in the children of its
vehicle, and similarly for its siblings. For grandparents, aunts, uncles,
and grandchildren, the likelihood is twenty-five percent. The more
distant the relationship, the fewer are the genes shared in common.
Under kin selection, then, it is worthwhile to the genes of an organism to
protect the vehicle's relatives, the value of the investment turning on the
closeness of the relation and the likely reduction in the organism's own
reproductive success.29 Thus, a person gains the same genetic advantage
from a specific sacrifice for the benefit of one of her children or two of
her nephews and nieces. This bolsters nepotism.30 Also illuminated is
26 Owen Jones pointed out to me that basic mathematical skills may well have been
subject to selection pressures. He posits these vital calculations, among others: "How
much food will it take to satisfy my needs, and those of my relatives? Is my colleague
providing me a fair quantum of food, given my contribution?"
27 The term "selfish gene" was made famous by Dawkins. See DAWKINS, SELFISH GENE,
supra note 22.
28 Wilson defines "kin selection": "The selection of genes due to one or more
individuals favoring or disfavoring the survival and reproduction of relatives (other than
offspring) who possess the same genes by common descent." WILSON, supra note 23, at
587. See generally DAVID P. BARASH, SOCIOBIOLOGY AND BEHAVIOR 79-93 (1977); BUSS,
PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 8, at 222-49; HELENA CRONIN, THE ANT AND THE PEACOCK 293-310
(1991); TRIVERS, supra note 19, at 45-47, 169-202. That this is the principle theory that
grounds sociobiology, see Maxwell, supra note 7, at 5.
29 One sympathetic evolutionary psychologist concedes that "the selfish gene side of
sociobiology is proving difficult to demonstrate in humans." PLOTKIN, supra note 5, at 110.
This is due to the substantial effect of nurture and culture on human behavior. See id. at
110-11. Consequently, he concludes, "there may be few, if any, aspects of human
psychology and behaviour that can be understood without reference to the causal forces of
human intelligence and culture." Id. at 119.
30 "According to inclusive-fitness theory, then, we should have evolved to be
exceedingly effective nepotists, and we should have evolved to be nothing else at all."
ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 46; see GOLDSMITH, ROOTS, supra note 20, at 40 (indicating that
"[tihe nepotistic interests of humans decrease with distance of relatedness and are
conveniently calibrated by the Arab adage 'Myself against my brother; my brother and
myself against my cousin; myself, my brother, and my cousin against an outsider.");
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the warning cry of an animal, which is more likely to perish by drawing
the attention of the predator, but which protects its kin.31 In this
attenuated sense, then, the organism is induced to act altruistically. 32
A gene may even increase its reproductive success by favoring
unrelated organisms. Through what is known as "reciprocal altruism," a
somewhat misleading label, if an animal gives resources to another one
in need in the justified expectation that the recipient will reciprocate
when the giver is the needy one, both animals, depending on the
circumstances, are more likely to survive.33 For example, if one year a
William Irons, Anthropology, in THE SOCIOBIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION, supra note 7, at 71, 82-
86 (reporting that anthropologists have "extensively confirmed" that humans are
nepotistic). Hume also perceived the sentiments favoring kin selection. See MICHAEL RUSE,
TAKING DARWIN SERIOUSLY 268-69 (2d ed. 1998) (citing DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF
HUMAN NATURE 483-84 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 2d ed. 1978)).
31 See, e.g., BARASH, supra note 28, at 81; KONNER, supra note 21, at 6; MAYR, supra note 5,
at 156. But see STEPHEN JAY GOULD, Caring Groups and Selfish Genes, in THE PANDA'S THUMB
85, 88 (1980) (referring to "the debates [that] have brought forth at least a dozen
alternatives that interpret [warning] crying as beneficial for the crier"); Carol K. Yoon,
Study Exposes Craven Motive of the Brave Meerkat Sentry, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1999, at F3
(noting that meerkat sentry is not entirely altruistic since it is the first to see the predator
and escape down a hole).
32 Wilson declares that "[f]rom this simple premise [of kin selection] and elaborations of
it have come a wealth of predictions about patterns of altruism, patriotism, ethnicity,
inheritance rules, adoption practices, and infanticide. Many are novel, and most have held
up well under testing." WILSON, CONSILIENCE, supra note 5, at 169. For example, in one
interesting study it was shown that it was reproductively beneficial to elite families in the
European Middle Ages to cloister some women members in celibate religious institutions.
See Erica Hill, Lineage Interests and Nonreproductive Strategies, 10 HUM. NATURE 109 (1999).
For a sophisticated mathematical analysis of kin selection, see Jack Hirshleifer, Evolutionary
Models in Economics and Law: Cooperation Versus Conflict Strategies, 4 RES. L. & ECON. 1, 26-30
(1982).
33 Wilson defines "reciprocal altruism": "The trading of altruistic acts by individuals at
different times. For example, one person saves a drowning person in exchange for the
promise (or at least the expectation) that his altruistic act will be repaid if the circumstances
are reversed at some time in the future." WILSON, supra note 23, at 593. The characteristics
of reciprocal altruism are: "1. The exchanged acts, while beneficial to the recipient, are
costly to the performer. 2. There is a time lag between giving and receiving. 3. Giving is
contingent on receiving." DE WAAL, GOOD NATURED, supra note 7, at 24. See generally
BARASH, supra note 28, at 94-96; BUSS, PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 8, at 253-77; CRONIN, supra
note 28, at 253-65; TRIVERS, supra note 19, at 47-49; Robert L. Trivers, The Evolution of
Reciprocal Altruism, in THE SOCIOBIOLOGY DEBATE, supra note 7, at 213. Matt Ridley
advances the principle of reciprocal altruism as the main factor in the human quality of
virtue. See RIDLEY, VIRTUE, supra note 8. Trivers believes it "likely that during our recent
evolutionary history (at least the last 5 million years) there has been strong selection on our
ancestors to develop a variety of reciprocal interactions." TRIVERS, supra note 19, at 386.
For detail, see id. at 386-92. Other "evolutionary pathways to altruism" have also been
proposed. See, e.g., id. at 49-52; John Tooby & Leda Cosmides, Friendship and the Banker's
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farmer has a bumper crop, it would be to her long term, reproductive
advantage to give some of her production to her less lucky neighbors to
the extent that she can depend on their future aid when the tables are
turned.34
In general, as inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism reveal, the
interests of the selfish gene may be advanced not only by successful
competition with other genes, but also, depending on the circumstances,
by cooperation with other genes and organisms.35 The genes giving rise
to heritable traits that dispose an organism to behavior with
reproductive benefits are likely to spread in the gene pool.3 6 Moral
Paradox: Other Pathways to the Evolution of Adaptations for Altruism, in EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL
BEHAVIOUR PATTERNS IN PRIMATES AND MAN 119 (W.G. Runciman et al. eds., 1996);
Christopher Boehm, The Natural Selection of Altruistic Traits, 10 HUM. NATURE 205 (1999);
David S. Wilson & Kevin M. Kniffin, Multilevel Selection and the Social Transmission of
Behavior, 10 HUM. NATURE 291 (1999). For criticism of the circumscription of human
autonomy that follows from the sociobiological view of altruism as grounded, mainly
through inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism, ultimately on selfishness, see KITCHER,
supra note 13, at 388-406, and for a rejection of the naturalistic foundation of ethics, see F.J.
Ayala, The Biological Roots of Morality, in ISSUES IN EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS, supra note 5, at
293, 312-14.
34 For an excellent history of the theoretical problems and solutions to the question of
altruism, see Alexander Rosenberg, Altruism: Theoretical Contexts, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF
BIOLOGY 448 (David L. Hull & Michael Ruse eds., 1998). See generally id. at 445-87
(Altruism); Brian C.R. Bertram, Problems with Altruism, in CURRENT PROBLEMS IN
SOCIOBIOLOGY, supra note 11, at 251. Frank interestingly suggests that genuine moral
sentiments, costly to implement, have evolutionary survival value in providing individuals
with dependable reputations that facilitate cooperation even when cheating is difficult to
detect or prevent. See ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON 90-95 (1988). Thus, one
is more willing to provide a reputable person with benefits in the expectation that she will
reciprocate, when necessary.
35 For example, reproductively advantageous behavioral traits are evident in the
interactions and relations between men and women, as well as among men and among
women. But because males and females play different roles in reproduction, they are
genetically predisposed to behave differently in some regards. See generally BUSS, DESIRE,
supra note 8; HELEN FISHER, THE FIRST SEX (1999); GEOFFREY MILLER, THE MATING MIND
(2000); RIDLEY, RED QUEEN, supra note 8.
36 Wilson reduces the primary evolutionary principles of sociobiology to these basic
categories: kin selection, parental investment, mating strategy, status, territorial expansion
and defenses, and contractual agreement. See WILSON, CONSILIENCE, supra note 5, at 168-72.
But, Masters cautions, "an evolutionary approach to human behavior must integrate
emotion and cognition, feeling and judgment." Roger D. Masters, The Problem of Justice in
Contemporary Legal Thought, in THE SENSE OF JUSTICE 1, 13 (Roger D. Masters & Margaret
Gruter eds., 1992).
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sensibility may have thus originated from cooperative and other
behavioral dispositions. 37
III. THE NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF BIOLOGICAL DISPOSITIONS
Let us assume that indeed humans are biologically predisposed to
behave in certain ways. What normative conclusion is to be drawn from
this given fact? None. At least, none from this fact alone. In drawing
this conclusion, there are four aspects of the underlying argument that
need to be addressed. First, as David Hume posited, there is an
unbridgeable chasm between the world of fact and the world of value.
"Is" does not imply "ought." That humans have particular dispositions
or qualities does not imply that these are normatively unimpeachable.
Second, despite contrary assertions by critics, there is no supported
principle of biological determinism in a strong, morally significant sense,
among mainstream sociobiologists. Normatively significant behavior is
not hard-wired. Behavior is a product of the interaction between genes
and environment. Neither one acts alone. Third, biological dispositions
evolved almost entirely during the prehistoric age when human
ancestors were hunters and gatherers. The qualities that enhanced
fitness during that period are unlikely to harmonize completely with
those that enhance fitness during the modem age. Thus, even if
normative conclusions could be drawn from the factual, evolved
dispositions, they may well be ones that are counterproductive to human
welfare under today's and tomorrow's circumstances. Fourth, evolution
is driven by the individual gene in an organism, the "selfish gene," but
37 For example, Wilson opines that empathy, certain attachments, cooperative behavior,
among other traits, have survival value and genes disposing these feelings and behavior
"inevitably gave birth to the moral sentiments." WILSON, CONSILIENCE, supra note 5, at 253.
With rare exception, if any, "these instincts are vividly experienced by every person
variously as conscience, self-respect, remorse, empathy, shame, humility, and moral
outrage. They bias cultural evolution toward the conventions that express the universal
moral codes of honor, patriotism, altruism, justice, compassion, mercy, and redemption."
Id. Another leading biologist takes another view: "I account for morality as an accidental
capability produced, in its boundless stupidity, by a biological process that is normally
opposed to the expression of such a capability." George C. Williams, Reply to Comments ol
"Huxley's Evolution and Ethics in Sociobiological Perspective," 23 ZYGON 437, 438 (1988), quoted
in DE WAAL, GOOD NATURED, supra note 7, at 2. De Waal rejects Williams' pessimism,
concluding that "[gliven the universality of moral systems, the tendency to develop and
enforce them must be an integral part of human nature." DE WAAL, GOOD NATURED, supra
note 7, at 2. He asserts that the "conditions for the evolution of morality" are: (1)
"Dependence on the group for finding food or defense against enemies and predators
[group value"]; (2) "Cooperation and reciprocal exchange within the group [mutual aid"];
(3) "Individual members have disparate interests [internal conflict]." Id. at 34.
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this mechanism may not always be beneficial for the survival of the
group, community, or the species as a whole. While the "interests" of
the genes may inform cultural norms to some extent, their selfishness is
seemingly one reason that culture and institutions emerged with the
principles and functions that they have. Among other roles, they
provide structures and incentives to resist the socially injurious effects of
some human dispositions. These institutions are fashioned, arguably, to
promote group selection, not individual selection alone. To achieve this
goal they must sometimes counter human nature. These four
considerations are discussed in turn. In doing so, I demonstrate the
acrimony that has permeated the debates by sometimes focusing on the
give and take of particular antagonists.
A. Fact and Value
It is a basic tenet of modem moral reasoning, first argued by Hume,
that "is" cannot be derived from "ought."38 A later variation by G.E.
Moore characterizes this as the "naturalistic fallacy." 39 In other words,
from a factual observation alone, no value conclusion can be properly
drawn.40 Critics assert that sociobiologists inevitably commit this very
error.
41
Modern sociobiologists typically acknowledge the chasm between
fact and value, and deny that they succumb to the naturalistic fallacy.42
38 See HUME, supra note 30, at 469-70.
39 See G.E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA 5-17 (1903).
40 "Hume's challenge can be summarized in the maxim that 'ought' claims cannot be
derived solely from 'is' claims. Moore's challenge can be summarized in the maxim that
'good' in the ethical sense is a nonnatural property." Thompson, supra note 5, at 20. "The
label naturalistic fallacy has come to be used quite loosely to describe either Hume's or
Moore's challenge." Id.
41 In order to marginalize the normative import of evolution, "[tihe most powerful tool
in the arsenal of opponents [of evolutionary ethics] has been the logical principle that moral
statements cannot be derived from factual statements alone (commonly referred to as the
naturalistic fallacy)." Id.
42 See, e.g., BARASH, supra note 28, at 278-79; Edward 0. Wilson, For Sociobiology, in THE
SOCIOBIOLOGY DEBATE, supra note 7, at 265, 267. Ayala finds that, though "sociobiologists
reiterate their conviction that science and ethics belong to separate logical realms," their
statements are not always consistent with their espoused convictions. Francisco J. Ayala,
The Biological Roots of Morality, 2 BIOLOGY & PHIL. 235, 246 (1987). But, like some others,
Masters, a political scientist who espouses sociobiological "biopolitics," unabashedly rejects
the naturalistic fallacy and contends that "human moral and political values can be judged
by objective criteria that are relative to time and place." ROGER D. MASTERS, THE NATURE
OF POLITICS 186 (1989) [hereinafter MASTERS, POLITICS]; see id. at 227, 239-43; Roger D.
Masters, Evolutionary Biology, Political Theory and the State, in LAW, BIOLOGY AND CULTURE
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But this does little to deter critics from contending otherwise,43
occasionally for quite defensible reasons.44 To examine this dispute and
show the flavor of it,4 5 I focus on Philip Kitcher's sustained attack on E.O.
Wilson's version of sociobiology, in Kitcher's book Vaulting Ambition:
Sociobiology and the Quest for Human Nature.46 I also discuss later writings
171, 187-89 (Margaret Gruter & Paul Bohannan eds., 1983). Arnhart takes another tack
against the standard interpretation of Hume's separation of fact and value. See LARRY
ARNHART, DARWINIAN NATURAL RIGHT 69-83 (1998). "The textual context makes clear that
Hume's claim is that moral distinctions are derived not from pure reason alone but from a
moral sense." Id. at 70. "Far from denying that moral judgments are judgments of fact,
Hume claims that moral judgments are accurate when they correctly report what our moral
sentiments would be in a given set of circumstances." Id. For Arnhart's discussion of
others who take on Hume's separation, see id. at 80-83.
43 See, e.g., LEWONTIN, GENES, supra note 11, at 28. While Lewontin, Steven Rose, and
Leon J. Kanin, severe critics of sociobiology, deny they will attempt to derive "is" from
"ought," they accuse sociobiologists, as biological determinists, of doing so. See id. As
their example, they condemn "E.O. Wilson's demand for a 'genetically accurate and hence
completely fair code of ethics."' Id. (citing WILSON, supra note 23, at 575). Taken at face
value, one could suppose that these critics might then demand that, in the name of
equality, women, in order to obtain athletic scholarships, must perform absolutely as well
as male scholarship athletes.
44 "[Alnyone knowledgeable in the history of evolutionary theorizing cannot be
surprised that Moore's work has so little effect and that people have gone on connecting
origins and ethics." Ruse, supra note 4, at 199. For example, Wynne-Edwards asserts that
"[firom the biological point of view," an individual's "overriding duty should be to ensure
the survival of the stock to which he belongs and whose torch he temporarily bears. This is
the primary purpose towards which his moral or altruistic behaviour ought therefore to be
directed." V.C. Wynne-Edwards, Ecology and the Evolution of Social Ethics, in THE
SOCIOBIOLOGY DEBATE, supra note 7, at 100, 107 (emphasis added). Going on to stress the
importance of maintaining loyalty within the social grouping, and observing that nation-
states seem to do this best today, he concludes that, apparently, "on biological as well as
traditional grounds, it is to his sovereign state that the individual's first loyalty should
continue to be given." Id. at 108 (emphasis added). More directly, Richards, in making out
his case for evolutionary ethics, argues "that there is no general fallacy in arguing from
facts to values, from 'is's to 'ought's." Robert J. Richards, Birth, Death, and Resurrection of
Evolutionary Ethics, in EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS 113, 116 (Matthew H. Nitecki & Doris V.
Nitecki eds., 1993) [hereinafter Richards, Resurrection]. For Richards's revised version of
evolutionary ethics, which he claims avoids the naturalistic fallacy, see Robert J. Richards,
A Defense of Evolutionary Ethics, 1 BIOLOGY & PHIL. 265 (1986) [hereinafter Richards, Defense];
Robert J. Richards, Dutch Objections to Evolutionary Ethics, 4 BIOLOGY & PHIL. 331, 331-36
(1989).
45 While I quote language from Kitcher that reveals some of the nastiness of the criticism
of sociobiology, Dennett finds the response also to be barbed. See DENNETIT, supra note 2, at
471 ("The typical inability of Wilson and other sociobiologists to see their critics as
anything but religious fanatics or scientifically illiterate mysterians is yet one more sad
overswing of the pendulum.").
46 KITCHER, supra note 13. Owen finds Kitcher's book "thought-provoking, insightful,
and rigorous" in "eviscerat[ing] certain aspects of the field but in fact [it] devotes much of
its effort to criticizing theories from the late 60's and 70's that were pre-formative, and in
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of Wilson, showing that some of Kitcher's criticisms that I found to be
unfair when first leveled have become more justified as Wilson has
moved, occasionally, on to thinner ice.
Few critics deny that biology is relevant to ethics and the law. As
H.L.A. Hart cogently notes, if humans were strongly protected by thick
shells, normative principles would be transformed accordingly.
47
Arguably, morality must be based on human wants, whether natural or
otherwise.48 The question, then, is the extent of the reach of evolutionary
biology across the chasm separating fact from value. Kitcher posits four
possibilities:
(A) Evolutionary biology has the task of explaining how
people come to acquire ethical concepts, to make ethical
judgments about themselves and others, and to
formulate systems of ethical principles.
(B) Evolutionary biology can teach us facts about
human beings that, in conjunction with moral principles
that we already accept, can be used to derive normative
principles that we had not yet appreciated.
(C) Evolutionary biology can explain what ethics is all
about and can settle traditional questions about the
objectivity of ethics. In short, evolutionary theory is the
key to meta-ethics.
(D) Evolutionary theory can lead us to revise our system
of ethical principles, not simply by leading us to accept
some cases already abandoned." Jones, supra note 7, at 265, 271 n.14. As devil's advocate, I
question the extent of the evisceration.
47 See H.L.A. HART, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, in ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 49, 80 (1983) (If humans were invulnerable and could
extract food from the air, "rules forbidding the free use of violence and rules constituting
the minimum form of property ... would not have the necessary non-arbitrary status
which they have for us, constituted as we are in a world like ours."). For similar
observations by Ruse and Wilson, perhaps pushed in the wrong direction, see infra note 62.
4 Dennett finds the most compelling answer to the question of the derivation of
"ought": "[E]thics must be somehow based on an appreciation of human nature-on a sense
of what a human being is or might be, and on what a human being might want to have or
want to be. If that is naturalism, then naturalism is no fallacy." DENNETr, supra note 2, at
468. The fallacy, if any, "is greedy reductionism of values to facts, rather than reductionism
considered more circumspectly, as the attempt to unify our world-view so that our ethical
principles don't clash irrationally with the way the world is." Id.
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new derivative statements - as in (B) - but by teaching
us new fundamental normative principles. In short,
evolutionary biology is not just a source of facts but a
source of norms.49
Kitcher finds the first two possibilities as legitimate and even
established.50 But he finds that sociobiologists go beyond this, using
Wilson as his exemplar. Specifically, he objects to Wilson's "most
ambitious.., pop sociobiological adventures in philosophy,"51 by means
of his "thoroughly confused" assertion of the last two possibilities.52
Certainly Wilson makes comments regarding the biologicization of
ethics that are aptly questioned by Kitcher. Kitcher quotes from the first
page of Wilson's key book, Sociobiology: The New Synthesis: "evolutionary
biology must undertake 'to explain ethics and ethical philosophers, if not
epistemology and epistemologists, at all depths.' ' 53 The last phrase might
well imply that Kitcher's last two possibilities above are within the reach
of sociobiology. To further make out his case of Wilson's vaulting
ambition, Kitcher goes on to quote from the last (among critics,
infamous) chapter of Wilson's book in which readers are invited "to
consider 'the possibility that the time has come for ethics to be removed
temporarily from the hands of the philosophers and biologicized."'m But
the word "temporarily" suggests that Wilson does not believe that ethics
is a subject for biologists alone. Instead he may be merely contending
that biologists have some useful assistance to offer, and the ethicists may
gain from standing back while the biologists work out the details of their
49 KITCHER, supra note 13, at 417-18.
50 Kitcher gives by way of example of the use of (A) and (B) the employment by
utilitarians of evolutionary biology to "learn[] how the maximization of happiness can
actually be achieved. Analogous points apply to rival systems of ethical principles." Id. at
420. For sustained use of evolutionary biology to explore these two possibilities, see, for
example, FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE GREAT DISRUPTION (1999); LIONEL TIGER, THE
MANUFACTURE OF EVIL (1987).
51 KITCHER, supra note 13, at 417.
52 See id. at 418 (referring to WILSON, supra note 23; EDWARD 0. WILSON, ON HUMAN
NATURE (1978) [hereinafter WILSON, HUMAN NATURE]; and PROMETHEAN FIRE, supra note
5). I include some of Kitcher's language in criticizing Wilson to reveal the tone of derision
that often infects Kitcher's discussion of sociobiology, a tone not uncommon among critics
that must certainly have hindered any scientific and philosophical dialogue.
53 Id. at 417 (quoting WILSON, supra note 23, at 3) (emphasis added). De Waal makes a
similar (overstated) claim: "We seem to be reaching a point at which science can wrest
morality from the hands of philosophers." DE WAAL, GOOD NATURED, supra note 7, at 218.
54 KITCHER, supra note 13, at 417 (quoting WILSON, supra note 23, at 562) (emphasis
added).
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sociobiological analysis.55 This position is consistent with possibilities
(A) and (B) above, quite within the competence of biologists according to
Kitcher.56
Kitcher's next target in Wilson's text follows hard on the last one:
"In the first chapter of this book I argued that ethical philosophers intuit
the deontological canons of morality by consulting the emotive centers of
their own hypothalamic-limbic system."57 Kitcher apparently finds this
statement objectionable for falling within possibility (C) above:
"Evolutionary biology ... can settle traditional questions about the
objectivity of ethics."58 Kitcher attacks Wilson's statement because,
"[d]espite the frequency of assertion, there is no vestige of argument for
any such conclusion."5 9 Let us see if this is correct.
By far the best known deontological system of ethics is, of course,
that of Kant. Without rehearsing the means by which Kant, through
"reason" alone, discerns the various forms of the categorical imperative
and their upshot, we can zero in on his bottom line: a just ethical system
must consist of a rational, coherent collection of universalized moral
maxims respecting humans as ends in themselves. 60 One of the claimed
weaknesses of Kant's derivation of ethical principles is that, in theory,
55 For various interpretations of Wilson's controversial statement, see CAMILIO J. CELA-
CONDE, ON GENES, GODS AND TYRANTS 10-11 (1987). One commentator, a gentle critic,
urges sociobiologists to avoid the naturalistic fallacy and, instead, retreat to a weaker form
of ethical naturalism that posits that biological facts are relevant to, not determinative of,
the justification of moral claims. "Various facts about humans might serve to make some
moral claims more appealing than others, and rule out some possible approaches to ethical
problems; but the facts alone would not show what should be done." Ruth Mattern,
Altruism, Ethics, and Sociobiology, in THE SOCIOBIOLOGY DEBATE, supra note 7, at 462, 471.
But then, she contends, this weaker form, already "a familiar one in some traditions of
philosophical ethics," "would not commit one to saying that ethics ought to be taken out of
the hands of philosophers, even temporarily." Id. Meaning, the relevant biological facts
are presently known well enough that moral philosophers in this tradition need not await
further knowledge? In any case, insofar as Wilson merely "suggest[s] that we should
utilize empirical facts in constructing an ethics for humans," Mattern states that Wilson's
view is not a radical departure from existing moral theory and may offer important
advances. Id. at 471-72.
56 For doubt that sociobiologists can aid philosophers in pursuit of (B), at least regarding
altruism, see John Chandler, Ethical Philosophy, in THE SOCIOBIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION,
supra note 7, at 157, 161-64.
57 KITCHER, supra note 13, at 417 (quoting WILSON, supra note 23, at 563).
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 See, e.g., C.D. BROAD, FIVE TYPES OF ETHICAL THEORY 117-21 (1930). See generally H.J.
PATON, THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE (1947).
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his formal framework can be satisfied by many possible collections of
moral maxims. 61 No one congeries emerges.62 Yet Kant himself has no
problem "finding" particular moral maxims apparently required of this
formal system. For example, promisekeeping and truthtelling, he
asserts, must be embraced by all rational persons.63 Other Kantian
philosophers, such as Rawls and Nozick, also find unique systems of
moral maxims by means of their own rational faculties.64 Why are these
moral philosophers so confident in their own derived systems when, in
principle, there are an unlimited number of possible ones within their
adopted Kantian formal framework? Perhaps, as Wilson declares, the
"ethical philosophers intuit the deontological canons of morality by
consulting the emotive centers of their own hypothalamic-limbic
system." 65 Perhaps, the "leap of faith," the gap in reason that cannot be
61 See F.H. BRADLEY, ETHICAL STUDIES 142-59 (2d ed. 1927); BROAD, supra note 60, at 123
("Kant would say, I think, that it is no more the business of ethics to provide rules of
conduct than it is the business of logic to provide arguments. The business of ethics is to
provide a test for rules of conduct, just as it is the business of logic to provide a test for
arguments."); ONORA NELL, ACTING ON PRINCIPLE: AN ESSAY ON KANTIAN ETHICS 132-37
(1975). This observation originates with Hegel. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE:
AN ETHICAL STUDY 113-14 (1988) (citing G.W.F. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT 252-62
(A.V. Miller trans., 1977)). But see CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, Kant's Analysis of Obligation:
The Argument of Groundwork I, in CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDS 43, 64-65 (1996) (Kant's
system is not simply "empty formalism").
62 In rebutting the argument that moral imperatives would stand, like mathematical
truths, irrespective of the materialist, genetic source of the human sense of morality, Ruse
and Wilson lose sight of the formal nature of deontological reasoning. To make the point,
they observe that, owing to the opportunism of natural selection, if humans had the
physical needs of termites, some of which we consider disgusting, "[olur minds would be
strongly prone to extol such acts as beautiful and moral." Michael Ruse & Edward 0.
Wilson, The Evolution of Ethics, NEW SCIENTIST, Oct. 17, 1985, at 50, 52. Indeed, as H.L.A.
Hart notes, human needs affect moral maxims, see supra note 47, but still the maxims must
satisfy the Kantian formal mandates of universalizability and respect for others.
Utilitarianism could also stand in place, though the preferences to be satisfied would
change. However, if, say, humans needed to kill and cannibalize conspecifics to breed,
Kant's categorical imperative would suffer.
63 See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 70-71 (H.J.
Paton trans., 3d ed. 1956) (1785) [hereinafter KANT, GROUNDWORK] (promisekeeping);
IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 224-29 (Louis Infield trans., 1930) (truthtelling).
64 See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE (1971).
65 WILSON, supra note 23, at 563. Churchland offers another biological explanation of
moral perception and moral understanding based on "a hierarchy of learned prototypes...
embodied in the well-tuned configuration of a neural network's synaptic weights. We may
here find a more fruitful path to understanding the nature of moral learning, moral insight,
moral disagreements, moral failings, moral pathologies, and moral growth at the level of
entire societies." PAUL M. CHURCHLAND, THE ENGINE OF REASON, THE SEAT OF THE SOUL
144 (1995). For the explanation, see id. at 144-50, 292-94.
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closed by logic alone, which arguably is a prerequisite to all normative
inquiry, 66 is intuited as Wilson claims. After all, the essence of the
postmodernist critique is that reason alone does not take us all the way
down to foundations, if there be any at all. 67 If sociobiology can tell us
how we nevertheless get to chosen foundations, it has something very
telling to say about moral questions.68
Wilson clearly does see sociobiology as helping to explain the "leap
of faith." This position is evident in another of Wilson's works,
Promethean Fire, which Kitcher also cites as evidence of the "monotonous
regularity" with which sociobiology is claimed as a building block of
normative inquiry. 69 Here Wilson quotes the basic propositions on
which Rawls and Nozick build their renowned moral and political
edifices, 70 noting that neither philosopher identifies the origins of their
propositions but only develops the consequences. 71  Starting with
undefended origins, Rawls ends up with a defense of welfare-state
6 Richards cites William James for the proposition that "first principles of an ethical
system can be justified only by appeal to another kind of discourse, an appeal in which
factual evidence about common sentiments and beliefs is adduced." Richards, Defense,
supra note 44, at 284. This need to ground ethics on facts, Richards asserts, undercuts the
naturalistic fallacy. See id. at 286.
67 See, e.g., COSTAs DOUZINAS & RONNIE WARRINGTON, POSTMODERN JURISPRUDENCE 14-
18 (1991); STEPHEN TOULMIN, COSMOPOLIS 175-201 (1990).
68 Though Hume may have been there first by asserting that "reason is ... the slave of
the passions." HUME, supra note 30, at 415. Still, evolutionary psychologists can explicate
details of the master-slave relationship. For the empiricist vision of morality, Wilson cites,
along with Hume, Aristotle and Darwin. See WILSON, CONSILIENCE, supra note 5, at 248.
69 KITCHER, supra note 13, at 417 (citing PROMETHEAN FIRE, supra note 5, at 175; WILSON,
supra note 52, at 5-7, 196). In evaluating Kitcher's attack on Wilson, I will largely restrict
my discussion to the parts of Wilson's work that Kitcher himself cites.
70 The tracts are, of course, NOZICK, supra note 64, and RAWLS, supra note 64.
71 See WILSON, supra note 52, at 5. Wilson provides Rawls' basic proposition: "In a just
society the liberties of equal citizenship are taken as settled; the rights secured by justice are
not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests." Id. Nozick's
beginning is: "Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to
them (without violating their rights). So strong and far-reaching are these rights they raise
the question of what, if anything, the state and its officials may do." Id.; see WILSON,
CONSILIENCE, supra note 5, at 250 (repeating this criticism of Rawls and Nozick).
Incidentally, Ruse finds "that the way in which Rawls presents his moral theory sounds
almost as if it had been prepared by a Darwinian." RUSE, supra note 30, at 245; see id. at 245-
47. But cf. Chandler, supra note 56, at 160 (doubting Ruse's ready finding "that moral
phenomena conform to sociobiological predictions"). Ruse argues that the sense that
morality is objective is "a collective illusion foisted upon us by our genes" as an adaptive
means to dispose us to beneficial, cooperative behavior. RUSE, supra note 30, at 253. This
posited origin of the sense of morality skirts the naturalistic fallacy because it avoids
justification altogether. See Ruse, supra note 4, at 217-19.
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liberalism and Nozick with libertarianism. "Like everyone else,
philosophers measure their personal emotional responses to various
alternatives as though consulting a hidden oracle." 72 Wilson then finds
the oracle within the limbic system: emotional reactions are
transformed, over evolutionary time, into hard-wired moral dispositions.
These foundational dispositions, he asserts, "have been programmed to a
substantial degree by natural selection over thousands of generations.
The challenge to science is to measure the tightness of the constraints
caused by the programming... and to decode their significance through
the reconstruction of the evolutionary history of the mind." 73 So far, so
good. Wilson does not use biology to bridge the gap between fact and
value, but simply uses biology to understand the bridges intuited by
moral philosophers.74 Implicitly he does not find "the tightness of the
constraints caused by the programming" to be very great, for Rawls and
Nozick, far from alone in their particular leaps of faith, end up with very
different normative schemes.75 At least we see the schemes as very
different, but that may be an illusion because our limbic systems have
72 WILSON, supra note 52, at 6. "The Achilles heel of the intuitionist position [such as
Rawls's] is that it relies on the emotive judgment of the brain as though that organ must be
treated as a black box." WILSON, supra note 23, at 562. Elsewhere also Wilson criticizes
moral philosophers for their unwillingness to admit fallibility. See WILSON, CONSILIENCE,
supra note 5, at 240. Wilson, no hypocrite, is willing to admit his fallibility, though,
uncharacteristically, without much humility in his voice. See id. at 241 ("And yes-lest I
forget-I may be wrong."). By this caveat, perhaps he is implicitly responding to Charles
Taylor's prior observation, in this context, of Wilson's "sublime indifference to
inconsistency." CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF 406 (1989).
73 WILSON, supra note 52, at 6. Elsewhere Wilson states that "by appealing to the core
principles of neurobiology, evolutionary theory, and cognitive science, practitioners of a
new human science can reach a deeper understanding of why we feel certain courses of
action to be intrinsically correct. They can help us to understand why we have moral
feelings." PROMETHEAN FIRE, supra note 5, at 183.
74 This point is made again in the last source Kitcher points to for Wilson's "monotonous
regularity" in advancing sociobiology as an aid to moral inquiry: "[E]thical philosophy
should no longer operate outside the boundaries of science. Leaving it to the vagaries of
genes and culture and the unaided intuition of great thinkers can be dangerous, as history
has amply shown." Id. at 175. This does not strikes me as radical or reactionary. Perhaps
Kitcher objects to the author's venture into epistemology: "Because moral judgment is a
physiological product of the brain, it too can be greatly assisted by the new, human-
focused science." Id. This agenda is being pursued by some evolutionary psychologists.
See, e.g., Patricia O'Neill & Lewis Petrinovich, A Preliminary Cross-Cultural Study of Moral
Intuitions, 19 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 349 (1998).
75 De Waal feels that Rawls's political system, in accounting for "gratitude, obligation,
retribution, and indignation," "elaborates on ancient themes, many of which are
recognizable in our nearest relatives." DE WAAL, GOOD NATURED, supra note 7, at 161. He
believes that our ancient ancestors were not the autonomous beings of Rousseau's and,
presumably, Nozick's, political construct. See id. at 166-67.
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blinded us to radically different possibilities, such as one in which we
dedicate our lives and well-being to species that have demonstrated their
superiority by surviving so long on earth-the cockroaches and
horseshoe crabs. 76 Be that as it may, we see in pages by Wilson cited by
Kitcher that, Kitcher's contention notwithstanding, there is indeed more
than "a vestige of argument" for the conclusion that "[elvolutionary
biology ... can settle traditional questions about the objectivity of
ethics." 77 Certainly not all the traditional questions, but at least the one
of them discussed here: From where might moral philosophers derive
their basic, assumed, supposedly objective premises?78 Surely it is
reasonable to examine whether that source is informed by biology.
76 See, e.g., DAVID G. GORDON, THE COMPLEAT COCKROACH 33 (1996) ("Geological
evidence, largely in the form of fossilized wings, indicates that cockroaches have been
around for at least 340 million years."); JOHN MAYNARD SMITH, THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION
190 (3d ed. 1975) (The horseshoe crab is "a 'living fossil' which closely resembles in
structure animals living 400 million years ago ...."). Perhaps we need not resort to such
wild imagination: Along with the range of systems found in existing societies, human
nature reaches those that "might be achieved through conscious design by future societies.
By looking over the realized social systems of hundreds of animal species and deriving the
principles by which these systems have evolved, we can be certain that all human choices
represent only a tiny subset of those theoretically possible." WILSON, supra note 52, at 196.
Again, this hardly sounds like biological determinism. But some of Wilson's critics would
go further: "[W]e know of no relevant constraints placed on social processes by human
biology. There is no evidence from ethnography, archaeology, or history that would enable
us to circumscribe the limits of possible human social organization." Sociobiology Study
Group of Science for the People, Sociobiology-Another Biological Determinism, in THE
SOCIOBIOLOGY DEBATE, supra note 7, at 280, 290 [hereinafter Sociobiology Study Groupi.
Meaning, every attempted type of social organization succeeded? Responding to these
critics, Wilson states that his position is closer to the environmentalist pole, at which people
are infinitely malleable, than the genetic pole, at which they are completely fixed. See
Edward 0. Wilson, Academic Vigilantism and the Political Significance of Sociobiology, in THE
SOCIOBIOLOGY DEBATE, supra note 7, at 291, 292 [hereinafter Wilson, Academic Vigilantism].
On the other hand, evolutionary success does not imply moral superiority, or even
progress. Instead, evolution "branches all over the place, making it quite impossible to
offer true assessments of top and bottom, higher and lower, better and worse." M. Ruse,
Evolutionary Ethics: A Phoenix Arisen, in ISSUES IN EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS, supra note 5, at
225, 227; see STEPHEN JAY GOULD, FULL HOUSE 135-230 (1996); ERNST MAYR, THIS IS BIOLOGY
197-98 (1997).
77 KITCHER, supra note 13, at 417.
78 Ruse similarly identifies the sociobiological contribution to ethics: "What is really
important to the evolutionist's case is the claim that ethics is illusory inasmuch as it
persuades us that it has an objective reference. This is the crux of the biological position."
Ruse, supra note 76, at 235. For further elaboration, see RUSE, supra note 30, at 99-101. For
challenges to this position, see Chandler, supra note 56, at 164-69; Peter G. Woolcock, The
Case Against Evolutionary Ethics Today, in BIOLOGY AND THE FOUNDATION OF ETHICS, supra
note 4, at 276, 288-92.
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But it must be acknowledged that in a later book, On Human Nature,
Wilson slides onto thinner ice and creates a legitimate opening for critics.
He contends that once we understand "the very origin and meaning of
human values, from which all ethical pronouncements and much of
political practice flow," 79 then we must address: "Which of the censors
,and motivators should be obeyed and which ones might better be
curtailed or sublimated?" 80 At some point "we must consciously choose
among the alternative emotional guides we have inherited."
8 1
"Although human progress can be achieved by intuition and force of
will, only hard-won empirical knowledge of our biological nature will
allow us to make optimum choices among the competing criteria of
progress." 82
There is enough ambiguity in these last pronouncements to support
the criticism of unsympathetic readers that Wilson finds value in fact.
83
79 WILSON, supra note 52, at 5.
so Id. at 6.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 7. As noted by Kitcher, Wilson makes similar points at 196.
83 Rosenberg also finds that Wilson, in this chapter, rejects the naturalistic fallacy, along
with Alexander. See Alexander Rosenberg, The Biological Justification of Ethics: A Best-Case
Scenario, in ISSUES IN EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS, supra note 5, at 351, 354 (citing ALEXANDER,
supra note 1); see also MICHAEL RUSE, MONAD TO MAN 524 (1996) ("Wilson believes that one
can derive ethical norms from the history of life."). Elsewhere Wilson makes a similarly
confusing assertion while discussing the assistance that biological sciences can offer in
uncovering why we feel certain conduct is intrinsically correct or even why we have moral
feelings: "For now, though, the scientists can offer no guidance on whether we are really
correct in making certain decisions, because no way is known to define what is correct
without total reference to the moral feelings under scrutiny." PROMETHEAN FIRE, supra note
5, at 183 (first emphasis added). This seemingly implies that scientists may eventually offer
us guidance on correct moral decisions. But then the authors confound the point by
continuing: "Perhaps this is the ultimate burden of the free will bequeathed to us by our
genes: in the final analysis, even when we know what we are likely to do and why, each of
us must still choose." Id. Meaning, biological scientists cannot provide us with correct
moral standards, but only identify moral motivation? Or meaning, after scientists inform
us of correct moral decisions, we may nevertheless choose to make incorrect ones? This
latter interpretation still abridges the naturalistic fallacy. But perhaps Wilson has now
come to recognize the bite of the naturalistic fallacy: "There is a dangerous trap in
sociobiology, one that can be avoided only by constant vigilance. The trap is the
naturalistic fallacy of ethics, which uncritically concludes that what is, should be."
EDWARD 0. WILSON, IN SEARCH OF NATURE 93 (1996) [hereinafter WILSON, SEARCH]. "The
demonstration of any genetic bias cannot be used to justify a continuing practice in present
and future societies." Id. But, just as we can breathe easy that Wilson has seen the light, he
confuses matters by proceeding with the argument that, because we live in a "radically
new environment of our own making, the pursuit of such a practice would be bad biology;
and, like all bad biology, it would invite disaster." Id. Why doesn't he notice that the
practice may also be bad ethics as well as bad biology? Sober also finds in an article by
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Even on Wilson's own clear terms, we might ask why any of the
inherited emotional guides must be chosen? Perhaps none of them
"should be obeyed," having arisen through natural selection in
circumstances far different from those we find ourselves in now, and
thus having little current survival or reproductive value,84 let alone
independent normative value.85 Yet by this, Wilson might simply be
pointing out that going against naturally disposed moral feelings is
difficult. Some such feelings, therefore, should not be disobeyed even if
they are morally problematic, when the cost of overcoming them is high
in comparison to the positive normative consequences of succeeding.
For example, minimal disinterested altruism, as in the paradigmatic case
of easily saving a drowning baby,8 6 may be a worthy social aim, but the
costs and difficulties of legally implementing the aim may be too great in
light of the common belief, in America anyway, that the state should
avoid this type of interventionist regulation. Understanding the biology
Wilson and Ruse the suggestion that biology can offer moral guidance. See ELLIOTT SOBER,
Prospects for an Evolutionary Ethics, in FROM A BIOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW 93, 101-02 (1994)
(quoting Michael Ruse & Edward 0. Wilson, Moral Philosophy as Applied Science, 61
PHILOSOPHY 173, 174 (1986)). A recent commentator writes that Wilson, while originally
equivocating about the naturalistic fallacy, is now committed to recognizing it. See Ullica
Segerstr~le, Truth and Consequences in the Sociobiology Debate and Beyond, in 6 RESEARCH IN
BIOPOLITICS: SOCIOBIOLOGY AND POLITICS 249, 252-53, 263-66 (Albert Somit & Steven A.
Peterson eds., 1998) [hereinafter Segerstrhle, Truth and Consequences). As early as 1975,
Wilson clearly acknowledged the "trap" of the naturalistic fallacy. See SEGERSTRALE, supra
note 6, at 25 (quoting E.O. Wilson, Human Decency Is Animal, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 12,
1975, at 38, 50). But this acknowledgment, "just as in a good novel, ... was too late." Id.
For what drove Wilson to his position, see id. at 38-40.
84 Wilson states that precepts and religious faith have demonstrated their survival and
reproductive success after more than a thousand generations of those who conformed to
them. "There was more than enough time for epigenetic rules - hereditary biases of mental
development-to evolve that generate moral and religious sentiments. Indoctrinability
became an instinct." WILSON, CONSILIENCE, supra note 5, at 246-47 (1998); see WILSON, supra
note 52, at 169-93 (religion). Thus, "[eithical codes are precepts reached by consensus
under the guidance of the innate rules of mental development." WILSON, CONSILIENCE,
supra note 5, at 247; see infra note 88 (natural moral dispositions). They "are created from
the bottom up, from the people to their culture," and not top down. WILSON, CONSILIENCE,
supra note 5, at 247. Well, this all worked well enough to allow us to survive to here, but
will it work well enough to get us beyond here? And if the code that will best get us
further is fascistic, should we embrace it?
85 See the discussion of the "genetic" fallacy, infra note 100. One group of law and
biology scholars comes to the conclusion that "there was no reason why the biological
tendencies built into the species should necessarily be normatively privileged as a matter of
law. At most biology should be followed or accepted as a rebuttable presumption." Elliott,
supra note 7, at 606.
86 See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, The Moral and Legal Responsibility of the Bad Samaritan, in
FREEDOM AND FULFILLMENT 175, 176-77 (1992).
1152 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.38
of this human disposition, if any, will help clarify its strength and
perhaps suggest methods, and their costs, of curtailing or sublimating it
and others when deemed appropriate.87 But where the natural moral
feeling is entirely unacceptable (say, a disposition to aggress against
strangers, if such exists88), then it must be overcome, irrespective of the
price. Other normatively problematic dispositions, on the other hand,
can be curtailed or sublimated though environmental forces with
reasonable effort. Sociobiology helps us to calculate the costs and
benefits.89 Then we may make "optimum choices," incorporating costs,
benefits, and well-understood basic principles.9° And make them we
87 Bradie refers to this as the "engineering view" which "holds that the primary use of
biological information in the social sciences is as the empirical basis for altering human
social behavior." MICHAEL BRADIE, THE SECRET CHAIN: EVOLUTION AND ETHICS 117 (1994).
88 One ethologist "view[s] aggressive behavior as a fundamental characteristic of all
animal and human life, but ... also believe[s] that this trait cannot be understood in
isolation from the powerful checks and balances that evolved to mitigate its effects."
FRANS DE WAAL, PEACEMAKING AMONG PRIMATES 2 (1989). Among the evolutionary
benefits of aggressive behavior are: "co-opting the resources of others, defending oneself
and one's kin against attack, inflicting costs on intrasexual rivals, negotiating status and
power hierarchies, deterring rivals from future aggression, and deterring long-term mates
from infidelity or defection." Buss, PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 8, at 309. See generally id. at
278-311; DE WAAL, GOOD NATURED, supra note 7, at 182-86. Violence among humans, as
among animals who "ritualize" it, is regulated by rules, often unspoken. "In other words,
the rules of fighting are as natural as the fighting itself." ROBIN Fox, THE SEARCH FOR
SOCIETY 145 (1989). The sense of morality may have emerged to moderate aggression. See
Christopher Boehm, The Evolutionary Development of Morality as an Effect of Dominance
Behavior and Conflict Interference, in LAW, BIOLOGY AND CULTURE, supra note 42, at 134.
"And what is perhaps amazing about this violent species of ours is not that we kill so
many, but that, given our potential, we kill so few and so infrequently." FOX, supra, at 146;
see WILLIAM F. ALLMAN, THE STONE AGE PRESENT 141 (1994) ("The complex role that
aggression plays in primate life suggests that people are fundamentally neither aggressive
nor nice."). Compared to the other mammals that have been studied, the rate of murder by
humans is a fraction of a percentage of the killing of conspecifics by our nearest relatives.
See DENNETr, supra note 2, at 478 (citing George C. Williams, Huxley's Evolution and Ethics in
Sociobiological Perspective, 23 ZYGON 383 (1988)).
89 "Because the success of an ethical code depends on how wisely it interprets the moral
sentiments, those who frame it should know how the brain works, and how the mind
develops." WILSON, CONSILIENCE, supra note 5, at 240. For success, the framers must also
be able to predict "the consequence of particular actions as opposed to others, especially in
cases of moral ambiguity." Id. With this knowledge of human nature, "we should be able
to fashion a wiser and more enduring ethical consensus than has gone before." Id. So, with
knowledge of human biology, the propounders of a moral code will wisely interpret moral
sentiments, predict consequences, and fashion a more enduring ethical consensus, but will
the code be "right," or merely efficient or expedient? For more on the cost-benefit analysis
that evolutionary psychology may offer to those considering legal regulation of behavior,
see infra note 388 {Jones et all.
90 "By relying on moral intuition, on those satisfying visceral feelings of right and
wrong, people remain enslaved by their genes and culture." PROMETHEAN FIRE, supra note
2004] Evolution, Politics and Law 1153
can. For, as Wilson states, though "we are forced to choose among the
elements of human nature by reference to value systems which these
same elements created in an evolutionary age now long vanished.....
this circularity of the human predicament is not so tight that it cannot be
broken through an exercise of will."91
Kitcher is adept at finding other thin ice beneath his target, as where
Wilson states that "[in the beginning the new ethicists will want to
ponder the cardinal value of the survival of human genes in the form of a
common pool over generations." 92  From this and the following
statements, Kitcher understands Wilson to be claiming as a
"fundamental ethical principle" that "[h]uman beings should do
whatever may be required to ensure the survival of a common gene pool
for Homo sapiens."93 Kitcher finds this claim, which is in Wilson's view,
"entirely justified by certain facts about sexual reproduction," as
5, at 183. "Only by penetrating to the physical basis of moral thought and considering its
evolutionary meaning will people have the power to control their own lives. They will
then be in a better position to choose ethical precepts and the forms of social regulation
needed to maintain the precepts." Id. With this deepened knowledge of human nature,
some of the most self-destructive of human propensities, "aggression and xenophobia, can
be blunted. Other equally human propensities for altruism and cooperation might be
enhanced. The value of institutions and forms of government can be more accurately
judged, alternative procedures laid out, and steps cautiously suggested." Id. at 183-84.
"People who know human nature in this way are more likely to agree on universal goals
within the constraints of that nature and recognize absolute ethical truths, if such can be
shown to exist." Id. at 184. Concluding this book, the authors opine that societies "can
employ knowledge of the [epigenetic] rules to guide individual behavior and cultural
evolution to the ends on which their members may someday agree." Id. Lewontin attacks
Wilson's claim of universal xenophobia with examples of cultures that have embraced the
norms of other cultures. See R.C. LEWONTIN, BIOLOGY AS IDEOLOGY 91-92 (1991). In
attacking this example of Wilson's "determinism," he fails to note that Wilson speaks in
terms of universal propensities, finding room for cultural amelioration.
91 WILSON, HUMAN NATURE, supra note 52, at 196.
92 Id. at 196-97, quoted in KITCHER, supra note 13, at 427.
93 KITCHER, supra note 13, at 428. If this mandate is correct, so much for my system of
sacrifice for the sake of cockroaches and horseshoe crabs. Another group of commentators
also finds sociobiologists to be making a similar assertion. See R.C. Solomon et al., Group
Three [Reports on Group Discussions], in MORALITY AS A BIOLOGICAL PHENOMENON 253, 260
(Gunther S. Stent ed., rev. ed. 1980). "This argument, whose conclusion is sometimes
denied as soon as it appears ... nevertheless permeates the atmosphere in which
sociobiology is discussed." Id. Waddington falls within Wilson's camp. See C.H.
WADDINGTON, THE ETHICAL ANIMAL 7 (1960) ("[A]ny particular set of ethical beliefs... can
be meaningfully judged according to their efficacy in furthering th[e] general evolutionary
direction.").
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transgressing the naturalistic fallacy. 94 Kitcher notes that, although
Wilson is troubled by the specter of the naturalistic fallacy, he mollifies
this elsewhere by observations that, in recent years, the fallacy has lost
much of its bite. 95 But, as Kitcher correctly observes, this hardly satisfies
those who feel the bite, whether or not attenuated, nor, if the naturalistic
fallacy remains a fallacy, will factual assertions grounded in biology
alone give rise to normative conclusions without argument.96 More
tellingly, Kitcher continues with Kantian-based hypotheticals in which it
may be morally defensible to allow the gene pool to perish in light of
dire circumstances in which essential volunteers refuse to step forward. 97
Kantians would not use another person for their own means only, even if
the consequences are that the entire gene pool will vanish.98
Does Wilson indeed breach the naturalistic fallacy as Kitcher
contends? Well, perhaps, but the case is not as clear as Kitcher would
have it. In the pages of Wilson's piece cited by Kitcher for his
deprecation of Wilson's supposed naturalistic fallacy, Wilson does
contend that "[i]nnate moral imperatives exist in the form of learning
rules and the brain-reward system." 99 But by this, Wilson means, as
made clearer in his next paragraph, that humans innately feel these
imperatives, not that they obtain them as a matter of pure moral or other
logic.100 Wilson goes on to acknowledge that "[it is probable that the
94 KITCHER, supra note 13, at 428. The cockroaches and horseshoe crabs hope Kitcher is
correct.
95 Id. at 429 (quoting Edward 0. Wilson, The Relation of Science to Theology, 15 ZYGON 425,
431 (1980); E.O. Wilson, Comparative Social Theory, in I THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN
VALUES 49, 68-69 (Sterling M. McMurrin ed., 1980) [hereinafter Wilson, Social Theory]).
96 See id. at 429-30.
9 See id. at 430-31. One of his hypotheticals is where, after a world-wide holocaust
leaving few women, they refuse to bear children in light of humanity's recent history.
98 See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 100 (John Ladd
trans., 1965) (1797) ("If legal justice perishes, then it is no longer worth while for men to
remain alive on this earth.").
99 Wilson, Social Theory, supra note 95, at 68.
100 This distinction between fact and belief is made clear(er) elsewhere where Wilson and
Ruse assert that "[miorality, or more strictly our belief in morality, is merely an adaptation
put in place to further our reproductive ends." Ruse & Wilson, supra note 62, at 51. To this
comment Dennett responds: "Nonsense." DENNETT, supra note 2, at 470. Perhaps our
reproductive ends allowed our lineage to evolve into humans, and they may remain
powerful influences on our reasoning still, but since then culture has become a part of our
being, new values may have arisen independently of gene-derived, or gene-centered, ones.
"It does not follow from the fact that our reproductive ends were the ultimate historical
source of our present values, that they are the ultimate (and still principal) beneficiary of our
ethical actions." Id. To believe otherwise is to commit the "genetic" fallacy identified by
Nietzsche (and Darwin). See id.
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imperatives were more nearly fully adaptive for the hunter-gatherer
societies that lived during the major era of genetic evolution." 101 Hence,
"[m]ost modem difficulties arose from the attempt to solve
unprecedented [moral] problems with a Pleistocene apparatus." 10 2 Can,
then, we still depend on the innate moral imperatives adaptive to a
prehistoric age? No, according to Wilson: "innate ethical feelings do not
automatically constitute good impulses."103 Not only might moral
impulses be maladaptive in today's world, but also we have the ability to
reject all moral criteria based on genetic fitness.1 4 "To do so would be to
recognize implicitly that what is, in this case the biologically analyzable
innate ethical precepts, need not be translated into a proposition of what
ought to be." l05 But then, not quite willing to evict natural dispositions
from our moral realm, Wilson expresses doubt that we will reject our
Again, in a recent book, Wilson seems to make the same argument in an ambiguous
manner. He begins by contending that "the naturalistic fallacy is itself a fallacy. For if
ought is not is, what is? To translate is into ought makes sense if we attend to the objective
meaning of ethical precepts." WILSON, CONSILIENCE, supra note 5, at 249-50. Rather than
being "ethereal messages outside humanity, ... [tihey are more likely to be physical
products of the brain and culture." Id. at 250. "Precepts are the extreme in a scale of
agreements that range from casual assent to public sentiment to law to that part of the
canon considered unalterable and sacred." Id. Hence, "[tihe general empiricist principle
takes this form: Strong innate feeling and historical experience cause certain actions to be
preferred; we have experienced them, and weighed their consequences, and agree to conform with
codes that express them." Id. at 251. Yet, as close as this conservative, Burkean argument
comes to the naturalistic fallacy, at the last moment Wilson pulls away:
The empiricist view concedes that moral codes are devised to conform
to some drives of human nature and to suppress others. Ought is not
the translation of human nature but of the public will, which can be
made increasingly wise and stable through the understanding of the
needs and pitfalls of human nature. It recognizes that the strength of
commitment can wane as a result of new knowledge and experience,
with the result that certain rules may be desacralized, old laws
rescinded, and behavior that was once prohibited freed. It also
recognizes that for the same reason new moral codes may need to be
devised, with the potential in time of being made sacred.
Id. As much as is drives our understanding and dispositions regarding ought, in the end we
are free to make independent moral choices. And, at times, we should. For other efforts to
overcome the hurdles to developing an evolutionary ethics, see ARNHART, supra note 42;
BRADIE, supra note 87. See generally EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS, supra note 44; ISSUES IN
EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS, supra note 5.
11 Wilson, Social Theory, supra note 95, at 68.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 See id.
105 Id.
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innate moral precepts because "[tihey are the essence of humanity." 10 6
(And, we might note, the essence of our "inhumanity," as Wilson
indicates just before in mentioning our dangerous "proneness toward
ethnocentricity, xenophobia, territoriality, moralistic aggression, and
unfettered reproduction." 107) Striking middle ground by means of
lyrical expression, Wilson concludes that our innate ethical feelings
106 Id. This seems to portray nature's leash as weaker than had been depicted by Wilson
two years earlier. Then, while acknowledging that moral principles "can at least in theory
be non-Darwinian," he doubts that cultural evolution will overcome the insistencies of
genetic evolution. WILSON, supra note 52, at 167. "The genes hold culture on a leash....
Human behavior-like the deepest capacities for emotional response which drive and
guide it-is the circuitous technique by which human genetic material has been and will be
kept intact. Morality has no other demonstrable ultimate function." Id. Ayala takes
Wilson to task for this last sentence, finding, as does Kitcher, that Wilson possibly sees the
function of moral codes as preserving human genes, which entails the naturalistic fallacy.
See Ayala, supra note 33, at 309. Dennett also chimes in with the observation that "[tihere is
no reason to think, however, that evolutionary biology shows us that our genes are
powerful enough, and insightful enough, to keep us from making policies quite antithetical
to their interests." DENNETT, supra note 2, at 471. Perhaps Wilson is claiming that,
factually, there is no other possible ultimate function for a moral code, that as a matter of
fact humans cannot realistically adopt a moral code that does not aim to preserve human
genes. Cf. Ayala, supra note 33, at 309 ("It is possible that Wilson is simply giving the
reason why ethical behavior exists at all; his proposition would be that humans are
prompted to evaluate morally their actions as a means to preserve their genes, their
biological nature."). To this we respond, let's see. The Shakers evidence the contrary. See
infra note 123. Perhaps Wilson undermines here his claim to have respected, even
reluctantly, the naturalistic fallacy,
107 Wilson, Social Theory, supra note 95, at 68. "Territorial expansion and defense by tribes
and their modern equivalents the nation states is a cultural universal." WILSON,
CONSILIENCE, supra note 5, at 170 (emphasis omitted). But "[bliologists have determined
that territoriality is not unavoidable during social evolution. It is apparently entirely
absent in many animal species. The territorial instinct arises during evolution when some
vital resource serves as a 'density-dependent factor.'" Id. "Humanity is decidedly a
territorial species." Id. at 171. Indeed, "[tihe dark side to the inborn propensity to moral
behavior is xenophobia." Id. at 253. "People give trust to strangers with effort, and true
compassion is a commodity in chronically short supply." Id. The strategy of cooperating
with a member of one's own group and not cooperating with members of other groups
appears to be "evolutionarily stable," that is, beneficial to those who adopt the strategy
once the pattern is established. See ALLMAN, supra note 88, at 249-52; W.D. HAMILTON,
Innate Social Aptitudes of Man: An Approach from Evolutionary Genetics, in NARROW ROADS OF
GENE LAND 329, 330 (1996) (" [lt is suggested that the ease and accuracy with which an idea
like xenophobia strikes the next replica of itself on the template of human memory may
depend on the preparation made for it there by selection -selection acting, ultimately, at
the level of replicating molecules."); DEL THIESSEN, BITTERSWEET DESTINY 296 (1996) ("The
common evolutionary adaptations of strong kinship ties were nepotism, ethnocentrism,
tribalism, social bonding, obedience to authority, nationalism, patriotism, territorially [sic],
enemy thinking, xenophobia, jingoism, and reciprocal social exchange. We carry these
traits with us to the market every day."). For more on Wilson's view of human
territoriality and tribalism, see WILSON, supra note 23, at 564-65.
2004] Evolution, Politics and Law 1157
"have to be played somewhat like a musical instrument, with some parts
stressed to produce results of great beauty and pleasure (by terms of the
human limbic system) and other parts sublimated or averted."'08
Ignoring these feelings will, in words quoted and chided by Kitcher,
"produce an ultimate dissatisfaction of the spirit and eventually social
instability and massive losses in genetic fitness." 1°9 Is this an argument
of a person who believes value can be determined by fact alone? Or is
this an argument of a person who believes that value choices must weigh
heavily the factual consequences, some of which spring from natural
moral feelings? Kitcher believes the former. Wilson's language is quite
consistent with the latter. 10 By my reading, contrary to Kitcher's
understanding, Wilson does not claim as a "fundamental ethical
principle" that "[hluman beings should do whatever may be required to
ensure the survival of a common gene pool for Hono sapiens.""'
Humans may feel the impulse to follow this principle, but it may not be
morally proper in particular, peculiar circumstances. This would seem
to be especially true for Wilson, who is a champion of biological
diversity,1 2 when the interests of the human gene pool conflict with
other gene pools. In any case, I, no doubt like Kitcher, am left with the
impression that Wilson might prefer the dissolution of the naturalistic
fallacy, but nevertheless he gives it lip service and, most importantly,
ultimately acknowledges its bite.
Finally, Kitcher admonishes Wilson and other sociobiologists for
their failure to confront the "central task for any system of ethics [which]
is the construction of the impartial perspective."1 3 The foundational,
108 Wilson, Social Theony, supra note 95, at 68-69.
109 Id. at 69, quoted in KITCHER, supra note 13, at 429. In my view, this is not a bad
prediction of what will ensue when we commit our lives and welfare to the cockroaches
and horseshoe crabs, unless, perhaps, we are in the thralls of some weird cult.
110 See Wilson, Social Theony, supra note 95, at 431 ("[A] scientific analysis of human nature
appears to be the only rational way to make a cost-benefit analysis of social change.").
111 KITCHER, supra note 13, at 428. Mayr and Julian Huxley may subscribe to the
principle. See MAYR, supra note 76, at 269 (endorsing Huxley's "evolutionary humanism":
"our most basic ethical principle should be to do everything toward enhancing the future
of mankind"). If so, so much for the system of self-sacrifice for the sake of cockroaches and
horseshoe crabs.
112 See, e.g., EDWARD 0. WILSON, BIOPHILIA (1984); EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF
LIFE (1992).
113 KITCHER, supra note 13, at 433. This assumes that an impartial perspective is possible.
The non-cognitivists deny that it is. See, e.g., RICHARD B. BRANDT, ETHICAL THEORY 203-41
(1959). One of the leading Darwinian philosophers, Michael Ruse (a professor of
philosophy and zoology), endorses a non-cognitivist "ethical scepticism." See MICHAEL
RUSE, Evolution and Ethics, in EVOLUTIONARY NATURALISM, supra note 3, at 223, 249. "A
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undefended propositions of moral philosophers, such as those of Rawls
and Nozick, lead to conflicting normative systems. This, Kitcher
suggests, must be addressed by sociobiologists, who have not done so.
Rawls has constructed his famous framework of resolving moral
conflicts in the original position behind the veil of ignorance." 4 "[Elven
if we were to suppose that pop sociobiologists have fathomed all the
hypothalamic imperatives, the problem Rawls addresses would remain
untouched."1 15 Despite "Wilson's biologicization," issues loom: "Can
we find a set of reasons that are valid for all parties in a clash of
interests? If so, how do we specify such reasons? Has Rawls succeeded
in giving a method for discovering the reasons?"11 6 For resolving
apparent conflicts of interest, Kitcher dismisses sociobiology as having
"nothing to offer." "There is no higher standpoint than the dictates of
the hypothalamus. There is no impartial perspective." 117
Kitcher is harking back to his third possible task for the
biologicization of ethics: "Evolutionary biology can explain what ethics
is all about and can settle traditional questions about the objectivity of
ethics. In short, evolutionary theory is the key to meta-ethics."" 8 Again,
sociobiology may not be "the key to meta-ethics," but it seems to be
useful in addressing questions of the objectivity of ethics, perhaps in
ways that Wilson, insofar as he is a libertarian," 9 would not find
satisfying. If the basic, undefended propositions of moral philosophers
spring from their limbic systems pursuant to natural impulses honed
during the stone age, then this would say something about the likelihood
of the proposition being the product of objective, disinterested
evaluation. The selfish gene tends to encourage the selfish individual
(beyond the reproductive benefits of kin selection and reciprocal
altruism), and thus one would expect the limbic moral impulses to reflect
this selfishness. But the advancement of a moral system constructed on
selfish impulse smacks of limbic special pleading. And it appears to be
major attraction to my position in my eyes is that one simply cannot be guilty of
committing the naturalistic fallacy or violating the is/ought barrier, because one is simply
not in the justification business at all." Id. at 249. "[Nlormative ethics is a biological
adaptation, and I would argue that as such it can be seen to have no being or reality
beyond this." Id. For a defense, see id. at 250-56.
114 See RAWLS, supra note 64, at 118-92.
115 KITCHER, supra note 13, at 433.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 434.
118 Id. at 418.
119 See infra note 258.
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the special pleading of a limbic system formed in prehistoric
circumstances substantially different from those of today. Not only does
this make us wary of the supposed disinterestedness of the impulse, 120
but its consequences may even be counterproductive in modern times on
its own terms since the qualities advantageous to reproduction have
changed significantly. This is not to say that these selfish impulses
necessarily lead to a moral system that is wrong or indefensible on fully
objective grounds, 121 but simply that one should be skeptical in light of
their probable self-serving origin. To the extent they are grounded on
leaps of faith that are not, or are less, selfish,122 egalitarian or
120 In Gould's words, "I like to apply a somewhat cynical rule of thumb in judging
arguments about nature that also have overt social implications: When such claims imbue
nature with just those properties that make us feel good or fuel our prejudices, be doubly
suspicious." GOULD, Kropotkin Was No Crackpot, in BULLY FOR BRONTOSAURUS, supra note
18, at 325, 338-39. Then, addressing the side of the coin that Gould himself would favor, he
writes that he is "especially wary of arguments that find kindness, mutuality, synergism,
harmony -the very elements that we strive mightily, and so often unsuccessfully, to put
into our own lives -intrinsically in nature." Id. at 339.
121 For example, Alexander, another Darwinian who is not hesitant to enter the moral
arena, contends "that morality need not be contrary to natural selection or inconsistent
with it but ... may instead be a logical outgrowth or extension of the practice of social
reciprocity by a complexly social organism which changes as a result of both genetic
evolution and cumulative social leaning." R.D. Alexander, A Biological Interpretation of
Moral Systems, in ISSUES IN EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS, supra note 5, at 179, 182 (emphasis
omitted).
122 Even Rawls's welfare-state liberal edifice is constructed on the choices of persons
behind the veil of ignorance who make, as Rawls sees it, a self-interested decision. See
RAWLS, supra note 64, at 142 ("I have assumed throughout that the persons in the original
position are rational. In choosing between principles each tries as best he can to advance
his interests."). Michael Ruse sees this grounding as "mesh[ing] with the evolutionary
approach." Ruse, supra note 76, at 232. But, according to Ruse, the Darwinian can take the
next step by "linking the principles of justice to our biological past, via the epigenetic rules.
This is a great bonus, for Rawls himself admits that his own analysis is restricted to the
conceptual level. He leaves unanswered major questions about origins." Id. Yet when
pondering the psychological principles Rawls assumes to be true, he queries the origin of
the underlying human nature: "The theory of evolution would suggest that it is the
outcome of natural selection; the capacity for a sense of justice and the moral feelings is an
adaptation of mankind to its place in nature." RAWLS, supra note 64, at 503, quoted in Ruse,
supra note 76, at 233, and Michael Ruse, The New Evolutionary Ethics, in EVOLUTIONARY
ETHICS, supra note 44, at 133, 149 [hereinafter Ruse, New Ethics]. The adaptation may
precede mankind. See JANE GOODALL, IN THE SHADOW OF MAN 201-02 (1971) (suggesting
chimpanzees may have a sense of justice); Frans B.M. de Waal, The Chimpanzee's Sense of
Social Regularity and Its Relation to the Human Sense of Justice, in THE SENSE OF JUSTICE, supra
note 36, at 241 (ditto). But cf. Daniel J. Povinelli & Laurie R. Godfrey, The Chimpanzee's
Mind: How Noble in Reason? How Absent of Ethics?, in EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS, supra note 44,
at 277 (finding that chimpanzees possess only some of the abilities that, among humans,
emerged into ethical systems).
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communitarian normative systems are worthy of diminished skepticism
regarding the degree of their disinterested objectivity. Sociobiology may
provide a basis for presumptions in demonstrating the validity of
normative systems.123 This is still far from the key to meta-ethics, but it
argues that evolutionary biology "can [helpi settle traditional questions
about the objectivity of ethics." 124
123 Ruse finds that Darwinism leaves no place for objectivity in ethics: "The
evolutionist's claim .... [is that] morality has objective reference even though it does not.
Because of this, a causal analysis of the type offered by the evolutionist is appropriate and
adequate, whereas a justification of moral claims in terms of reasoned foundations is
neither needed nor appropriate." Ruse, supra note 76, at 236. First, Ruse seems to bridge
the fact-value chasm. He later clarifies his position and concludes "that our morality is a
function of our actual human nature and that it cannot be divorced from the contingencies
of our evolution. Morality, as we know it, cannot have the necessity or objectivity sought
by the Kantian and Rawlsian." Id. at 245. Yes, morality should not ignore the fact that
humans eat animal and vegetable matter, but it does not follow from this alone that all
humans must have the right to eat these nutrients at all. This must be argued. Those who
believe in strong animal rights, ethnic cleansing, and capital punishment, for example,
subscribe to a morality that limits the right of all to eat. Furthermore, evolution has also
contingently led to a human nature that is undoubtedly immoral in part, as in aspects of
our aggressive and violent impulses. A moral system must separate out acceptable from
unacceptable impulses. See R.J. Richards, A Defense of Evolutionary Ethics, in ISSUES IN
EVOLUTIONARY ETHIcS, supra note 5, at 249, 260. Second, to the lament of cockroaches and
horseshoe crabs everywhere, Ruse leaves no room for a moral system that is demonstrably
contrary to the self-interest of one's genes. One wonders where this leaves the Shakers
who subscribed to a belief system that included total celibacy, a genetic dead-end, or the
Hutterites who embrace beliefs of extreme selflessness, including the scorning of nepotism
and reciprocity. See DENNET, supra note 2, at 473-75 (discussing the "drastically
oversimplified" ethics of the Hutterites). Genes may create a moral leash, but it is
breakable. See Ayala, supra note 33, at 302 (Because "[tihe norms of morality must be
consistent with biological nature, .... accepted norms of morality will often promote
behaviors which increase the biological adaptation of those who behave according to them.
But this is neither necessary nor indeed always the case."). Ruse even has trouble with
moral obligations to unrelated humans outside the likely, narrow reach of reciprocal
altruism. See Ruse, supra note 76, at 239-40. Third, detecting neither a need nor aptness for
reasoned moral foundations, Ruse's claim verges into genetic determinism inasmuch as he
believes humans cannot embrace a disinterested morality. But then Ruse finds a place for
the belief in objectivity: "Furthermore, completing the case, the evolutionist points out that
there are good (biological) reasons why it is part of our nature to objectify morality. If we
did not regard it as binding, we would ignore it." Id. at 236; see also Ruse, New Ethics, supra
note 122, at 152 ("The simple fact is that if we recognized morality to be no more than an
epiphenomenon of our biology, we would cease to believe in it and stop acting upon it.").
Ah, now we are getting somewhere. But I wonder if this is true of ethical relativists once
they "see" the relativity of ethics.
124 Bradie concludes his study of biology and ethics with a similar conclusion. See
BRADIE, supra note 87, at 147 (Though "evolutionary considerations alone are not capable of
generating a foundation for ethical theory ... , a Darwinian perspective on ethics and
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Let us reconnoiter where Wilson stands against Kitcher's claim of
Wilson's indiscretions, the overexuberance of his "intellectual
hobbyhorses," his "idiefixe."125 First, let us review Kitcher's criticism of
Wilson's attempt "to explain ethics and ethical philosophers, if not
epistemology and epistemologists, at all depths."126 Insofar as normative
inquiry does require a "leap of faith," and insofar as cognition does turn
on the evolved brain and human nature,127 then sociobiology may well
explain "ethical philosophers, if not epistemology and epistemologists"
at great depth, if not "at all depths." Even ethics would be explained at
some depth, at least the depth of possibilities (A) and (B) above, and
perhaps even into the level of possibility (C). That is, despite Kitcher's
doubts, "evolutionary biology ... can [help] settle traditional questions
about the objectivity of ethics." If we felt generous to Wilson, 128
forgiving him his enthusiasm in expounding an emerging magnifying
glass for moral inquiry, we may even write off his perceived
overstatements as examples of the misfirings common during a new
discipline's "heroic" or "romantic" period.129 Frankly, I personally find
ethical theory is capable of generating potentially deep insights into the nature of our moral
practices and the formulation of our moral beliefs and principles.").
125 KITCHER, supra note 13, at 417.
126 Id. (quoting WILSON, supra note 23, at 3) (emphasis added). Unrepentant, Wilson
recently wrote that "Imoral reasoning, I believe, is at every level intrinsically consilient
with the natural sciences." WILSON, CONSILIENCE, supra note 5, at 238 (distinguishing
transcendentalists, who believe to the contrary, from empiricists).
127 That cognition does depend on the evolved brain and human nature, see generally
GERALD M. EDELMAN, NEURAL DARWINISM (1987); PINKER, supra note 6, at 59-148.
128 As in the nature-nurture debate taken up next, the protagonists have been far from
generous to one another, though my own view based on reading the literature is that the
critics have been far less generous. Regarding the nature-nurture controversy, one
commentator finds that if you look closely at what the opponents are accused of saying in
this debate, "you may be quite startled by the extent of misquoting, quoting out of context,
looking for the worst interpretation of what is said, and flagrant misrepresentation that
goes on." MATr RIDLEY, NATURE VIA NURTURE 95 (2003) (quoting JANET RADCLIFFE-
RICHARDS, HUMAN NATURE AFTER DARWIN (2000)).
129 Wilson describes this period "experienced by every successful scientific discipline
during its youth. For a relatively brief interval, usually a decade or two, rarely more than
half a century, researchers are intoxicated with a mix of the newly discovered and the
imaginable unknown." WILSON, CONSILIENCE, supra note 5, at 99. "The pioneers are
paradigm hunters. They are risk takers, who compete with rival theorists for big stakes
and are willing to endure painful shake-outs." Id. at 100. The modem synthesis of
evolutionary biology has recently experienced its heroic period. Id. Even Ruse, "a friendly
observer of Wilson's work," and proud of it, admits Wilson's speculations outrun the hard
data, but notes that Wilson subscribes "to a philosophy of scientific research that puts a
premium on bold conjectures." RUSE, supra note 3, at 213; see RUSE, supra note 8, at 184-87
(discussing Wilson's scientific values and how they differ from Lewontin's). Less friendly
critics have also noted Wilson's speculative leaps. See, e.g., Elizabeth Allen et al., Against
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aspects of Wilson's normative inquiry to be unpalatable: his insufficient
obeisance to the naturalistic fallacy, his moral relativism, his existential
angst,130 and his postmodernist over-discounting of reason. But how
many approaches to moral philosophy, even during their mature
periods, are beyond criticism, even withering attacks? Have any
impenetrable normative fortresses been formulated by the critics of
sociobiology, or for that matter, anyone else? 131 Wilson's own limbic
system may interfere with his "objective" analyses and valuations (as
with Kitcher and with me), but he brings much to the table that is
"Sociobiology," in THE SOCIOBIOLOGY DEBATE, supra note 7, at 259, 261-64; Sociobiology
Study Group, supra note 76, at 285-86. Nevertheless, the mistakes of exuberance are not to
be entirely regretted. "[T]he understandable propensity of researchers with new ideas to
claim too much for them is, for all the controversy generated thereby, an encouragement to
their correction by further research." W.G. Runcifman, Introduction to EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL
BEHAVIOUR PATTERNS IN PRIMATES AND MAN, supra note 33, at 1, 2. Gould agrees: "'Give
me a fruitful error any time, full of seeds, bursting with its own corrections. You can keep
your sterile truth for yourself' (Pareto's comment on Kepler)." STEPHEN JAY GOULD,
Hutton's Purpose, in HEN'S TEETH AND HORSE'S TOES, supra note 14, at 79, 83. Indeed, Mayr
criticizes Gould's initial overexuberance over his theory of punctuated equilibrium, noting
his later moderation and justification on grounds of fruitfulness. See ERNST MAYR,
Speciational Evolution Through Punctuated Equilibria, in TOWARDS A NEW PHILOSOPHY OF
BIOLOGY 457-88 (1988); Stephen J. Gould, Punctuated Equilibrium in Fact and Theory, 1
SKEPTIC 48, 58 (1992) ("Fruitfulness in research, with results both pro and contra, has
provided our greatest satisfaction with punctuated equilibrium."). The science having
developed since Wilson's seminal book of 1975, sociobiologists' "testable scientific beliefs
about human nature have changed and been considerably refined since Wilson's book
came out." ANDREW BROWN, THE DARWIN WARS 57 (1999). But even though there has
been "the emergence and triumph of a refined and purified sociobiology.... some of
[Gould's] criticisms of Wilson's original Sociobiology are now accepted even by its
sympathisers." Id. at 148.
As an example of overexuberant neglect of the naturalistic fallacy, Buss argues that,
although society may object to promiscuity from a moral point of view, "[fqrom a scientific
point of view, however, taking the long view over evolutionary time, there is no moral
justification for placing a premium on a single strategy within the collective human
repertoire. Our human nature is found in the diversity of our sexual strategies." BUSS,
DESIRE, supra note 8, at 216. Even a sophisticated philosopher of biology, such as Hull, can
slip: "Why cannot people who are essentially different nevertheless have the same rights?
Until this question is answered, I remain suspicious of continued claims about the existence
and importance of human nature." David L. Hull, On Human Nature, in THE PHILOSOPHY
OF BIOLOGY, supra note 34, at 383, 396.
130 Wilson ends his most famous book with a quote from Camus that includes: "In a
universe divested of illusions and lights, man feels an alien, a stranger." WILSON, supra
note 23, at 575 (citing ALBERT CAMUS, THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS (1955)). Ruse also objects to
Wilson's "Spencerian progressiveness." See RUSE, supra note 30, at 96-99.
131 As Hull puts it, "[a]lthough I feel uneasy about founding something as important as
ethics and morality on evolutionary contingencies, I must admit that none of the other
foundations suggested for morality provides much in the way of a legitimate sense of
security either." Hull, supra note 129, at 396.
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worthy of digestion and assimilation for the discerning consumer.
Kitcher's criticisms notwithstanding, Wilson propounds a powerful tool
for the understanding of the human condition. While sociobiology needs
much refinement, an appreciation of human nature, including moral
impulses, is an essential requisite for effectively, justly regulating society
and increasing personal flourishing.
B. Biological Determinism
Critics commonly complain that sociobiology implies biological
determinism. 132  When addressed to the current generation of
evolutionary psychologists, this complaint, taken at face value, is
gratuitous. 33 While occasionally one may use deterministic language
132 "The most common charge against human sociobiology is that it is an exercise in
biological or genetic 'determinism.' It is not always made crystal clear what exactly this
means, but whatever it is, it is not a good thing." RUSE, supra note 113, at 252 (citation
omitted); see, e.g., LEWONTIN, GENES, supra note 11, at 5-6, 17-36, 257; LEWONTIN, supra note
90, at 15-16, 23, 26, 87; DOROTHY NELKIN & LAURENCE TANCREDI, DANGEROUS DIAGNOSTICS
10-15 (1989); ROSE, supra note 11, at 5-7; Richard M. Burian, A Methodological Critique of
Sociobiology, in THE SOCIOBIOLOGY DEBATE, supra note 7, at 376, 377; Sociobiology Study
Group, supra note 76, at 280. For a discussion of the various relevant meanings of
determinism, see ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 98-103.
133 Lewontin, Rose, and Kamin use as their prime examples of strongly deterministic
sociobiologists Sir Francis Galton, a contemporary eugenicist cousin of Darwin, Konrad
Lorenz during the Nazi regime, and, in more recent times, Arthur Jensen and Richard
Herrnstein. See LEWONTIN, GENES, supra note 11, at 30, 69. While these authors find the
modem works of Wilson and Richard Dawkins to be "biologically determinist writings,"
see id. at 59, my readings of the cited books uncovered careful acknowledgments of the
substantial role of nurture in forming individual character. See, e.g., DAWKINS, SELFISH
GENE, supra note 22, at 331-32; WILSON, supra note 52, at 53-70. Even Herrnstein, in his
(rightfully) most controversial book with Murray, stresses the role of nurture in intelligence
differences. See RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE 311 (1994).
Wilson responds to the critics by claiming "[tihey misunderstand gene-culture coevolution,
confusing it with rigid genetic determinism, the discredited idea that genes dictate
particular forms of culture." WILSON, CONSILIENCE, supra note 5, at 166. "Genes do not
specify elaborate conventions .... Instead, complexes of gene-based epigenetic rules
predispose people to invent and adopt such conventions. If the epigenetic rules are
powerful enough, they cause the behaviors they affect to evolve convergently across a great
many societies." Id. at 166-67. These conventions are then known as cultural universals.
See id. Still, even a sympathetic commentator such as Ruse dissociates himself from "the
fairly deterministic view of human nature favoured by Wilson and Lumsden." MICHAEL
RUSE, The View from Somewhere, in EVOLUTIONARY NATURALISM, supra note 3, at 154, 159.
For support of Ruse's interpretation, see infra note 171. Still, "there is little evidence that
Wilson advocated any such total biological determinism." ROSE, supra note 6, at 169. 1
decline to defend Jensen. See WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 183-87 (the Jensen "furor").
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when making various points by means of unqualified language, 134 just as
many writers occasionally overgeneralize to avoid the infelicities of
appending extended qualifications, no mainstream Darwinist believes
that genes alone determine behavior, or rather, determine behavior
interesting to normative or legal issues,1 35 including any natural
disposition to behave morally.136  Evolutionary psychologists deny
genetic determinism and assert that environment substantially
134 See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 100; Wilson & Kniffin, supra note 33, at 292
("Assuming genetic determinism allows behavioral evolution to be explored without
worrying about the messy proximate mechanisms that actually separate genes from
behavior."). For example, Montagu calls Wilson to task for writing: "The question of
interest is no longer whether human social behavior is genetically determined; it is to what
extent." WILSON, supra note 52, at 19, quoted in Ashley Montagu, Introduction to
SOCIOBIOLOGY EXAMINED 3, 9 (Ashley Montagu ed., 1980). But even here Wilson is not
speaking of "determinism" in a strong sense, for otherwise there is no need to question "to
what extent." For a discussion of the unqualified statements, or metaphors, that subject
Richard Dawkins to the claim of determinist, see BROWN, supra note 129, at 34-44.
135 See WILSON, CONSILIENCE, supra note 5, at 188 (Insofar as genetic determinism is "the
belief that human behavior is fixed in the genes, and that its most destructive properties,
such as racism, war, and class division, are consequently inevitable .... I have never met a
biologist who believes in genetic determinism."); John Alcock, Unpunctuated Equilibrium in
the Natural History Essays of Stephen Jay Gould, 19 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 321, 324
(1998) ("The extreme determinist position assigned by debater [Stephen Jay] Gould to
sociobiologists and E.O. Wilson is embraced by no thinker, to the best of my knowledge.").
Alcock believes this claim of determinism is a polemical strawman. See id. Some behavior
may indeed be more influenced by genes than others, such as the basic instincts of fight,
flight, feeding, and reproduction. But these impulses usually have little to do with the
difficult normative questions. Where they do come to the forefront, as where a thief
defends her theft of food on the grounds that she was starving to death, or a rapist
advances the natural desire to leave offspring, the law has revealed few compunctions
about passing condemnatory judgment. Kitcher, one of the strongest critics, acknowledges
the public disavowal of genetic determinism by virtually all biologists, but worries about
the consequences of "genetalk" that uses the "convenient shorthand" of referring, in
deterministic language, to genes for particular characteristics or behavior. See PHILIP
KITCHER, THE LIVES TO COME 239-40, 245-49, 268-69 (1996). -
136 See MAYR, supra note 5, at 156-57 ("Undoubtedly, a genetic propensity for accepting
and maintaining such [legal and religious] cultural prescriptions is favored by selection,
but the contents of the ethical repertory are acquired in the individual's lifetime and are not
fixed genetically.") (citing WADDINGTON, supra note 93); Wynne-Edwards, supra note 44, at
105 (noting that a genetically disposed ingredient of moral persuasion "is conscience, the
alter ego which resides in us and constrains us to do what is right in conformity with moral
law"). De Waal posits the process of coming to individual moral outlooks: "Human
morality shares with language that it is far too complex to be learned through trial and
error, and far too variable to be genetically programmed." DE WAAL, GOOD NATURED,
supra note 7, at 36. "Possibly we are born, not with any specific social norms, but with a
learning agenda that tells us which information to imbibe and how to organize it. We
could then figure out, understand, and eventually internalize the moral fabric of our native
society." Id.
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influences conduct,13 7 just as credible critics acknowledge that behavior
reflects both nature and nurture. 138 Genes may dispose people to certain
137 For example, Buss insists that the deterministic implication that behavior is
"immutable, intractable, and unchangeable" is based on a mistaken belief that "divides
human behavior into two separate categories, one biologically determined and the other
environmentally determined. In fact, human action is inexorably a product of both." BUSS,
DESIRE, supra note 8, at 17. Stewart and Cohen assert that the claim of genetic determinism
"stems from a grievous misunderstanding of human development. The genome is more a
recipe than a blueprint, and the ingredients and the skill of the cook are at least as
important." IAN STEWART & JACK COHEN, FIGMENTS OF REALITY 229 (1997). In light of this,
Alexander points out that the unforeseeability of environmental influences and their
effects, as well as the feed-back effects from human cognition and self-reflection, are
enough to make behavior effectively unpredictable. ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 276-77.
Dawkins, presuming to speak for Wilson as well, rebuts critics by pointing out that "it is
perfectly possible to hold that genes exert a statistical influence on human behaviour while
at the same time believing that this influence can be modified, overridden or reversed by
other influences." DAWKINS, SELFISH GENE, supra note 22, at 331. Let us allow Wilson to
speak for himself in positing a role in moral reasoning for genes, culture, and self-conscious
decision: "[Mioral reasoning is based on the epigenetic rules that channel the development
of the mind.... But the rules only bias development; they do not determine ethical
precepts or the necessary decisions in a fixed manner." PROMETHEAN FIRE, supra note 5, at
179. For more detail, see id. at 179-82. See WILSON, SEARCH, supra note 83, at 88-94. While
Dawkins is optimistic about freewill, see DAWKINS, SELFISH GENE, supra note 22, at 201 ("We
are built as gene machines and cultured as meme machines, but we have the power to turn
against our creators. We, alone on earth, can rebel against the tyranny of the selfish
replicators."), Mackie questions the optimism by pointing out various hurdles, see J.L.
Mackie, The Lawv of the Jungle: Vtral-Alternatives and Principles of Evolution, in ISSUES IN
EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS, supra note 5, at 165, 176-77. But the claims of determinism cannot
be entirely dismissed: "Natural selection tends to make the members of a species alike in
their adaptive traits, because whichever version of a trait is better than the others will be
selected and the alternative versions will die out." PINKER, supra note 11, at 260. "That is
why most evolutionary psychologists attribute systematic differences among people to
their environments and attribute only random differences to the genes." Id.
138 See, e.g., STEPHEN JAY GOULD, A Hearing for Vavilov, in HEN'S TEETH AND HORSE'S TOES,
supra note 14, at 134, 144 ("A complete theory of evolution must acknowledge a balance
between 'external' forces of environment imposing selection for local adaptation and
'internal' forces representing constraints of inheritance and development."); STEPHEN JAY
GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 35 (rev. ed. 1996) [hereinafter GOULD, MISMEASURE]
("[N]o person with an iota of knowledge would say such a foolish thing" as to deny the
role of both nature and nurture.); ROSE, supra note 11, at 98-135. Rose contends that Wilson
improperly "privileges the gene as ... an unmoved mover," when "[ilt is far more
appropriate to recognize ... that genes and environments are dialectically interdependent
throughout any individual's lifeline." ROSE, supra note 11, at 133. Gould levels a similar
complaint against Herrnstein and Murray, writing that "[wihen causative factors (more
than two, by the way) interact so complexly, and throughout growth, to produce an
intricate adult being, we cannot, in principle, parse that being's behavior into quantitative
percentages of remote root causes." GOULD, MISMEASURE, supra, at 34. "A '60 percent'
biodeterminist is not a subtle interactionist, but a determinist on the 'little bit pregnant'
model." Id. Even if the causes of behavior cannot be privileged or parsed into percentages,
it strikes me that the acknowledgment that genes play some unquantifiable role, or that the
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behavior, more so for some behavior than other,139 but nurture as well as
nature affect character.140  Individuals can overcome genetic
dispositions. 14' The debate about the relative role of nature and nurture
environment does, suffices to make one "a determinist on the 'little bit [we can't know how
much] pregnant' model."
139 Selective advantage controls the mix of nature and nurture that guides particular
behavior. See JOHN T. BONNER, THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURE IN ANIMALS 39-40 (1980).
140 See, e.g., JEROME KAGAN, GALEN'S PROPHECY: TEMPERAMENT IN HUMAN NATURE 29
(1994) ("[Elach species is born with a central nervous system that biases the animal to find
some habits easy to acquire, some difficult, and some impossible. Children belonging to
different temperamental categories, like closely related species, also differ in the ease with
which particular emotions and accompanying behaviors become habitual."); RIDLEY, supra
note 128, at 82-83 (reporting that among the five personality types recognized today by
psychologists - openness, conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness, and
neuroticism-"a little over 40 percent of the variation in personality is due to direct genetic
factors, less than 10 percent due to shared environmental influences (i.e., mostly the
family), and about 25 percent due to unique environmental influences experienced by the
individual"). Kagan cautions against giving nature "an unwarranted ascendancy because
scientific progress is more rapid in the neurosciences than in psychology." KAGAN, supra,
at 23-24. Pinker emphasizes the nature side in stating "[tihe three laws of behavioral
genetics": (1) "All human behavioral traits are heritable"; (2) "The effect of being raised in
the same family is smaller than the effect of the genes"; (3) "A substantial portion of the
variation in complex human behavioral traits is not accounted for by the effects of genes or
families." PINKER, supra note 11, at 372-73. While the first law "is a bit of an exaggeration,"
id. at 375, the heritability values are "generally between .25 and .75," id. at 374.
141 - Wilson, quoting himself, seems to even plea for this position: "To an extent not yet
known, we trust -we insist -that human nature can adapt to more encompassing forms of
altruism and social justice. Genetic biases can be trespassed, passions averted or
redirected, and ethics altered .... Wilson, supra note 42, at 267. "Yet the mind is not
infinitely malleable." Id.
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continues hardly abated,142 but all credible commentators find a
substantial place for both influences.
143
142 While "[f]or more than 50 years sane voices have called for an end to the debate
[about nature versus nurture,] ... nobody could stop the argument. Immediately after
calling the debate futile or dead, the typical protagonist would charge into the battle
himself and start accusing others of overemphasizing one or the other extreme." RIDLEY,
supra note 128, at 3. For brief discussions of the difficulties of teasing apart the relative
roles of nature and nurture, see ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, MYTHS OF GENDER 7-8 (2d ed.
1992); ROSE, supra note 11, at 188-90; ELLIOTT SOBER, Apportioning Causal Responsibility, in
FROM A BIOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW 184 (1994); WILSON, CONSILIENCE, supra note 5, at 138-
42; WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 110-13. One of the complications is that nurture itself, insofar
as it is informed by culture, is influenced by genes. See AviSE, supra note 22, at 158; infra
Part III.B. The terms "gene" and "environment" are "complex and many-layered." ROSE,
supra note 11, at 140. See generally id. at 136-73 ("Lifelines"). Behavioral variation may stem
from a third source, "one of chaotic origin-chancy, nonlinear, highly variable, emerging,
and self-organized. Any dynamic system, like the brain, possesses this chaotic nature."
THIESSEN, supra note 106, at 403.
143 "Everybody with an ounce of common sense knows that human beings are a product
of a transaction between [both nature and nurture]." RIDLEY, supra note 128, at 3; see, e.g.,
NANCY L. SEGAL, ENTWINED LIVES, at xvi-xvii (1999); WRIGHT, supra note 8, at 348 ("[T]he
phrase 'genetic determinism' exudes ignorance as to what the new Darwinism is about....
[Elveryone (including Darwin) is a victim not of genes, but of genes and environment
together: knobs and tunings.").
Disparaging the role of genes in behavior, "Itihe three dominant themes on behavior
for a good part of the century were Freudianism, which said aberrant behavior was
produced in the childhood environment; Boasism, which said behavior was produced by
the cultural environment; and behaviorism, which said behavior resulted from
environmental conditions and learning." WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 170. We certainly have
political reason to hope that nature does play a role in human behavior, for, as Chomsky
has pointed out, "a tabula rasa model of the human mind is a 'totalitarian's dream."'
ALLMAN, supra note 88, at 30 (citing a quote from Noam Chomsky in DONALD SYMONS, THE
EVOLUTION OF HUMAN SEXUALITY (1979)); see DE WAAL, SUSHI MASTER, supra note 7, at 90
(behaviorism as "a perfectly Orwellian worldview").
Owen Jones opines that the antagonistic assertion of biological determinism is "a
function of two things: (1) an essentially narcissistic fiction that mind may be entirely
divorced from matter, and (2) misperception of the biological mechanism by which certain
behavioral patterns may be influenced and genetically inherited." Jones, supra note 7, at
273. Elsewhere Jones ascribes confusion about genetic determinism to "The Error of the
False Dichotomy" and the "failure to distinguish between two very different aspects of
behavioral biology: (1) behavioral genetics; and (2) evolved or 'species-typical'
psychology." Owen D. Jones, Sex, Culture, and the Biology of Rape: Toward Explanation and
Prevention, 87 CAL. L. REV. 827, 878 (1999) (with explanation). Alcock asserts that "the myth
of the deterministic sociobiologist" continues among some critics despite rebuttals
"[b]ecause the genetic determinist is too convenient a strawman to be discarded." ALCOCK,
supra note 13, at 44. See generally id. at 41-56.
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Different understandings of the term "biological determinism" may
trigger some of the debate among the commentators.144 We may
distinguish "loose" determinism from "tight" determinism.1 45 That
genes produce behavioral dispositions establishes loose determinism.
Biology channels conduct to a degree that depends on the type of
behavior in question.146 For example, one might suppose that the human
disposition to nurture the young is among the most strongly channeled
traits, for it is hard to imagine how those in normal situations,
particularly women, who are indifferent to their newborns would
succeed in spreading their genes.147 Still, here also, the channel is not
stifling, for there is a substantial range of accepted methods and practices
in nurturing the young even within a single culture, and regular news
144 For example, "[wihile many critics have been particularly vocal in asserting that
[sociobiology] necessarily implies genetic determinism and is vitiated by ideological bias,
in fact the approach merely applies a cost-benefit approach, like that of the Sophists or of
Machiavelli, to the analysis of animal behavior." ROGER D. MASTERS, MACHIAVELLI,
LEONARDO, AND THE SCIENCE OF POWER 115 (1996) (footnote omitted).
145 The terms "loose" and "tight" determinism are not entirely divorced from the
traditional distinction between "soft" and "hard" determinism used to distinguish moral
arguments that determinism is compatible with freedom and moral responsibility from
those that assert it is not. See, e.g., D.D. RAPHAEL, MORAL PHILOSOPHY 96-97 (1981);
NICHOLAS RESCHER, The Meaning of Life, in HUMAN INTERESTS 151, 158-60 (1990). See
generally BERNARD BEROFSKY, FREEDOM FROM NECESSITY (1987).
146 "The reaction norm for a particular genotype is all possible phenotypes that would
result, given all possible sequences of environments in which the organism might survive."
Hull, supra note 129, at 391. "Some reaction norms are very narrow-that is in any
environment in which the organism can develop, it exhibits a particular trait, and only that
trait. Sometimes reaction norms turn out to be extremely broad." Id. Reaction norms may
begin broad and then become narrow, be continuous or disjunctive, produce most
organisms at the center of the norm or clustered at the extremes, and so forth. See id.; see
also MASTERS, POLITICS, supra note 42, at 120-25 (discussing "norm of reaction" or "reaction
range"). "Because the genetic reaction range of Homno sapiens is so broad that humans must
rely on culturally transmitted and individually learned information to survive and
reproduce, the probability of contradictions between individuals or groups is exceptionally
high." MASTERS, POLITICS, supra note 42, at 138. But see John Tooby & Leda Cosmides, The
Psychological Foundations of Culture, in THE ADAPTED MIND, supra note 7, at 19, 33 ("[Tihe
idea that the phenotype can be partitioned dichotomously into genetically determined and
environmentally determined traits is deeply ill-formed, as is the notion that traits can be
arrayed along a spectrum according to the degree that they are genetically versus
environmentally caused.").
147 "Interestingly, in a tradition filled with law, there is no law obligating a mother to
nurture her child." Harlan J. Wechsler, The View of Rabbinic Literature, in JUSTICE ACROSS
GENERATIONS 19, 20 (Lee M. Cohen ed., 1993). This intuition is not entirely correct. There
are situations in which even maternal infanticide may have long term reproductive
advantages. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 17, at 1170-1216 (1997).
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reports of parents who fall far short of even minimal requirements.
148
The dispositions to eat and drink, and the sex drive, are perhaps even
stronger examples, though again there is a wide variety of actual
behavior, including those that are biologically beneficial and self-
destructive.149 Some belief in moral norms may also be rather narrowly
prescribed, though the particular norms themselves may not be.15° Tight
determinism resides at the far pole of the dichotomy. It connotes a
narrow channel of choice, a straight line at the limit. In the typical
debate among those who espouse freewill or determinism, this strong
form usually centers attention.
Because even the harshest critics of sociobiology acknowledge loose
biological determinism, 51 it is not likely that they consider this sufficient
14 On the other hand, efforts to overcome the natural bonding of children and parents in
favor of communal upbringing have met great difficulties, as exemplified by the efforts on
the Israeli kibbutz. See ARNHART, supra note 42, at 91-101.
149 "Chastity is a viable option for humans." CARTWRIGHT, supra note 7, at 332.
150 Ruse contends that the belief in moral norms falls within "a strong sense of genetic
determinism," though "even here I am allowing- demanding- an environmental causal
input." RUSE, supra note 113, at 253. Hamilton considers "the selective value of having a
conscience. The more consciences are lacking in a group as a whole, the more energy the
group will need to divert to enforcing otherwise tacit rules or else face dissolution."
HAMILTON, supra note 107, at 332. Yet, "[t]o give the human conscience a comfortable place
within Darwin's theory without reducing human feelings and motives to a complete
travesty is one of the greatest challenges to biology today." DE WAAL, GOOD NATURED,
supra note 7, at 117. Ruse bolsters his case: "did any moral thinker, except perhaps the
French existentialists at their most bizarre and unconvincing, ever truly think that we
choose the rules of moral action?" RUSE, supra note 113, at 253. For more detail, see id. at
253-56; MICHAEL RUSE, Evolutionary Ethics, in EVOLUTIONARY NATURALISM, supra note 3, at
257. When discussing the interrelationship between genes and culture, Lumsden and
Wilson generalize Ruse's position: "even when the underlying epigenetic rules and
assimilation functions are rigidly constrained by genetic prescription, they can generate
wide cultural diversity." CHARLES J. LUMSDEN & EDWARD 0. WILSON, GENES, MIND, AND
CULTURE 181 (1981). Perhaps taking a position less constraining than Ruse's when related
to moral norms, they contend that "[aIdditional variation arises from the probabilistic
nature of ethnographic distributions due to continuing flux in the decisions of individuals."
Id.
151 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 132-43. For example, it seems that Lewontin
and his coauthors use the term "determinism" in a weak sense, at least sometimes. Thus,
in introducing the "three claims of biological determinism," they specify the second claim:
"Second, while liberal ideology has followed a cultural determinism, emphasizing
circumstance and education, biological determinism locates such successes and failures of
the will and character as coded, in large part, in an individual's genes ...." LEWONTIN,
supra note 90, at 68 (emphasis added). First, I am not familiar with a well-recognized
liberal ideology that asserts that cultural determinism is so strong as to threaten
substantially the notion of individual freewill. Rawls certainly makes much of biological
and environmental influences in challenging the notion of personal desert, see RAWLS, supra
1170 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol.38
to preclude freewill, for then the critics would fall within the reach of
their own complaint against sociobiologists. 15 2 Furthermore, because the
critics acknowledge environmental influences on behavior, some
claiming that it is entirely controlling, this form of determinism, whether
loose or tight, should also make them uncomfortable with pointing
fingers. 5 3 Within the moral debate over freewill and determinism, those
note 64, at 100 ("inequalities of birth and natural endowment are undeserved"), but he falls
far short of denying freewill. Is the same weak determinism also being ascribed to
biological determinism? Second, as the added emphasis highlights, even Lewontin and his
coauthors admit that sociobiologists are not very strong biological determinists. How
strong is "in large part"? But then, in specifying the third claim of biological determinism,
the authors seem to find a very strong determinism: "Finally, it is claimed that the
presence of such biological differences between individuals of necessity lead to the creation
of hierarchical societies because it is part of biologically determined human nature to form
hierarchies of status, wealth, and power." LEWONTIN, supra note 90, at 68 (emphasis
added). Wilson does go so far so as to argue that dominance orders pay off for animals,
and that it would be "surprising" if humans avoided them, the evidence suggesting that
they have not. See WILSON, CONSILIENCE, supra note 5, at 259-60. We cannot point to the
experiments in communism as counterexamples (Am I being snotty? If so, I am just
simply caught up in the spirit of the debate. Or, perhaps more in the spirit, "I couldn't help
myself."). This supposed strong deterministic belief of sociobiologists is reasserted later by
Lewontin and cohorts: "The central assertion of sociobiology is that all aspects of human
culture and behavior, like the behavior of all animals, are coded in the genes and have been
molded by natural selection." LEWONTIN, supra note 90, at 235-36 (continuing with an
acknowledgment that "sociobiologists sometimes hedge on the issue of direct genetic
determination of every detail of social and individual behavior"). But I am not familiar
with reputable sociobiological claims this strong. The three critics themselves subscribe to
a view that most sociobiologists would probably second: "We must insist that a full
understanding of the human condition demands an integration of the biological and the
social in which neither is given primacy of ontological priority over the other ...." Id. at
75. Lewontin elsewhere counters genetic determinism with the argument that some
"variation is a consequence of neither genetic nor environmental variation. It is
developmental noise, a consequence of random events within cells at the level of molecular
interactions." LEWONTIN, TRIPLE HELIX, supra note 11, at 36. While this may undermine
genetic and environmental determinism, instead of favoring freewill, it puts our destiny in
the hands of the fates.
152 See VON SCHILCHER & TENNANT, supra note 18, at 48 ("It is jejune for the free will
theorist, in seeking room for human free will in the causal web of doings, to set more store
on either genetic or environmental causation than the other."); WILSON, SEARCH, supra note
83, at 89 (The critics of sociobiology "are quick to project a political scenario in which
genetic determinism leads to support for the status quo and continued social injustice.
Seldom do they entertain an equally plausible scenario, one in which complete cultural
determinism leads to support for authoritarian mind control and worse injustice.").
152 Posner, on the other hand, is willing to point the finger of determinism at himself. He
rejects the misunderstanding that he "subscribe[s] to a naive distinction between
determinism and freedom, regarding the former as the domain of biology and the latter as
that of economics. In fact, the model of economic man is as deterministic as the biological
model; rational man goes where the balance of costs and benefits inclines." RICHARD A.
POSNER, SEX AND REASON 88 (1992). With friends like this, it seems that sociobiologists
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who discern loose determinism are likely to be "compatibilists" who
contend that it does not preclude freewill or personal responsibility.'
54
Wherever one falls within the debate over the relative influence of nature
and nurture, loose determinism raises its head, but this need not relegate
us to moral despair.
To begin with, we might challenge the deterministic aspect of the
nature-nurture controversy. As Tooby and Cosmides explain, "[tihe
notion that inherited psychological structure constrains is the notion that
without it we would be even more flexible or malleable or
environmentally responsive than we are. This is not only false but
absurd. Without this evolved structure, we would have no competences
or contingent environmental responsiveness whatsoever."1 5 5 To respond
to the environment at all, organisms must have mechanisms designed to
make connections to it. "Our evolved cognitive adaptations - our
inherited psychological mechanisms -are the means by which things are
affirmatively accomplished." 15 6  In sum, "[f]ar from constraining,
specialized mechanisms enable competences and actions that would not
be possible were they absent from the architecture." 15 7
Or, we might even challenge the deterministic assumption beneath
genetic behavioral dispositions. As Matt Ridley points out, "We
instinctively assume that bodily biochemistry is cause whereas
behaviour is effect .... If genes are involved in behaviour then it is they
hardly need enemies. But then, he retreats. "Sociobiology identifies influences on
behavior, not determinants of it." Id. at 109. Perhaps the retreat was ill-advised. Hume,
for one, "rejects the contrast between free will and determinism as a false dichotomy."
ARNHART, supra note 42, at 84. "We are free when our actions are determined by our
deliberate choices." Id.
154 For an analysis of compatibilism and incompatibilism, see John Martin Fischer,
Introduction: Responsibility and Freedom, in MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 9, 32-40 (John Martin
Fischer ed., 1986). Ruse places himself in this camp. See RUSE, supra note 113, at 253
("[Siuch determinism is a condition of moral choice rather than a barrier."). Balkin
contends that "cultural software empowers individuals even as it constructs and creates
them. It untaps the potential power of the human mind just as an increasingly complicated
and sophisticated software program allows a computer to do more." J.M. BALKIN,
CULTURAL SOFTWARE 18 (1998). "Cultural software, rather than being the enemy of human
autonomy, is the very condition of its possibility." Id.
155 Tooby & Cosmides, supra note 146, at 38; see DANIEL C. DENNETF, Cognitive Wheels:
The Frame Problem of Al, in BRAINCHILDREN 181, 188 (1998) ("We can all agree, today, that
there could be no learning at all by an entity that faced the world at birth as a tabula rasa
156 Tooby & Cosmides, supra note 146, at 38.
157 Id. at 39. For another study along these lines, see MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA, NATURE'S
MIND (1992).
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that are the cause and they that are deemed immutable." 158 But, Ridley
cautions, "genes need to be switched on, and external events-or free-
willed behaviour -can switch on genes. Far from us lying at the mercy
of our omnipotent genes, it is often our genes that lie at the mercy of
US." 159
Furthermore, we might champion the benefits of determinism, of a
soft sort. As Dennett points out, there are important social benefits to the
absence of complete freewill. Holding people responsible depends on it.
Without some determinism, people "would not be deterred by the threat
of punishment, or be ashamed by the prospect of opprobrium, or even
feel the twinge of guilt that might inhibit a sinful temptation in the
future, because [they] could always choose to defy those causes of
behavior."'160
Even without these ways to finesse the problem, the most
unmitigated sociobiologist is unlikely in principle to be a strong
determinist. For one, the ability to learn is an evolved trait.161 To put it
in ironic terms, it is genetically "determined" that organisms can learn
158 MATT RIDLEY, GENOME 153 (1999).
159 Id. Ridley provides this example: "It is also an indisputable fact that you can trigger
activity in the 'happiness centres' of the brain with a deliberate smile, as surely as you
trigger a smile with happy thoughts. It really does make you feel better to smile." Id. at
154. Ridley also points out that one must not equate determinism with fatalism, threats to
political freedom, or lack of responsibility. See id. at 306-13.
160 PINKER, supra note 11, at 176-77 (discussing DANIEL C. DENNETT, ELBOW ROOM: THE
VARIETIES OF FREE WILL WORTH WANTING (1984)). This also leads to "Hume's Fork":
"Either our actions are determined, in which case we are not responsible for them, or they
are the result of random events, in which case we are not responsible for them." Id. at 178.
161 See, e.g., ALLMAN, supra note 88, at 31; ROBIN DUNBAR, GROOMING, GOSSIP, AND THE
EVOLUTION OF LANGUAGE 34 (1996) ("Learning is just another example of a Darwinian
process: it is differential survival of traits (behavioural rules in this case) as a result of
selection."); GOULD, MISMEASURE, supra note 138, at 361 ("If intelligence sets us apart
among organisms, then I think it probable that natural selection acted to maximize the
flexibility of our behavior."); KONNER, supra note 18, at 24-25 (noting that behavioral
scientists "have always stressed that the hallmark of human evolution is an increase of
individual adaptability"); H.C. Plotkin, Learning and Evolution, in THE ROLE OF BEHAVIOR IN
EVOLUTION 133, 136 (H.C. Plotkin ed., 1988) ("Learning is adaptive. This is the most
commonplace view of the role of learning in evolution, and it is closely related to the
generally accepted notion that learning is an evolved trait or set of traits."). "The error of
many [behavioral scientists] was, to quote Julian Huxley, to 'forget that even the capacity to
learn, to learn at all, to learn only at a definite stage of development, to learn one thing
rather than another, to learn more or less quickly, must have some genetic basis."'
KONNER, supra note 18, at 25 (quoting JULIAN HUXLEY, ESSAYS OF A HUMANIST (1965)).
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and respond to their environments.162  Strong genetic behavioral
determinism (other than, perhaps, the ability to learn) would be an
evolutionary dead end.163 Even in a relatively stable environment, the
162 Because the ability to learn is honed by selective pressures, some things are learned
more easily than others. "Learning is part of the adaptive pattern of a species and can be
understood only when it is seen as a process of acquiring skills and attitudes that are of
evolutionary significance to a species when living in the environment to which it is
adapted." S.L. Washburn et al., Field Studies of Old World Monkeys and Apes, 150 SCd. 1541
(1965), quoted in HAMILTON, supra note 107, at 329; see PROMETHEAN FIRE, supra note 5, at 83
("Mental capacities and emotional responses were shaped in ways that favored particular
levels of inquisitiveness and optimism, as well as idiosyncratic modes of reasoning, a
stubborn tendency to see the world as a peculiar medley of lights, sounds, and smells, and
the deep, emotionally controlled preference for certain cultural choices over others.").
Browne observes that the ease with which males and females learn their social sex roles
suggests an adaptive advantage to them. See Kingsley R. Browne, Sex and Temperament in
Modern Society: A Darwinian View of the Glass Ceiling and the Gender Gap, 37 ARIZ. L. REV.
971, 1063-64 (1995). See generally Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Cognitive Adaptations for
Social Exchange, in THE ADAPTED MIND, supra note 7, at 163.
163 "The hypothesis that human behavioral propensities are adaptations shaped by
natural selection does not imply that human behavior is not plastic or that differences in
behavior among human populations are the result of genetic differences." Irons, supra note
19, at 5 (emphasis omitted). Seemingly, differences in social behavior among groups "are
environmentally induced variations in the expression of basically similar genotypes," the
ability and propensity for such variable responses being itself an adaptation. Id. (emphasis
omitted); see id. at 7-8 (offering support for the view "that this flexibility is an adaptive
character produced by natural selection"); RICHARD D. ALEXANDER, THE BIOLOGY OF
MORAL SYSTEMS 9 (1987) ("Inflexibility or preprogramming would be the worst possible
strategy in the face of conflicts of interest, competition, the importance of cooperation, and
other aspects of sociality."); Elliott, supra note 7, at 619 ("Because of differences in
environments, and also because of the notion that there is a diversity of [adaptive]
strategies which are being played in any population, one would not expect the same thing
that works in a particular culture to work in another context."); Michael S. Fried, The
Evolution of Legal Concepts: The Menietic Perspective, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 291, 295 (1999) (" [I]n
the competition for survival among genes, the ability to respond rapidly to environmental
fluctuations proved to be a successful strategy. This was accomplished by designing
organisms that were able to adjust their behavior according to past experiences in their
lives."). Dennett, after pointing out the need of organisms to partially "redesign
themselves" to cope with the unpredictable, even chaotic, conditions they encounter, notes
that "[s]ometimes such redesign is called learning and sometimes it is called just
development," the line between the two being contentious. DENNETT, supra note 18, at 183.
The "postnatal design-fixing" is accomplished "by a process strongly analogous to the
process that fixes the prenatal design, or in other words, a process of evolution by natural
selection occurring within the individual (within the phenotype)." Id. The capability to do
this "also reflects back on the process of genetic evolution and speeds it up" by means of a
phenomenon known as the Baldwin effect. Id. at 184; see JOHN T. BONNER, LIFE CYCLES 89-
90 (1993) ("This process of genes infiltrating or becoming assimilated to reinforce
something that is already occurring is called the Baldwin effect."); CARTWRIGHT, supra note
7, at 19 ("The theory became known as 'organic selection' but is usually today known as the
'Baldwin effect' and describes how a learnt adaptation could become fixed in the
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contingencies that must be coped with by a complex animal are so varied
as to require an excessive amount of hard wiring within a fully
determined organism.164  Creatures that confront the multitude of
contingencies encountered by humans would not do well with strongly
determined behavior.165 While the strength of a particular behavioral
genome."); KONNER, supra note 18, at 23 ("In one process, sometimes called the Baldwin
effect, change within the life course of some individuals in a population creates conditions
that, over a longer course of time, select for genetic features that mimic the same
changes."); PINKER, supra note 6, at 178-79 (explaining the principle of the Baldwin effect);
PLOTKIN, supra note 20, at 65 ("What Baldwin was saying is that selection does not operate
upon genetical variation alone but upon phenotypic variation which is the outcome of both
genetically and developmentally generated variation."); Geoffrey E. Hinton & Steven J.
Nowlan, How Learning Can Guide Evolution, 1 COMPLEX Sys. 495, 495 (1987) (Under the
Baldwin effect, "[1learning alters the shape of the search space in which evolution operates
and thereby provides good evolutionary paths towards sets of co-adapted alleles."). For
further explanation, see DENNETr, supra note 18, at 184-91.
164 See MILLER, supra note 35, at 393 ("Evolution avoids such [deterministic]
preprogramming by endowing animals with senses for registering what is going on in the
environment, and reflexes for letting those senses influence movements. These senses and
reflexes allow behavior to track environmental variables faster than genetic evolution
can."); PINKER, supra note 11, at 90-94 (Brain assembly is not completely determined
because "a gene cannot anticipate every detail of the environment" and "the genome is a
limited resource."); Paul W. Andrews, The Psychology of Social Chess and the Evolution of
Attribution Mechanisms: Explaining the Fundamental Attribution Error, 22 EVOLUTION & HUM.
BEHAV. 11, 15-16 (2001) ("To deal with a nearly infinite number of subtly varying contexts
that could be encountered, the biological automaton must come equipped with a nearly
infinite number of hard-wired rules, each of which is invoked in a slightly different
context."). Since nature does not have "true prescience," "[i]t learns that uncertainty can
never be entirely eliminated; that the chance, the contingent, the arbitrary, have always to
be reckoned with." PLOTKIN, supra note 5, at 194. Hence, "not everything can be
phylogenetically acquired and doled out to individuals by way of their genes as a priori
knowledge, either complete in the form of instincts or partial as in the case of constrained
learning." Id.
165 "[B]ehavioral flexibility becomes increasingly adaptive in proportion to the
complexity and responsiveness of an organism's environment, especially its social
environment." Jones, supra note 7, at 275. Despite genetic tendencies, "the more advanced
an individual's capacity for context recognition, analysis, and learning, the more external
conditions may affect the manifestation or repression of a genetically coded behavioral
predisposition." Id. "Because circumstances vary significantly, an ability to shift among a
variety of potential behaviors in response to endlessly shifting environmental conditions
often proves adaptive." Jones, supra note 17, at 1146 ("Condition-Dependent Strategies");
see PAUL R. EHRLICH, HUMAN NATURES 124-25 (2000). "[Nlonmalleable behaviors ...
would be the worst of all strategies to enter the competition and cooperativeness of social
life, in which others are prepared to alter their responses, with only preprogrammed
behaviors." Richard D. Alexander, Biology and Law, 7 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 167, 171
(1986). "It would be like trying to plan a game of, say, chess, without reference to the
moves of the other player." Id. In Wilson's words, "genes promoting flexibility in social
behavior are strongly selected at the individual level." WILSON, supra note 23, at 549.
Lewontin and his coauthors respond: "While that might indeed be true, it deprives
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predisposition is likely to differ among individuals, thereby providing
variation for natural selection to work on, 166 still, for every individual,
the advantage of behavioral versatility turns on the context.167 For
example, while it may be best to cope with the unforeseeable obstacles to
capturing sophisticated prey with a cunning flexibility, it may be best for
the prey itself to avoid being anticipated by acting quite randomly. 168 On
the other hand, the trustworthiness facilitating cooperation will be
undermined if behavior is unpredictable, that is, if people cannot rely on
one another.169 Nevertheless, strong determinism is still not necessary
for dependability when, for example, reliable commitment by the parties
sociobiology of all content." LEWONTIN, GENES, supra note 11, at 254. This response
overshoots. As Wilson's following comments make clear, genes do not promote total
behavioral flexibility: they do not allow much room for entirely self-destructive behavior,
for example. Understanding the direction and reach of the flexibility would be very useful
for social decisionmaking.
166 See, e.g., Anne Fausto-Sterling, Beyond Difference: Feminism and Evolutionary Psychology,
in ALAS, POOR DARWIN, supra note 13, at 209, 222-23 ("In fact, geneticists studying animals
and plants have amassed experimental data showing that plasticity is a trait under genetic
control, and can evolve via natural selection."); Jones, supra note 143, at 851-52.
167 See, e.g., WRIGHT, supra note 8, at 215-16 (discussing the advantage of flexibility
regarding reciprocal altruism and cheating); Geoffrey F. Miller, Protean Primates: The
Evolution of Adaptive Unpredictability in Competition and Courtship, in MACHIAVELLIAN
INTELLIGENCE II, at 312, 313-14 (Andrew Whiten & Richard W. Byrne eds., 1997) (noting
various counterstrategies to predictions and manipulations by others).
168 "If another organism is trying to predict what you will do in order to catch you and
eat you, you had better behave a bit more randomly. Selection may favor brain circuits that
randomize responses, to produce adaptively unpredictable behavior." MILLER, supra note
35, at 394. Determined randomness!?! For exposition, see id. at 394-406.
169 See Derek Freeman, Sociobiology: The "Antidiscipline" of Anthropology, in SOCIOBIOLOGY
EXAMINED, supra note 134, at 198, 201-02 (discussing essays from ERNST MAYR, EVOLUTION
AND THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE (1976), which explain that a "closed" behavioral program is
adaptive when conspecifics interact through formal signals and appropriate responses); H.
Kummer, Analogs of Morality Among Nonhuman Primates, in MORALITY AS A BIOLOGICAL
PHENOMENON, supra note 93, at 31, 43 ("Every being can become more dangerous simply
by becoming less predictable, regardless of whether it appears in the role of an enemy, a
competitor, or a cooperator.... [B]ehaving in a predictable way increases the benefits and
alleviates the risks of social life."). An advantage of the evolution of moral faculties may be
in its "selective suppression of shrewd flexibility in the social context." Kummer, supra, at
44. "[Pjerfect flexibility would often make it impossible to solve the commitment problem
[that facilitates cooperation which seems contrary to self-interest]." FRANK, supra note 34,
at 162. For some moral behavior, "there may thus be powerful advantages in having one's
hands tied by emotional predispositions" Id. Hirschleifer formalizes the advantages of a
"tender trap" in which any behavioral rule that allows predictions of actions is preferable
to no rules. See Hirshleifer, supra note 32, at 13.
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will suffice.170 Perhaps for humans it is even adaptive to believe in
freewill.1 71
For critics to claim that sociobiologists are inevitably strong
determinists smacks of additional irony. If it is the case that behavior is
strongly determined by genes, then the sociobiologists who are
determinists cannot help themselves and criticism of them must be
inefficacious. But we must not criticize the critics for this superfluous
endeavor, for they also cannot help themselves. For that matter, if we do
criticize the critics, that is something we cannot choose to avoid, because
we also are determined. The entire endeavor of discussing biological
determinism, and everything else, is a formalistic playing out of a
prerecorded tape. "One can critically assess only what one can 'step
away from,' and consider rejecting only what is not determined." 172 So
why bother to try? (Because we have no choice.)
Moving beyond this ironical toying with concepts, if we take
sociobiologists at their considered word that genes predispose behavior
having fitness consequences, not determine it, this is hardly a position to
raise alarm. But this does invite the discussion to progress to the nature-
nurture debate. To what extent is behavior biased by nature and by
nurture? Is it even possible to unravel the interactions? Irrespective of
the relative inputs of nature and nurture, predisposition obtains,
however grounded. No resolution of the controversy eliminates all
determinism, it simply identifies its sources. Hence, those who criticize
biological determinism on the grounds that it denies human freedom
must, to keep their freedom unfettered, deny the channeling influences
170 For a general discussion of the relationship between commitment and evolution, see
FRANK, supra note 34.
171 In advancing an argument against "simple determinism" based on the need to track
the "all but infinite in detail" workings of the human brain in order to fully know and
predict its responses, Wilson proclaims that "the self can go on passionately believing in its
own free will. And that is a fortunate circumstance. Confidence in free will is biologically
adaptive. Without it the mind, imprisoned by fatalism, would slow and deteriorate."
WILSON, CONSILIENCE, supra note 5, at 120. Is this why Calvinism has pretty much
departed from the world stage? "Thus in organismic time and space, in every operational
sense that applies to the knowable self, the mind does have free will." Id. Is this, then,
complex determinism? Relatedly, Pinker "simply note[s] that our moral sense cannot work
unless it believes that right and wrong have an external reality." Steven Pinker, The Blank
Slate, the Noble Savage, and the Ghost in the Machine, in 21 THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN
VALUES 179, 207 (Grethe B. Peterson ed., 2000). Are, then, moral relativists all immoral?
172 Solomon et al., supra note 93, at 261.
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of nurture as well. 173 Few commentators seem comfortable with the
claim that human choice is entirely free from all exogenous influences.
Finally, those who morally criticize sociobiologists as determinists
fail to notice its relationship to Hume's chasm between "is" and "ought."
A sociobiologist who claims that genes strongly determine behavior is
not likely to add, "And that is a good thing." The supposed claim is
doubtlessly a factual one, not a normative one: "It is the case that genes
strongly determine behavior," not, "It should be the case ...."174 To
criticize a person on normative grounds for making such an observation
is to make a category mistake. It is like attacking Copernicus for
discovering that the earth is not the center of the universe for the reason
that this undermines belief in biblical revelations. It is indeed proper to
criticize any claim of biological determinism on the facts, but not on the
normative overtones of the facts. 1 75 Don't shoot the messenger.
173 See PROMETHEAN FIRE, supra note 5, at 174; RIDLEY, RED QUEEN, supra note 8, at 319-20;
Pinker, supra note 171, at 202; Jones, supra note 17, at 1154. Wilson, quoting Noam
Chomsky in support, levels this twist against some of his harshest critics, the Sociobiology
Study Group of Science for the People, a group that includes Lewontin and Gould,
pointing out that environmental determinism may support reactionary politics. See
Wilson, Academic Vigilantism, supra note 76, at 300-02 (responding to Sociobiology Study
Group, supra note 76). Lewontin and his coauthors confront this problem by finding that
behavioral determinism, unlike the supposed claims of biological determinists, results from
such a vast multitude of causes that any one or few of them have negligible influence,
allowing us to overcome even these by our ability to control and recreate "our own psychic
and material environments." LEWONTIN, GENES, supra note 11, at 287-90. I wonder if these
critics could ever feel themselves "free" to choose to murder their sociobiological
archenemies, even with the repeal of homicide statutes. My guess is that their
environments have too strongly channeled their behavior to the contrary. See Bailey
Kuklin, You Should Have Known Better, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 545, 552-58 (2000). But Gould is
not so quick to deny cultural determinism. In one piece he quotes approvingly Gunnar
Myrdal: "Cultural influences have set up the assumptions about the mind, the body, and
the universe with which we begin; pose the questions we ask; influence the facts we seek;
determine the interpretation we give these facts; and direct our reaction to these
interpretations and conclusions." STEPHEN JAY GOULD, Utopia, Limited, in AN URCHIN IN
THE STORM 216,216 (1987) (quoting GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (1944)).
174 For example, Alexander, who sees a natural self-interested tendency to adopted
norms, see infra text accompanying note 223, believes that, nevertheless, evolution has
"nothing whatsoever" "to say about normative ethics." ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 276.
175 Pinker discusses the critics' fallacious "confusion of explanation with exculpation,"
quoting the old saying, "To understand is not to forgive." Pinker, supra note 171, at 202.
Gould responds to the point: "Critics have never rejected sociobiology simply because they
dislike a potential social message." Stephen Jay Gould, Sociobiology and Human Nature: A
Postpanglossian Vision, in SOCIOBIOLOGY EXAMINED, supra note 134, at 283, 285. But then he
characterizes the sociobiologist's message in extreme terms: "I believe that the
methodological flaws in human sociobiology are serious enough to incapacitate its central
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To reemphasize the point, that critics would shift the center of
gravity of behavioral dispositions from the realm of biology to that of
environment hardly avoids the indictment of determinism. Behavior
remains channeled whether formed by genes or caregivers. Yet critics do
not admit to environmental determinism. This is because, apparently,
the term "determinism" is an epithet used by critics as a rhetorical,
political tool in the debate with sociobiologists. 176 The words of Stephen
Jay Gould, perhaps the most famous critic, reveal this. In one essay, he
writes: "I am supposed to be a 'nurturist' in the great 'nature-nurture'
debate, but I find nothing upsetting in this notion of biological influence
upon human behavior." 177 Remaining calm, he points out "for the
umpteenth time" that "there is no 'nature-nurture' debate as such"
because "[elvery scientist, indeed every intelligent person, knows that
human social behavior is a complex and indivisible mix of biological and
social influences." 78 The real issue is "the degree, intensity, and nature
of the constraint exerted by biology upon the possible forms of social
organization." 79 (One might also wonder about the constraints exerted
by nurture on the possible forms of social organization. Furthermore, we
seem to have shifted our attention from "human social behavior," which
apparently focuses on individual behavior, to "social organization,"
which relates to group behavior. While obviously these are intertwined,
as are nature and nurture themselves, they are not identical, as
suggested by the frequent unwillingness of individuals to conform their
behavior to social mandates, such as seatbelt and littering laws, or even
informal social norms, such as election voting. Finally, one may ponder
if there are polemical purposes for redeploying the term "determinism,"
which earned its notoriety in the freewill-determinism debates over
individual behavior, to the related, but separate, question of constraints
on group behavior.)
My parenthetical quibbles aside, let us get to the heart of Gould's
tactics. The quotations above are from a review of a book by Lumsden
and Wilson contending that genes and culture coevolve. Gould pursues
claim of strong genetic constraint imposed by nature selection for specific, adaptive
behaviors." Id.
176 See WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 199-200.
177 STEPHEN JAY GOULD, Genes on the Brain, in AN URCHIN IN THE STORM, supra note 173, at
107, 112 (reviewing PROMETHEAN FIRE, supra note 5).
178 Id. at 112-13.
179 Id. at 113; see GOULD, MISMEASURE, supra note 138, at 359 ("In one sense, the debate
between sociobiologists and their critics is an argument about the breadth of ranges [of
behavior].").
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his criticism by listing seven "genetic universals" found by the two
authors, including "avoidance of brother-sister incest; learning of color
vocabularies; ... the universality of certain facial expressions; ... [and]
anxiety of very young children in the presence of strangers . "180 He
continues:
Item two on color provides a good illustration of
why I maintain that these genetic universals offer no
threat to the attitude often mistakenly called the
'nurturist' position- that human biology is rarely
sufficiently constraining to determine human culture directly
and that biology usually permits a wide and flexible range of
different cultural possibilities. (The two positions should
be called biological determinism and biological
potentiality, not naturist and nurturist. We might
instead refer to determinists and potentialists.)181
Gould then explains the biology behind the genetically programmed,
color vision.8 2 "Now why should any potentialist (or even an old-
fashioned, caricatured, exaggerated, nonexistent, tabula rasa nurturist)1 8 3
feel threatened by such a discovery?" 1 4 Why indeed?!? That our flag is
more likely to be red, white, and blue than fuchsia, ivory, and azure
hardly occasions outrage and denial over the supposed biological
constraints on our flag waving. While the main reaction to most of the
180 GOULD, supra note 177, at 113 (reviewing PROMETHEAN FIRE, supra note 5). Lumsden
and Wilson do not refer to these characteristics as "genetic universals" but rather "label the
various regularities of development as epigenetic rules." PROMETHEAN FIRE, supra note 5,
at 70 (emphasis omitted). In continuing, they demonstrate, the impression from Gould
notwithstanding, their belief in the interaction between nature and nurture: "Epigenesis is
a biological term that means the sum of all the interactions between the genes and the
environment that create the distinctive traits of an organism." Id. at 70-71. Does Gould use
the term "genetic universals," rather than Lumsden and Wilson's "developmental
regularities," because it connotes "determinism"?
181 GOULD, supra note 177, at 113-14 (emphasis added) (reviewing PROMETHEAN FIRE,
supra note 5).
182 See id. at 114.
183 "The straw man set up to caricature biological determinism is cultural determinism or
the tabula rasa in its pure form." STEPHEN JAY GOULD, Nurturing Nature, in AN URCHIN IN
THE STORM, supra note 173, at 145, 152. To this I respond, "people in glass houses ...."
"Although biological determinists often like to intimate, for rhetorical effect, that their
opponents hold such a view, no serious student of human behavior denies the potent
influence of evolved biology upon our cultural lives. Our struggle is to figure out how
biology affects us, not whether it does." Id.
184 GOULD, supra note 177, at 114 (reviewing PROMETHEAN FIRE, supra note 5).
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seven "genetic universals" may be normative indifference, what of the
one listed last above, the "anxiety of very young children in the presence
of strangers"? At first blush it would seem that this might partially
reflect or ground, "determine" in Gould's parlance, several important
behavioral traits, such as xenophobia and aggression, that would have
far-reaching consequences in understanding, judging, and tempering
human conduct. About the implications of this item on the list, there is
not a word from Gould. Furthermore, Lumsden and Wilson observe
that, based on preliminary evidence uncovered in the prior twenty years,
there appear to be other
developmental regularities in even the most subtle and
complex forms of mental activity. People follow
unexpected and sometimes remarkably inefficient
procedures in the way they recall information, judge the
merits of other people, estimate risk, and plan strategy.
Among the peculiarities of decision making is the
excessive use of stereotypes. 85
These and other mentioned qualities strike me as potentially having
interesting, substantial normative repercussions.
But let us examine more closely Gould's rhetoric above. 186 Like
every other scientist, indeed, every intelligent person, Gould
185 PROMETHEAN FIRE, supra note 5, at 71. Over twenty years ago, one leading
sociobiologist wrote that the discipline "has accounted or can readily account for the
evolution of such human phenomena as altruism, parent-offspring conflict, the double
standard, lying, sex differences in behavior, ethnocentrism and race prejudice, incest
taboos, altruism, [and] sexual jealousy .... " Jerome H. Barkow, Sociobiology: Is This the
New Theory of Human Nature?, in SOCIOBIOLOGY EXAMINED, supra note 134, at 171, 173.
These characteristics are not morally neutral.
186 Many other examples appear in Gould's writings. One more will do: "Biological
determinists ... complain bitterly that they have been maligned, and that they do, after all,
acknowledge the importance and independence of culture. They then allot the percentages
so that genes control what really matters -80 percent determinism, after all, is usually good
enough for the cause." GOULD, supra note 183, at 152 (citations omitted). Who are these
sociobiologists he is invoking and what behavior do they find this much determined?
Perhaps he is referring to the IQ controversy. "In my reading, the literature of estimates of
heritability for IQ is a confusing mess -with values from 80 percent... all the way down to
... [the] contention... that existing information is not incompatible with a true heritability
of flat zero." STEPHEN JAY GOULD, Singapore's Patrimony (and Matrimony), in THE
FLAMINGO'S SMILE 319, 325 (1985); see, e.g., DEAN HAMER & PETER COPELAND, LIVING WITH
OUR GENEs 218-19 (1998) (reporting that IQ is 48-75% heritable); SEGAL, supra note 143, at
49-60, 135-36 (While reporting at 135 that "different ways of calculating genetic influence
[on IQ] yield a range of values, usually 30-70%," Segal states at 49 that "IQ heritability ... is
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acknowledges in the quoted, emphasized language the role of biology in
human behavior. While, as he opines, it may be true "that human
biology is rarely sufficiently constraining to determine human culture
directly and that biology usually permits a wide and flexible range of
different cultural possibilities," does he believe it is not important or
useful to uncover what these biological constraints are, however weak
they might be? As a biologist and paleontologist specializing in snails,
he doubtlessly expended great effort studying them, including, I would
suppose, their behavioral traits. Can others not legitimately investigate
the biology of human behavior?187 And, to pursue the quoted paragraph
estimated to be 20% in infancy, 40% in childhood, 50% in adolescence and 60% in
adulthood."); SEGERSTRALE, supra note 6, at 236, 283, 407 (reporting that IQ inheritability is
said to be up to 0.8); Tim Beardsley, For Whom Did the Bell Curve Toll?, 9 SCI. AM. PRESENTS
30, 30 (1998) ("In a recent book that reanalyzes The Bell Curve's major arguments,
Intelligence, Genes and Success, statisticians and geneticists Michael Daniels, Bernie Devlin
and Kathryn Roeder argue that the figure [for IQ heritability] is actually about 48
percent."); Linda S. Gottfredson, The General Intelligence Factor, 9 SCI. AM. PRESENTS 24
(1998) (discussing the controversy over, including the heritability of, IQ). Contrary to
Gould, I am not familiar with any reputable scientist who has reported heritability as high
as 80% for normatively interesting behavioral dispositions. See, e.g., SEGAL, supra note 143,
at 70-71 ("Approximately 20-50% of individual differences in personality are genetically
based, so genes have a somewhat lesser impact upon personality traits than they do upon
intellectual skills."). Is it IQ, then, that is all that "really matters"? Are sociobiologists all
elitists who espouse an intellectual aristocracy? Even so, B.F. Skinner was a 100 percent,
tabula rasa "potentialist," yet I am not aware of any reputable sociobiologist who sticks this
claim on all the critics.
187 Gould seems ambivalent. Picking up a theme adumbrated earlier, see Gould, supra
note 175, at 290, he writes at one point that when sociobiology "is judicious and implicates
genetics only in setting the capacity for broad spectra of culturally conditioned behaviors,
then it is not very enlightening," STEPHEN JAY GOULD, The Ghost of Protagoras, in AN
URCHIN IN THE STORM, supra note 173, at 62, 68 [hereinafter GOULD, Protagoras] (contrasting
nonsensical, "injudicious" sociobiology that speculates about specific human behaviors).
Then, elsewhere in the same book, he writes: "Clearly, there must be a potential
evolutionary science of behavior. If we wish to call this enterprise sociobiology (broad
version), then no right-thinking person can oppose it." STEPHEN JAY GOULD, Cardboard
Darwinism, in AN URCHIN IN THE STORM, supra note 173, at 26, 32 [hereinafter GOULD,
Cardboard Darwinism] (contrasting the improper "narrow version" based on the theory that
natural selection takes place exclusively at the level of individuals). "Potential evolutionary
science of behavior"! Meaning, current Darwinists have not even begun the enterprise?
Well, no. "The character of the biological universals that we can identify (and we have no
reason to think that further research will alter the form of example, though the list will
obviously be augmented) suggests that the leash is loose and nonconstraining, though well
worth our continued examination." GOULD, supra note 177, at 114-15. To the contrary,
another critic asserts that the biological universals are likely to yield only generalizations
"at a level of abstraction that renders them trivial or common-place," and therefore of little
use. Michael A. Simon, Biology, Sociobiology, and the Understanding of Human Social Behavior,
in SOCIOBIOLOGY EXAMINED, supra note 134, at 291, 297.
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above, are the consequences of the positions of naturists and nurturists
sufficiently different to be distinguished by the labels "biological
determinism" and "biological potentiality"? In other words, why is it
biologically deterministic to assert that "human biology is rarely
sufficiently constraining to determine human culture directly" and
biologically potentialistic to assert that "biology usually permits a wide
and flexible range of different cultural possibilities"? Are not these two
assertions essentially the same? If, instead, he is referring to the different
orientations alone, focusing on constraints on the one hand and
flexibility on the other, though they are interrelated, 8 8 notice that he
rejects the labels "naturist" and "nurturist" in favor of "determinists"
and "potentialists." Allow me to speculate why he does this. For one,
"determinist," as mentioned above, carries much baggage that is best
avoided for one's own debating position and ascribed to the
opponent's. 189  "Naturist" and "nurturist" both have overtones of
determinism, whether by genes or by environment. "Potentialism," on
the other hand, suggests freedom from constraints, freewill in the terms
of the freewill-determinism debate.190 In sum, while Gould readily
admits that all intelligent persons are biological "determinists" to some
degree, he quickly eschews that label for his own position and sticks it
on his opponents, apparently for polemical reasons.191 Is this reasoned,
objective scientific analysis? 92
188 Elsewhere Gould writes that it is not merely a difference in emphasis on the potential
range of behavior. Rather, if, as he ascribes to sociobiologists, "ranges are narrow, then
genes do code for specific traits and natural selection can create and maintain individual
items of behavior separately." GOULD, MISMEASURE, supra note 138, at 359. But if, as he
believes, "ranges are characteristically broad, then selection may set some deeply recessed
generating rules; but specific behaviors are epiphenomena of the rules, not objects of
Darwinian attention in their own right." Id. If this is the case, it seems to me that this
would not derail investigation, but simply steer it to the level of the underlying rules,
which presumably are "objects of Darwinian attention."
189 "During most of the twentieth century 'determinism' was a term of abuse, and genetic
determinism was the worst kind of term." RIDLEY, supra note 128, at 98.
190 Gould uses these labels in another of his essays criticizing Wilson's tract. See STEPHEN
JAY GOULD, Biological Potentiality vs. Biological Determinism, in EVER SINCE DARWIN 251
(1977). Yet despite this loaded labeling, Gould concedes that "[t]here is no hard evidence
for either position," and wonders what difference it makes whether we conform mainly
from genetic or environmental forces. Id. at 258.
191 I am not the first to accuse Gould of resorting to debater's tricks. See BROWN, supra
note 129, at 57-58 ("To call the [sociobiologists] 'Darwinian fundamentalists', as Gould
does, is an inspired piece of polemical mud-slinging, but neither fair nor accurate."). For a
sustained diatribe against this tactic by Gould, see Alcock, supra note 134. One
commentator notes that the flaws in Gould's and Lewontin's criticisms of Darwinian
"gradualism" and "adaptationism" "are so serious that their work is now studied by
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C. Future Fitness
Once one grants a place for some biological influences on behavior, it
must be recalled that selection pressures on human nature were
formative largely during the millions of years when humans dwelled on
the savanna in small hunting and gathering groups.193 The dramatic
changes in the human physical and social environment stemming from
the establishment of agricultural communities began only ten millennia
ago, a mere three to four hundred human generations. Evolutionarily
speaking, this is only a brief moment in the metaphorical day of life on
earth. Human dispositions could be tweaked during this period, but the
basic genetic program that emerged on the savanna is still largely in
rhetorical theorists as a model of sophistical rhetoric in science." ARNHART, supra note 42,
at 12. Yet Gould is willing to yell "foul" when others use rhetorical tactics. For example, in
an unfavorable review of a book by Jeremy Rifkin attacking genetic engineering, Gould
complains, "Rifkin does not respect the procedures of fair argument. He uses every
debater's trick in the book to mischaracterize and trivialize his opposition, and to place his
own dubious claims in a rosy light." STEPHEN JAY GOULD, Integrity and Mr. Rifkin, in AN
URCHIN IN THE STORM, supra note 173, at 229, 234-35 (reviewing JEREMY RIFKIN, ALGENY
(1983)).
192 Midgley also criticizes Gould's argument with "biological determinism." See
MIDGLEY, supra note 13, at 62-68. She believes it partially stems from his aversion to
fascism, see id. at 67, though it may well be inconsistent with his attraction to Marxism, see
infra note 259. For Ruse's similar analysis of Gould's psychology, see RUSE, supra note 8, at
142-46. In mentioning this debate, Dunbar writes that "[t]he bugaboo of genetic
determinism is for many a modern-day version of Social Darwinism. But once again, the
problem is largely one of misinformation-sometimes exacerbated by a refusal to listen."
DUNBAR, supra note 161, at 34. I agree with the first sentence, but question the second.
Scientists as astute as Gould do not succeed as he has if they remain misinformed on a
topic they write about regularly. Instead, I suppose, for the sake of their intellectual
investments and other personal motivations, they just baldly deny or misunderstand the
information. Perhaps this cognitive dissonance leads to, in Dunbar's words, "a refusal to
listen." Conceivably, as Kuhn suggests sometimes occurs, we must simply wait for them to
die off before disinterested debate is possible. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 152 (2d ed. 1970).
193 See, e.g., ALLMAN, supra note 88, at 18-19; RIDLEY, RED QUEEN, supra note 8, at 188-92;
WILSON, supra note 52, at 196 ("Human nature is, moreover, a hodgepodge of special
genetic adaptations to an environment largely vanished, the world of the Ice-Age hunter-
gatherer. Modern life [is] ... only a mosaic of cultural hypertrophies of the archaic
behavioral adaptations."); WILSON, CONSILIENCE, supra note 5, at 223. But social life on the
savanna was apparently far from uniform: "Judging from extant foragers as well as
archaeological evidence, Pleistocene foragers developed a range of social systems,
subsistence systems, mating patterns, and so on, not all of them matching the stereotype of
nomadic band societies." Eric A. Smith, Is Tibetan Polyandry Adaptive?: Methodological and
Metatheoretical Analyses, 9 HUM. NATURE 225, 241 (1998); see also ROSE, supra note 6, at 152
(questioning whether we can sufficiently know of living patterns on the African savanna).
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place.194 Present natural dispositions were selected during an age in
which the survival and reproductive needs of the individual were
situated in a very different setting.1
95
It is exceeding unlikely that the traits beneficial for enduring the
prehistoric savanna would wholly coincide with those beneficial in
modern industrialized society.' % Certainly there must be a substantial
overlap, for humans have made themselves fairly comfortable in the
developed world. But success at survival and reproduction in the past
offers no assurance of continuance in circumstances that have
substantially altered, ironically largely as a consequence of that very
success. 197 For example, from an individual vantagepoint in the United
States, the appetite for sweets and fat that induced our ancestors to store
up for periodic famines has led to an epidemic of unbalanced
consumption and obesity that is driving many people to a premature
194 See, e.g., ALLMAN, supra note 88, at 35. "There are estimates that in the 10,000 years
since the invention of agriculture, with all the massive changes that the juggernaut of
technological culture has since then imposed, our genes have changed by only a tiny, tiny
fraction of 1 per cent-in effect, in the face of enormous cultural change, our biology has
not altered at all." PLOTKIN, supra note 5, at 264. Some evolutionary biologists refer to the
period of human development on the savanna as the EEA, the environment of evolutionary
adaptedness. See, e.g., WRIGHT, supra note 8, at 37-39; Symons, supra note 7, at 143-44.
While the ancient history of human behavioral traits is often touted, one must not
underestimate the facility of genetic evolution. "In laboratory experiments in which stocks
of fruit flies were subjected to artificially imposed selection, a variety of behavioral traits
have been dramatically altered in ten generations or less." GOLDSMITH, RooTS, supra note
20, at 92 (footnote omitted). "Some traits are conservative, change slowly with evolution,
and remain with the lineage for long periods of time; others are more malleable and exhibit
much greater variation." Id. at 93. "[Mlost of the traits that characterize the social lives of
vertebrates-for example, group size, presence or absence of harem structure, presence or
absence of territoriality, involvement of both sexes in rearing young-are not very
conservative, exhibiting differences at the species or even the population level." Id.
(footnote omitted); see WILSON, SEARCH, supra note 83, at 103.
195 "There is no reason to expect an organism to produce an adaptive response, especially
one based on the interaction of many genes, to a set of environmental conditions never
encountered by its ancestors." Irons, supra note 19, at 6.
196 See Wilson, Academic Vigilantism, supra note 76, at 301 ("We cannot follow the
suggestions of the [internal] censors and motivators blindly. Although they are the source
of our deepest and most compelling feelings, their genetic constraints evolved during the
millions of years of prehistory, under conditions that to a large extent no longer exist.").
Dworkin overlooks this point (and other evolution concepts) when attacking Posner for his
Darwinian-driven ethical relativism. See Ronald Dworkin, Darwin's New Bulldog, 111
HARV. L. REV. 1718, 1735-38 (1998).
197 See, e.g., Owen D. Jones, On the Nature of Norms: Biology, Morality, and the Disruption of
Order, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2072, 2088-90 (2000) (reviewing FUKUYAMA, supra note 50).
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demise. 98 From a community perspective, the value ascribed to high
birth rates needed in an age of low survival,199 along with an innate
territoriality, aggressiveness, or xenophobia that may have been useful in
keeping rival congeners at bay in the contest for the sparse resources of
the wide savanna,2°° appear to be explosively destructive in a congested,
mightily-armed world.
While the broad and flexible range of naturally disposed individual
behavior has spawned a similarly wide variation in social
organization, 201 insofar as ancient innate dispositions are harmful under
current conditions, and previously marginal dispositions are
increasingly beneficial, the invisible hand of evolution cannot be
depended on to do its work of adequately modifying the pool of natural
tendencies. First, some of the selection pressures for individual change
have been reduced in the developed world by social action protecting
the genetically vulnerable and unlucky who would perish in an
indifferent milieu.20 2  On the one hand, this might diminish the
198 See, e.g., HAMER & COPELAND, supra note 186, at 236-69; RANDOLPH M. NESSE &
GEORGE C. WILLIAMS, WHY WE GET SICK 147-51 (1994); Randolph M. Nesse & George C.
Williams, Evolution and the Origins of Disease, 279 SCI. AM. 86, 91 (1998). As the most
destructive aspects of miseating occur after a person is beyond the prime breeding period,
the selection pressure against this trait is reduced.
199 See WILSON, SEARCH, supra note 83, at 93; Margaret Gruter, The Origins of Legal
Behavior, 2 J. Soc. BIOLOGICAL STRUCTURES 43, 45 (1979) (The continued valorization of high
birth rates is maladaptive and threatens species' survival.).
200 See WILSON, SEARCH, supra note 83, at 93.
201 See WILSON, supra note 23, at 549. "In order to generate the amount of variation
actually observed to occur, it is necessary for there to be multiple adaptive peaks. In other
words, different forms of society within the same species must be nearly enough alike in
survival ability for many to enjoy long tenure." Id. While societies with "obvious
inefficiencies and even pathological flaws" have endured in the past, id., with the shrinking
of the modern, competitive world, one might wonder if this will continue to be true, see id.
at 550. As an example, Gell-Mann refers to the Southeast Asian ethnic groups who practice
irrigated rice agriculture as having dominated, through greater production per acre, the
groups practicing dry rice production. See MURRAY GELL-MANN, THE QUARK AND THE
JAGUAR 256 (1994). "The course of cultural evolution has similarly been marked by a
succession of types each of which has embodied more varied and effective energy-
capturing devices and consequently has tended to spread at the expense of its less
fortunately endowed predecessors." David Kaplan, The Law of Cultural Dominance, in
EVOLUTION AND CULTURE 69, 73 (Marshall D. Sahlins & Elman R. Service eds., 1960).
202 See, e.g., WILSON, CONSILIENCE, supra note 5, at 274-75. One early commentator on
Darwin posited that "[i]f natural selection produced the social and moral sentiments in
man, ... such feelings would in proto-human groups prevent the beneficial culling of the
morally and intellectually degenerate.... [Miembers of a tribe would prevent their dim-
witted friend who wished to pet the sleeping sabre-tooth from meeting his natural end."
Robert J. Richards, The Moral Foundations of the Idea of Evolutionary Progress: Darivin,
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robustness of the gene pool in some respects, as when the susceptibility
to emerging ailments is overcome by medical intervention.203 On the
other hand, this may enrich the gene pool in other respects, as where the
amicable natural temperament of a particular group of individuals is
preserved by international mandate that protects the group from its
belligerent neighbors.2°4 Second, with the reduction of abject poverty
and the advancement of the reproductive sciences, the leaving of
offspring has become more a matter of pure individual choice than
simply natural selection. 205 Third, as communities become less separated
and broad-ranging intermarriage becomes more common, the relative
isolation in breeding communities that facilitates the evolution of traits is
disappearing. Indeed, some geneticists opine that human evolution has
slowed to a stall. 206 Fourth, with respect to variations in brain structures,
Spencer, and the Neo-Darwinians, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY, supra note 34, at 592, 605
(citing W.R. Greg, On the Failure of "Natural Selection" in the Case of Man, 78 FRASER'S MAG.
353 (1868)).
203 For example, upon reporting that adverse mutations occur in the human genome
more rapidly than in other animals, it was noted that "some biologists fear that as the bite
of natural selection is relaxed by medical advances, the mutational baggage could become
more significant in the centuries ahead." Nicholas Wade, To Err Is Human, DNA Analysis
Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1999, at A24. But perhaps we are on the brink of overcoming
this problem by gene therapy. See WILSON, CONSILIENCE, supra note 5, at 275-76.
204 "The concept of temperament refers to any moderately stable, differentiating
emotional or behavioral quality whose appearance in childhood is influenced by an
inherited biology, including differences in brain neurochemistry." KAGAN, supra note 140,
at xvii. Pinker mentions "the five major ways in which personality can vary... : openness
to experience, conscientiousness, extroversion-introversion, antagonism-agreeableness, and
neuroticism." PINKER, supra note 11, at 375; see RIDLEY, supra note 128, at 82-83.
The preservation of the vulnerable may support the benefits of natural selection since
it "preserve[s] a greater range of variation in the species and help[s] those to survive who
are needed by the species in its growing dependence on intelligence, inquisitiveness, and
social invention." LIONEL TIGER & ROBIN Fox, THE IMPERIAL ANIMAL 182 (1971). On the
other hand, it may also preserve, to put it crudely, the stupid, incurious and prosaic.
205 See, e.g., GEORGE AINSLIE, PICOECONOMIcS 368 (1992) ("Henceforth, the people who
leave the most surviving offspring will largely be those who are most motivated to do so
(or least motivated not to do so), a trait that may not be particularly correlated with the
skills of environmental mastery that our reward structure evolved to foster."). Darwin
responded to the concern that the "inferior classes" were reproducing at a rate that would
swamp the superior genes of their betters with the opinion that their social conditions
prevented this. See Richards, supra note 202, at 606. But, "it could be that civilized nations
faced, after reaching a peak, a gradual decline." Id.
206 See, e.g., LUIGI L. CAVALLI-SFORZA & FRANCESCO CAVALLI-SFORZA, THE GREAT HUMAN
DIASPORAS 246 (1995); MAYR, supra note 76, at 240; IAN TATTERSALL, BECOMING HUMAN
238-39 (1998); WILSON, CONSILIENCE, supra note 5, at 271-73; WILSON, supra note 23, at 575
("In particular, the rate of gene flow around the world has risen to dramatic levels and is
accelerating, and the mean coefficients of relationship within local communities are
correspondingly diminishing."). But see MAYNARD SMITH, supra note 76, at 327 (It "is
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the advantages of learning to cope with the environment through
cultural knowledge, rather than merely on raw mental power, may have
relieved the evolutionary pressure on gene selection. 2 7 Finally, and
most importantly, the looming crises in the human condition created by
our population and material successes to this point will not await the
many generations needed to make significant evolutionary changes.208
Since we cannot wait for nature, we must turn to nurture. In place of
the glacial pace of genetic evolution, the necessities of the modern
condition now depend on the development of responsive human culture.
Despite the contentions of some Darwinists that morality springs from
"altruistic" natural dispositions, such as those beneath kin selection and
reciprocal altruism, 2°9 perhaps, early in the controversy over Darwinism,
Thomas Huxley got it right: "Let us understand, once for all, that the
ethical progress of society depends, not on imitating the cosmic process,
still less on running away from it but in combating it." 210 From this
almost certainly the case [that] the rate of human evolution today is, as evolutionary rates
go, extremely rapid."); CHRISTOPHER WILLS, CHILDREN OF PROMETHEUS: THE
ACCELERATING PACE OF HUMAN EVOLUTION (1998).
207 See DENNETT, supra note 18, at 208 ("The design improvements one receives from
one's culture - one seldom has to 'reinvent the wheel'- probably swamp most individual
genetic differences in brain design, removing the advantage from those who are slightly
better off at birth.").
208 Will gene manipulation become an available option to speed the process? In any
event, Wills surveys the alarmists predicting the end of human evolution, and finds their
observations unpersuasive. See WILLS, supra note 206, at 17-25. In fact, the thrust of his
book is that human evolution is actually invisibly accelerating.
209 See generally ARNHART, supra note 42; PAUL L. FARBER, THE TEMPTATIONS OF
EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS (1994); WRIGHT, supra note 8; Dennis L. Krebs, The Evolution of Moral
Behaviors, in HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY 337 (Charles Crawford & Dennis
L. Krebs eds., 1998).
210 Thomas H. Huxley, Evolution and Ethics, in EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS, supra note 44, at 29,
68. For a brief historical perspective of Huxley's position, see FARBER, supra note 209, at 58-
69. For agreement with Huxley, see Ayala, supra note 42, at 235, 237. Williams, one of the
towering evolutionary biologists of the century, asserts that modern studies support an
even stronger condemnation of nature. See George C. Williams, Huxley's Evolution and
Ethics in Sociobiological Perspective, in ISSUES IN EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS, supra note 5, at 317,
337-38 [hereinafter Williams, Huxley's Evolution]; George C. Williams, Mother Nature Is a
Wicked Old Witch, in EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS, supra note 44, at 217 (citing as supporters, at
229, A. Dillard, R. Dawkins, and J. Lopreato). De Waal challenges Huxley's view, first for
"curb[ing] the explanatory power of evolution" and, second, for "offer[ing] no hint
whatsoever where humanity could possibly have unearthed the will and strength to go
against its own nature." DE WAAL, SUSHI MASTER, supra note 7, at 344; see id. at 344-49
(owing to its resemblance to the doctrine of original sin, calling this "Calvinistic
sociobiology").
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perspective, culture, a product of the group rather than the isolated
individual,211 must come to our moral rescue.
D. Cultural Norms
Culture, then, is invoked to overcome the moral limitations of
natural dispositions. Yet some sociobiologists contend that culture is
subject to the same basic evolutionary framework as is nature.212 For
example, Wilson and Charles Lumsden outline their position:
To start, the main postulate is that certain unique and
remarkable properties of the human mind result in a
tight linkage between genetic evolution and cultural
history. The human genes affect the way that the mind
is formed-which stimuli are perceived and which
missed, how information is processed, the kinds of
memories most easily recalled, the emotions they are
most likely to evoke, and so forth. The processes that
create such effects are called the epigenetic rules. The
rules are rooted in the particularities of human biology,
and they influence the way culture is formed....
Mathematical models created from the theory allow the
prediction of patterns of cultural variation from a
knowledge of such epigenetic rules. It is possible in
principle to go from data in cognitive psychology to data
in cultural anthropology and sociology, and then to
work back in the reverse direction.
211 See DE WAAL, SUSHI MASTER, supra note 7, at 31 ("Culture is a way of life shared by the
members of one group .... "); PLOTKIN, supra note 5, at 228 (" [Clulture is, by definition, a
group-level phenomenon.").
212 See, e.g., L.L. CAVALLI-SFORZA & M.W. FELDMAN, CULTURAL TRANSMISSION AND
EVOLUTION (1981); DURHAM, supra note 18, at 419; PLOTKIN, supra note 5, at 225; STEWART &
COHEN, supra note 137; P.E. Griffiths & R.D. Gray, Developmental Systems and Evolutionary
Explanation, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY, supra note 34, at 117, 140-42. "Among
biologists who are interested in the phenomenon of culture, there is widespread agreement
not only that human culture is a product of evolution (as, of course, it must be) but also
that human culture is itself an evolutionary process." Plotkin, supra note 161, at 154. For
an insightful introduction, see Tooby & Cosmides, supra note 146, at 19. See generally THE
ADAPTED MIND, supra note 8. That evolution is the engine driving the culture of other
species, including other primates, see BONNER, supra note 139; GOLDSMITH, ROOTS, supra
note 20, at 124; Christophe Boesch, The Emergence of Cultures Among Wild Chimpanzees, in
EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR PATrERNS IN PRIMATES AND MAN, supra note 33, at 251.
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This translation from mind to culture is half of gene-
culture coevolution. The other half is the effect that
culture has on the underlying genes. Certain epigenetic
rules-that is, certain ways in which the mind develops
or is most likely to develop- cause individuals to adopt
cultural choices that enable them to survive and
reproduce more successfully. Over many generations
these rules, and also the genes prescribing them, tend to
increase in the population. Hence culture affects genetic
evolution, just as the genes affect cultural evolution.213
Richard Alexander, in summarizing his book on Darwinian aspects
of human affairs, "argue[s] that culture is, like phenotypes among all
organisms, a kind of biological adaptation through plasticity that is
simply more elaborate and has a greater potential for intergenerational
heritability than other kinds of phenotypic plasticity." 21 4  Thus,
"variations in cultural patterns, like phenotypic variations in general, are
interpretable as outcomes of the reproductive strivings of competing and
213 PROMETHEAN FIRE, supra note 5, at 20. The authors had taken on the same subject for
specialists a few years earlier. See LUMSDEN & WILSON, supra note 150. For brief summaries
of the main threads, see WILSON, CONSILIENCE, supra note 5, at 127-28, 157-58, 217-18;
WILSON, SEARCH, supra note 83, at 109-11. The epigenetic rules "are innate operations in
the sensory system and brain. They are rules of thumb that allow organisms to find rapid
solutions to problems encountered in the environment. They predispose individuals to
view the world in a particular innate way and automatically to make certain choices as
opposed to others." WILSON, SEARCH, supra note 83, at 193. Lumsden and Wilson
speculate, based on coevolutionary equations, that a "thousand-year rule" may operate to
facilitate great acceleration of human genetic change through cultural innovation: "In as
few as fifty generations- about a thousand years - substantial genetic evolution can occur
in the epigenetic rules guiding thought and behavior." PROMETHEAN FIRE, supra note 5, at
152. Culture "is a force so powerful in its own right that it drags the genes along. Working
as a rapid mutator, it throws new variations into the teeth of natural selection and changes
the epigenetic rules across generations." Id. at 154. Notice how uncomfortably this
speculation fits with assertions that human genetic evolution has been de minimus since
the development of agriculture some 10,000 years ago, see supra note 194, or has even come
to a halt, see supra note 206. Perhaps this inconsistency can be resolved by concluding that
culture has not changed in the last ten millennia. Nahhhhh. They didn't have blue jeans
back then. Perhaps, then, Tinbergen is correct in surmising that genetic evolution has not
kept pace with cultural change: "There are good grounds for the conclusion that man's
limited behavioral adjustability has been outpaced by the culturally determined changes in
his social environment, and that this is why man is now a misfit in his own society." Niko
Tinbergen, On War and Peace in Animals and Man, in THE SOCIOBIOLOGY DEBATE, supra note
7, at 76, 89.
214 ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at xvi.
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cooperating individuals who live in different circumstances." 21 Cultural
change can be analyzed in a manner parallel to genetic evolution, the
same general processes being at work.216
One aspect of the view that culture affects evolution is that social
norms face survival pressures. Irrespective of whether genes predispose
humans to choose particular moral maxims, 217 once adopted, or even
215 Id.; see Richard D. Alexander, Evolution and Culture, in EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY, supra
note 7, at 59. "Culture, including the more resplendent manifestations of ritual and
religion, can be interpreted as a hierarchical system of environmental tracking devices."
WILSON, supra note 23, at 560. "The span of the purely cultural tracking system parallels
much of the slower segment of the biological tracking system, ranging from days [e.g.,
fashion] to generations [e.g., religion]." Id.
216 See ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 73-74 (the processes constituting inheritance,
mutation, selection, drift, and isolation). Other commentators also see a coupling between
cultural change and genetic evolution. See, e.g., id. at 78-82; THEODOSIUS DOBZHANSKY,
MANKIND EVOLVING 18-21 (1962); DURHAM, supra note 18; GOLDSMITH, ROOTS, supra note
20, at 126-30; MASTERS, POLITICS, supra note 42, at 69-113 ("Society, Language, and Cultural
Change"); PLOTKIN, supra note 5, at 230-40; William H. Durham, Toward a Coevolutionary
Theory of Human Biology and Culture, in EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY, supra note 7, at 39
[hereinafter Durham, Coevolutionary Theory], and in THE SOCIOBIOLOGY DEBATE, supra note
7, at 428. For a comparison of some of the characteristics of organic and cultural evolution,
finding that the essential difference is the replicating units (genes versus memes), see
DURHAM, supra note 18, at 426; GOLDSMITH, ROOTS, supra note 20, at 126-28. Wilson
concludes that "Itihe genetic fitness hypothesis- that the most widely distributed traits of
culture confer Darwinian advantage on the genes that predispose them-has been
reasonably well borne out by the evidence." WILSON, CONSILIENCE, supra note 5, at 172.
Comparing human social traits with the behavior of other primates, Wilson posits that
some traits are relatively labile, such as "openness of group to others," while others are
comparatively conservative, such as "aggressive dominance systems, with males dominant
over females" and "scaling of responses, especially in aggressive interactions." WILSON,
supra note 23, at 552. But again, as one critic acknowledges, both Wilson and Alexander are
careful to deny biological determinism of culture. See Marvin Harris, Sociobiology and
Biological Reductionism, in SOCIOBIOLOGY EXAMINED, supra note 134, at 311, 318 (quoting
E.O. Wilson, Biology and Social Sciences, 106 DAEDALUS 127, 133 (1977) ("The evidence is
strong that almost but probably not quite all differences among cultures are based on
learning and socialization rather than on genes."), and Richard Alexander, Evolution,
Human Behavior, and Determinism, 2 PHIL. SCI. ASS'N - PROC. BIENNIAL MEETINGS 3, 6 (1976)
("I hypothesize that the vast bulk of cultural variations among peoples alive today will
eventually be shown to have virtually nothing to do with their genetic differences.")). De
Waal explains the connection: "Although the relation between culture and nature can be
tense, culture mostly tries to get along with nature, like the mouse with the elephant,
because there is little doubt which is the heavyweight." DE WAAL, SUSHI MASTER, supra
note 7, at 275.
217 One group of commentators surmises that evolutionary reasoning does not suggest a
"genetic disposition toward specific moral norms." H.S. Markl et al., Group One [Reports on
Group Discussions], in MORALITY AS A BIOLOGICAL PHENOMENON, supra note 93, at 209, 215.
Nevertheless, Fukuyama contends "that we human beings are by nature designed to create
moral rules and social order for ourselves. The situation of normlessness -what Durkheim
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considered, the maxims confront other, competing maxims in the
marketplace of ideas. Those that significantly handicap subscribers in
the competition for resources and reproduction are likely to fare poorly
against others. When potential subscribers consciously think of the
tradeoffs among norms, they may evaluate the conceivable effects of the
maxims on their welfare and dispositionally be influenced in their
choices accordingly. 218 Even if they do not consciously think of the
tradeoffs, those that choose maxims hindering reproductive success are
less likely to leave offspring, thereby depleting the gene pool of any
natural disposition that might support their choice. But (extended)
prudence notwithstanding, humans, as rational, ethical beings, are fully
capable of making principled, moral decisions irrespective of their
survival or reproductive consequences. Both principle and prudence,
though often at odds, doubtlessly influence individual moral
decisionmaking. 219
Collectively, similar evolutionary pressures may confront general
cultural norms.220 For example, in a society that does not reward war
heroes or their kin, self-sacrificing norms will be more difficult to
labeled anomie- is intensely uncomfortable for us, and we will seek to create new rules to
replace the ones that have been undercut." FUKUYAMA, supra note 50, at 137.
218 See Markl et al., supra note 217, at 215-19. In sum, "moral systems would be subject to
selection in the process of cultural evolution according to their ability to confer greater
fitness, that is, survival capacity on their adherents." Id. at 216.
219 De Duve, a Nobelist for his study of the cell, speculates that "ethical rules were
fashioned and screened in the course of biological and, especially, cultural evolution, by a
trial-and-error process in which their effects on individual fitness and social cohesion acted
as selective factors." CHRISTIAN DE DuvE, VITAL DUST 266 (1995). Yet this does preclude
the possibility that "this evolution also reflects a progressive appreciation of absolute
values, from dimly perceived and inadequately applied notions to more clearly
apprehended and rationally argued imperatives. The two developments are not
incompatible." Id. For an extended, thought-provoking examination of values and
evolution, see GEORGE E. PUGH, THE BIOLOGICAL ORIGIN OF HUMAN VALUES (1977).
220 Again, natural selection does not determine cultural norms. "It might, for example, be
possible to show that a particular form of behavior in a particular society is maladaptive,
but nevertheless evaluated, in that society, as morally good." Irons, supra note 19, at 38. "It
also does not imply that the behavior is morally incorrect by any universal standard that I
am aware of." Id. Durham hypothesizes "that cultural features of human phenotypes are
commonly designed to promote the success of an individual human being in his or her
natural and sociocultural environment." Durham, Coevolutionary Theory, supra note 216, at
46 (emphasis omitted). But, since many cultural norms are rather neutral with respect to
fitness costs or benefits, even in principle they would face inconsequential selection
pressure. See id. at 50. That many cultural and moral norms are subject to the survival fires
of between-group competition, see ELLIOTT SOBER & DAVID S. WILSON, UNTO OTHERS 173-
75 (1998); Markl et al., supra note 217, at 218-19.
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inculcate among warriors. 221 Difficult, but of course, not impossible, for
the arts of entreaty have been well honed by the language-speaking
species, as seen in the gung-ho, selfless attitude often instilled in the
military and even far back in the mythological skills of Odysseus, the
shrewd one, who has been said to have been the first modern man owing
to his ability to have his way with others through his glibness and
persuasiveness. 222  But perhaps these examples simply reflect the
221 See infra note 237. One commentator surmises that cultural norms advantageous to
group survival and reproduction, but not individual inclusive fitness, will not, in general,
endure, and vice versa. See Durham, Coevolutionany Theory, supra note 216, at 51-53. On the
other hand, the behavioral traits that increase an individual's reproductive success within a
group, for example, dominance and territoriality, may also become manifest in intergroup
conflicts, as where the "alpha male" is quick to meet threats by rival groups, thereby
possibly having overall reproductive benefits despite the additional risk to the trait holder.
See MASTERS, POLITICS, supra note 42, at 7-9.
222 This observation about Odysseus came from my freshman literature instructor. I have
found no written endorsement. "[I]n a group of communicators competing for attention
and sympathies there is a premium on the ability to engage, interest, and persuade
listeners." Steven Pinker & Paul Bloom, Natural Language and Natural Selection, in THE
ADAPTED MIND, supra note 7, at 451, 483. "Symons's observation that tribal chiefs are often
both gifted orators and highly polygynous is a splendid prod to any imagination that
cannot conceive of how linguistic skills could make a Darwinian difference." Id. (citing
SYMONS, supra note 143). "[Llet me grant at once that the intensity and form of altruistic
acts are to a large extent culturally determined." WILSON, SEARCH, supra note 83, at 82.
Although the promotion of morality is advantageous to each member of society, see infra
note 222, the "continuing possibilities of differential success within groups" leads us to
expect each individual "to promote a slightly greater degree of 'morality' (altruism) in his
neighbor than in himself." Richard D. Alexander, Biology and the Moral Paradoxes, in LAW,
BIOLOGY AND CULTURE, supra note 42, at 101, 106. According to Campbell, among the
possible routes to the "ultrasociality" of humans "are reciprocal altruism (clique
selfishness), moralistic aggression to punish defectors from reciprocal-altruist pacts, the in-
group as a socially inherited reciprocal-altruist pact, socially evolved beliefs promising
transcendent purposes, posthumous rewards for altruistic contribution to group welfare at
own expense, and transcendent sanctions against self-serving behavior that jeopardizes
group welfare." Donald T. Campbell, Legal and Primary-Group Social Controls, in LAW,
BIOLOGY AND CULTURE, supra note 42, at 159, 160.. For complications, see id. at 161-63.
Wilson notes that "[hiuman beings are absurdly easy to indoctrinate- they seek it."
WILSON, supra note 23, at 562. He speculates that this occurs because conformity has fitness
value among groups or individuals. Id. Midgley defends Wilson's observation and
observes that it is simply an example of social conditioning, not irresistible genetic
determinism. See MIDGLEY, supra note 13, at xx-xxi. Thiessen also notes that humans are
extraordinarily credulous, perhaps because during the evolution of hominids instant,
uncritical action was sometimes required to avoid immediate risks. See THIESSEN, supra
note 106, at 180-81. But see John Maynard Smith, The Evolution of Animal Intelligence, in
MINDS, MACHINES AND EVOLUTION 63, 70 (Christopher Hookway ed., 1984) (" [Mien can be
swayed by beliefs, but not too far."). Durham would grant the possible preservation of a
social system that sacrifices individual inclusive fitness for the group advantage if it could
be maintained by force or misinformation. See Durham, Coevolutionan Theory, supra note
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observation that norm-setters are naturally disposed to espouse maxims
that are in their own self-interest, so that, at a more remote vantagepoint,
even apparently self-sacrificing norms are often under the sway of self-
interest.223 Hence, inasmuch as cultural norms are also subject to the
self-centered tendencies of evolution, to be truly ethical creatures we
must counter some of the dispositions stemming from nurture as well as
those from nature by finding the means to embrace maxims not driven
simply by self-interest, for otherwise morals merely resolve into
prudence.224 In principle, this can be done, for the biological and cultural
evolutionary processes are largely driven by different replicators, genes
versus memes,225 with reason closer to the surface of the latter. Even
216, at 52. But indoctrinability can go too far. "If a person played out a socially constructed
role, other people could shape the role to prosper at his or her expense. Powerful men
could brainwash the others to enjoy being celibate or cuckolded, leaving the women for
them." PINKER, supra note 6, at 467. The genes for indoctrinability would then be selected
out. Id.
213 See ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 240 (contending that the function of the law is to
regulate reproductive strivings for the sake of group unity, this providing "beneficial
effects to those segments or units that propose, maintain, adjust, and enforce the laws").
Moving to the vantagepoint of the kin group, Alexander "suggest[s] that the concepts of
right and wrong are instilled into children in such fashion as to guide them toward
inclusive-fitness-maximizing behavior in the particular societies and groups within which
they are growing up and are likely to live out their lives." Id. at 275. Beyond the kin group,
each member of society would benefit from encouraging other members to be more
altruistic. "One way of promoting this outcome is to designate as heroes (i.e. as
appropriate targets for special rewards) those who most closely approach the ideal moral
condition." Alexander, supra note 222, at 107. Irons urges anthropologists to test in
traditional societies "the prediction that people will try to influence the social rules and other
aspects of their culture in such a way as to promote their reproductive interests." Irons,
supra note 30, at 77.
224 Following this reasoning, Williams concludes that, updating Huxley, the "program for
the betterment of the human condition is a twofold attack on the natural enemy and any
institutional enemies favored by cultural evolution." Williams, Huxley's Evolution, supra
note 210, at 342.
225 See supra note 212; DENNETr, supra note 18, at 199-208 ("The Third Evolutionary
Process: Memes and Cultural Evolution"); PLOTKIN, supra note 5, at 231 ("Put another way,
if cultural change is wrought by the actions of cultural replicators and cultural vehicles,
then those replicators copy and propagate themselves sometimes without regard to
biological replicator survival."). But see DE WAAL, SUSHI MASTER, supra note 7, at 264-66
(doubting the parallelism of genes and memes). See generally BALKIN, supra note 154; SUSAN
BLACKMORE, THE MEME MACHINE (1999); RICHARD BRODIE, VIRUS OF THE MIND (1996);
AARON LYNCH, THOUGHT CONTAGION (1996); Fried, supra note 163. For an anthropological
view, see EVOLUTION AND CULTURE, supra note 201. Posner has a less sanguine view. "A
society's moral code changes when it is shown to be nonadaptive, when changes in
material conditions... challenge factual assertions entangled in the moral code, or when a
charismatic moral leader uses nonrational methods of persuasion to alter moral feeling."
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independent of reason, history has shown that some memes, such as
those favoring smoking or the consumption of fast food, may overcome
the interests of genes.2 26
Irrespective of whether culture, including its normative components,
is subject to the same bottom up, invisible hand dynamic that drives
genetic evolution,227 it also responds to top down, centrally commanded
channeling, regardless of whether the channel is designed to promote
reproduction.228 This, at least, is a key motivation behind the enactment
of criminal sanctions, tax breaks, and other positive and negative
legislative incentive schemes. People react to carrots and sticks.
These legislative incentive schemes may even affect the gene pool.
For example, imprisonment removes offenders, violent ones usually
during their prime reproductive years, from mating opportunities. Tax
incentives, by increasing the wealth of those who exploit them, make
these persons, especially if they are men,229 more reproductively
Richard A. Posner, The Problernatics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1637, 1689-
90 (1998).
226 See PLOTKIN,, supra note 5, at 235-36 (endocannibalism, smoking, fast driving). Even
Wilson, the bulls-eye of much criticism of sociobiology, declares the epigenetic rules of
evolution, including cultural evolution, to be "usually adaptive." WILSON, CONSILIENCE,
supra note 5, at 150 (emphasis added). "Particular features of culture have sometimes
emerged that reduce Darwinian fitness, at least for a time. Culture can indeed run wild for
a while, and even destroy the individuals that foster it." Id. at 158. Plotkin remarks that
some apparently destructive behavior may instead be beneficial through sexual selection,
as where females favor men who engage in risky behavior for their bravery. PLOTKIN,
supra note 5, at 236-38.
227 While biological evolution is Darwinian, that is, driven by the natural selection of
adaptive characteristics, cultural evolution may be both Darwinian and Lamarckian, of
sorts, in that it also allows for the passing of acquired characteristics through social
learning. See BALKIN, supra note 154, at 35-36. But see PINKER, supra note 6, at 209 ("To say
that cultural evolution is Lamarckian is to confess that one has no idea how it works.").
Balkin finds the analogy between genes and culture limited, for some cultural choices are
irrelevant to survival advantage, e.g., the various designs of guitars and violins. BALKIN,
supra note 154, at 36. Yet this is also the case for biological evolution in which some genetic
changes are neutral with respect to fitness. See, e.g., MAYR, supra note 5, at 151-53 ("neutral
evolution"). The important relevant feature for genetic and cultural evolution is the
capacity for variation, some beneficial, some deleterious, and some neutral.
2W See MASTERS, POLITICS, supra note 42, at 139 ("Whether or not enforced by a central
government, law functions as a program whose primary function is to channel the behavior
of the individuals and groups comprising a society.").
29 The qualities perceived as desirable for a mate diverge between men and women.
Men generally prefer women who are young and physically attractive. Women generally
prefer men who have status, maturity, and economic resources. See Buss, DESIRE, supra
note 8, at 211.
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desirable. But in the short history of incentive programs, and even
central government itself, consequent changes in the gene pool must be
marginal at best.230  Draconian, even fascistic, measures, such as
mandatory sterilization, 231 have been proposed and implemented in the
past to remove perceived negative qualities from the breeding
population,232 but these eugenic steps have been rightfully rejected as too
tyrannical for an enlightened society.233 While the excesses of advocates
have even resulted in driving the term "eugenics" off stage as politically
incorrect, the complaint is mainly leveled against "negative" eugenics,
which aims to remove "bad" genes from the gene pool as by sterilization
of "undesirables," rather than "positive" eugenics, which attempts to
increase "good" genes as by establishing sperm banks of Nobelists. 234 If
2M Interestingly, on the one hand, cultural change may "creat[e] new and different
organic selection pressures." Durham, Coevolutionary Theon, supra note 216, at 53. On the
other hand, over the long history of mankind, the cultural traits molded by natural
selection may relieve selective pressure on individual genotypes since cultural norms, by
guiding behavior, "may make the genotypes equally or almost equally 'fit."' Id. Hence,
because adaptive behavior may be driven by culture, as a "proximate" mechanism, rather
than genes, as an "ultimate" mechanism, Durham believes this "shifts the burden of proof
for any explicitly biological basis for particular adaptive human behaviors over to the
sociobiologists." Id. at 53.
231 Holmes insured that the excesses of mandatory sterilization will remain in modern
consciousness with his memorable and misguided phrase, "[tlhree generations of imbeciles
are enough." See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). Gould notes that "all liberal justices
voted aye; the single dissent in this eight-to-one ruling was filed by the court's most
conservative member, a catholic who upheld his church's position on reproductive
controls." STEPHEN JAY GOULD, Does the Stoneless Plum Instruct the Thinking Reed?, in
DINOSAUR IN A HAYSTACK 285,287 (1995).
232 While Darwin does not propose draconian measures to alleviate the perceived
problem, he was not beyond expressing concern about the deleterious consequences of
allowing the "inferior members of society" to breed abundantly. See CHARLES DARWIN, The
Descent of Man, in THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 501-02, 507 (Modern Library n.d.) (1871).
M But, as Gould notices, eugenics has not been championed only by the authoritarian
right. "[Elugenics, touted in its day as the latest in scientific modernism, attracted many
liberals and numbered among its -most vociferous critics groups often labeled as
reactionary and antiscientific." STEPHEN JAY GOULD, Carrie Buck's Daughter, in THE
FLAMINGO'S SMILE, supra note 186, at 306, 310-11 (1985). "The movement spanned a full
spectrum from hereditarian hardheads who wanted to sterilize the handicapped, the
diseased, and even the merely impoverished, to Fabian idealists who hoped to persuade
smart and gentle people to have more kids." GOULD, supra note 231, at 287.
234 See, e.g., DANIEL J. KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS 85 (1985). But Posner finds
positive eugenics more ominous than negative eugenics such as genetic screening, though
the "macrosocial effects" are so distant that "it seems idle to worry about them now."
POSNER, supra note 153, at 432. Nevertheless, apparently Nobelists will have to find ways
other than sperm banks to leave progeny. When such a sperm bank was founded in 1980,
"[t]he couples who patronized the bank did not want the Nobel laureates' sperm ...
because of the advanced age of the laureates; for the older the male (as well as the female)
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it did not strike the modem ear so discordantly, one might even say that
some tax incentives are partially inspired by positive eugenics. Be that
as it may, in their evolutionarily brief period of existence, it is hardly
conceivable that positive eugenics alone can sufficiently affect human
dispositions to solve immediate social problems.
Instead of channeling behavior by affecting the genetic component of
natural tendencies in the population through positive or negative
eugenics, society realistically is limited to creating an environment in
which individual character is refined to the point where it can overcome,
as much as possible, personal temperament that is individually injurious
or socially detrimental. A just society struggles to devise an enlightened
vision of human flourishing, and then implement that vision through
means, public and private, that respect individual rights and encourage
personal responsibility.
The question remains whether an enlightened vision of human
flourishing aligns with the mechanisms that drive evolution. As seen in
the next section, the common visions diverge from natural selection in
important ways.
IV. THE POLITICS OF SOCIOBIOLOGY
Natural selection operates slowly over aeons of time at the level of
the individual, even at the level of a particular gene within an individual,
but not, generally, at the level of a group.235 Beyond the reach of
parent, the greater the risk of birth defects." Id. at 421. But the bank is prospering by
offering the sperm of younger, well-regarded scientists. Id.
235 "All traits must begin as rare in a species and can increase in frequency only if they
increase the survival and reproductivity of those bearing the traits." TRIVERS, supra note 19,
at 85. Many evolutionary biologists have been seduced by the notion that evolution
operates at the level of the group rather than the individual. See id. at 67-68. See generally
id. at 67-85 ("The Group Selection Fallacy"). Indeed, there are conditions in which selection
may operate at the level of the group rather than the individual. This occurs "only for
groups with a fitness value that is greater than the arithmetic mean of the fitness values of
the individuals of which it is composed. There are only two such groups," those
encompassed by kin selection and reciprocal altruism. MAYR, supra note 5, at 157; see
GOLDSMITH, ROOTS, supra note 20, at 41; MAYR, supra note 76, at 200-03; PLOTKIN, supra note
5, at 228-30; Robert N. Brandon, The Level of Selection: A Hierarchy of Interactors, in THE
PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY, supra note 34, at 176, 183-85; Mackie, supra note 137, at 172-75.
Some modern biologists even see a substantial role for group selection, see, e.g., GOULD,
Cardboard Danvinisyn, supra note 187, at 30-31 (criticizing sociobiologists for failing to take
this into account); SOBER & WILSON, supra note 220 (explaining the existence of altruism
partially in terms of group selection); James H. Fetzer, Group Selection and the Evolution of
Culture, in 6 RESEARCH IN BIOPOLITICS: SOCIOBIOLOGY AND POLITICS, supra note 83, at 3;
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altruism falling within the principles of kin selection and reciprocal
altruism, which upon closer inspection is self-interested in some sense, 236
behavior that is beneficial to a group may provide no reproductive
advantage to particular individuals within the group. To return to the
example of the warrior who sacrifices herself on a battlefront "for the
motherland," she gains by this conduct alone no advantage in the
struggle to increase her contribution to the gene pool. Consequently,
any genes that might dispose a person to this unrewarded, sacrificial
behavior will probably be selected against.237 In general, the interests of
the individual may be disadvantageous to the group, be it family, tribe,
David S. Wilson & Elliott Sober, Reintroducing Group Selection to the Human Behavioral
Sciences, 17 BEHAV. & BRAIN Sci. 585 (1994), but, as the commentators on Wilson and
Sloan's lead article reveal, most demur to an extensive reintroduction, see, e.g., John Alroy
et al., Open Peer Commentary, 17 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 608 (1994), though there is life in the
idea, see SEGERSTRALE, supra note 6, at 282-85. See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 36-
43; THE PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY, supra note 34, at 147-220 ("Units of Selection");
SEGERSTRALE, supra note 6, at 127-55; WILSON, supra note 23, at 106-29. Darwin recognized
an interrelationship between group and individual selection. See DARWIN, supra note 232,
at 443.
236 See supra text accompanying notes 27-37.
237 See D.T. Campbell, Social Morality Norms as Evidence of Conflict Between Biological
Human Nature and Social System Requirements, in MORALITY AS A BIOLOGICAL PHENOMENON,
supra note 93, at 67, 76 ("[Tlhe predicament of genetic competition among the cooperators
precludes the biological evolution for any strong innate tendencies toward self-sacrificial
altruism in the group's benefit ...."). Wright posits that, under the principle of kin
selection, this wartime sacrificial behavior may have once had fitness value when the
soldiers were in the presence of close relatives. See WRIGHT, supra note 8, at 390-91.
Perhaps reciprocal altruism supports warrior cooperation and sacrifice. See John Q. Patton,
Reciprocal Altruism and Warfare, in ADAPTATION AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 417 (Lee Cronk et
al. eds., 2000). Perhaps the self-sacrificers who survived had increased procreational
opportunities. See Campbell, supra, at 77. Even today one can imagine substantial rewards
to the relatives of sacrificing soldiers having reproductive benefits by means of kin
selection. The tendency to praise and socially reward self-sacrifice may even be innate. Id.
at 76-77. Or one can imagine that the disposition to such sacrificial behavior may spill over
to other, genetically advantageous contexts, as where one makes other types of sacrifices
for kin. In any case, for "nationalistic military patriotism[] [t]here probably has been more
widespread convergent evolution ... than for any other moralizing system." Id. at 80
(citation omitted). In general, "[e]ven if sainthood takes you into the biologically
maladaptive, the Darwinian would think this no more than the occasional price you pay for
a first-class social-facilitating mechanism like morality. Most of us admire saints, but feel
no great pressure to follow them-nor do we think we should." RUSE, supra note 30, at 244
(citation omitted); see WILSON, supra note 52, at 164-66 ("Sainthood is not so much the
hypertrophy of human altruism as its ossification. It is cheerfully subordinate to the
biological imperatives above which it is supposed to rise."); Posner, supra note 225, at 1667-
68 (noting that to encourage sacrifice, the military and church forge group loyalties and
provide posthumous rewards).
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or nation,23 8 just as the interests of any of the group levels may conflict
with the interests of another level.239
What normative lessons are to be drawn from the fact that selection
operates glacially at the level of the gene rather than the group? The
Humean chasm between "is" and "ought" instructs us that no moral
lessons come directly since natural selection operates in the realm of fact
and the inquiries into personal and community interests operate in the
realm of value. Nevertheless, there is a noteworthy correlation between
the political views of the antagonists over sociobiology and their
particular positions.240 The labels and epithets in the attacks reflect this.
The critics have contended that sociobiological analysis explicitly or
implicitly justifies the inequalities of the status quo, 241 sexism, 24 2
2M Consequently, "[olne set of moral norms can be understood as attempts to protect
group members from the unbounded self-interest of others (the banning of murder, theft,
witchcraft, slander, adultery)." N. Bischof, On the Phylogeny of Human Morality, in
MORALITY AS A BIOLOGICAL PHENOMENON, supra note 93, at 48, 50. But "[tihere appears to
be no 'general moral principle' from which all the concrete norms may be deduced." Id.
239 After making this observation, Wilson notes that
[clounteracting selection on these different units will result in certain
genes being multiplied and fixed, others lost, and combinations of still
others held in static proportions. According to the present theory,
some of the genes will produce emotional states that reflect the balance
of counteracting selection forces at the different levels.
Wilson, Morality of tihe Gene, supra note 5, at 155.
240 See, e.g., MAYR, supra note 76, at 41 ("And the reason why sociobiology was attacked
so viciously in the 1970s was that it seemed to promote certain political values
incompatible with those of its opponents."). Steven Rose maintains that science is
inevitably swayed by the political outlook of its practitioners. "The metaphors and
analogies we find attractive are laden with cultural values and expectations that come from
outside our science.... That is, they are not and cannot be free from ideology." ROSE,
supra note 11, at 68. Those scientists who deny this "are at best unselfreflective." Id.; see
also LEWONTIN, supra note 90 (ideology permeates science).
241 See, e.g., MARSHALL SAHLINS, THE USE AND ABUSE OF BIOLOGY 101 (1976); Allen et al.,
supra note 129, at 264; Martin Barker, Biology and Ideology: The Uses of Reductionisni, in
AGAINST BIOLOGICAL DETERMINISM, supra note 13, at 9, 26-27; Gould, supra note 175, at 285;
Montagu, supra note 134, at 12-13; Simon, supra note 187, at 308-09; Sociobiology Study
Group, supra note 76, at 280-81. "Darwin's evolutionary biology [has also been accused by
postmodernists of] being motivated by a wish to perpetuate the privileged social class from
which he came...." CARL SAGAN, THE DEMON-HAUNTED WORLD 257 (1995). Irons states
that the early claim by Sahlins, an anthropologist, that sociobiology was simply a form of a
self-justificatory ideology supporting the entrenched bourgeois culture, among other
things, made the subject politically incorrect for other anthropologists. See Irons, supra note
30, at 72-75 (discussing SAHLINS, supra).
One social scientist provides a taste of the Darwinian argument supporting the status
quo: "If man .... believes that he has a species-specific repertoire of behavior that can be
combined successfully only in certain ways, then there are definite limits to what this
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racism, 243 elitism,244 nationalism, 245 reactionary politics,246 fatalism, 247
eugenics,248 discrimination,249 social injustice,250 preventive detention,
animal can do, to the kinds of societies he can operate, to the kinds of cultures he can live
with." Fox, supra note 88, at 19. Fox lumps the "progressive-liberal" of the United States
with the "revolutionary-socialist" of Soviet Russia as naively rejecting the natural
limitations in human behavior and accepting "an infinitely perfectible human machine and
a totally unoriginal virtue that will be implanted by the benign, self-appointed mentors."
Id. at 40-41. Alexander matter-of-factly concludes that his sociobiological arguments
regarding culture would give rise to certain expectations, including "a reasonably close
correspondence between the structure of culture and its usefulness to individuals in
inclusive-fitness-maximizing," as well as "tendencies for culture to be so structured as to
resist substantial alteration by individuals and subgroups in their own interests and
contrary to those of others." ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 85. Barash rebuts this claim that
Darwinism rationalizes the status quo on the grounds that, since evolution may lead to
dead ends on the "adaptive landscape," "evolutionary biology does not claim that all
phenotypes must represent fitnesses that are absolutely maximal." BARASH, supra note 28,
at 280.
242 See, e.g., GOULD, Cardboard Darwinisn, supra note 187, at 29 (quoting Wilson's surmise
that, owing to an apparently genetic bias, "[elven with identical education and equal access
to all professions, men are likely to continue to play a disproportionate role in political life,
business and science"); Joseph Alper et al., Sociobiology Is a Political Issue, in THE
SOCIOBIOLOGY DEBATE, supra note 7, at 476, 481-85; Barker, supra note 241, at 11, 14, 26;
Montagu, supra note 134, at 12-13; Sociobiology Study Group, supra note 76, at 280-81.
Fausto-Sterling worries that the defense of "natural impulses" may even justify rape, at
least partially. See FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 142, at 156-58, 161-62.
243 See, e.g., ROSE, supra note 11, at 207 n.19; Barker, supra note 241, at 14-15; Montagu,
supra note 134, at 12-13. One advocate disclaims the racist thrust of his discipline with this
point: "Sociobiology deals with biological universals that may underlie human social
behavior, universals that are presumed to hold cross-culturally and therefore cross-racially.
What better antidote for racism than such emphasis on the behavioral commonality of our
single species?" BARASH, supra note 28, at 278. Similarly, Pinker points out that to a
biologist, the differences between races are "virtually invisible." For example, "the genetic
difference between, say, two randomly picked Swedes is about twelve times as large as the
genetic difference between the average of Swedes and the average of Apaches or
Warlpiris." STEVEN PINKER, THE LANGUAGE INSTINCr 430 (1994); see PINKER, supra note 11,
at 142-44. On the other hand, pop sociobiology has certainly been advanced for racist
politics. For example, the main publication of the right-wing, pro-white Council of
Conservative Citizens continually encourages subscribers "to study biological
determinism, eugenics and other racist views packaged as 'scientific."' Bob Herbert, Mr.
Lott's "Big Mistake," N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1999, at A31. Similarly, in Britain the right-wing
extremist journal New Nation has found vindication in sociobiology. See RICHARD MORRIS,
EVOLUTION AND HUMAN NATURE 162-63 (1983).
244 See, e.g., Thomas Sheehan, Paris: Moses and Polytheism, in SOCIOBIOLOGY EXAMINED,
supra note 134, at 342, 349-54; Sociobiology Study Group, supra note 76, at 280-81.
245 See, e.g., Montagu, supra note 134, at 12-13; Sociobiology Study Group, supra note 76, at
280-81.
246 See, e.g., ROSE, supra note 11, at vii, 207 n.19 (discussing the "neo-Fascist," "New
Right," and "neo-Nazi" political movements); N.A.C. & W.I., Prologue to EVOLUTIONARY
BIOLOGY, supra note 7, at xv (Sociobiology "invariably encourage[s] reactionary politics.");
Hilary Rose & Steven Rose, Introduction to ALAS, POOR DARWIN, supra note 13, at 1, 9
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aggression,251 "victim blaming," 25 2 moral irresponsibility, 25 3 and other
objectionable viewpoints.254
As adumbrated by this laundry list of criticisms, some proponents of
sociobiology are from the political right and the main attackers are from
the left,255 this being the case even though the political terms "right" and
("[Tlhe political agenda of EP [evolutionary psychology] is transparently part of a right-
wing libertarian attack on collectivity, above all the welfare state.").
247 See, e.g., S.A. Barnett, Biological Determinism and the Tasmanian Native Hen, in
SOCIOBIOLOGY EXAMINED, supra note 134, at 135, 153; Lawrence G. Miller, Philosophy,
Dichotomies, and Sociobiology, in THE SOCIOBIOLOGY DEBATE, supra note 7, at 319, 324
("Determinist theories [such as sociobiology] ... serve to inculcate an ethos of passivity and
thus render us susceptible to active manipulation by others.").
248 See, e.g., ROSE, supra note 11, at 274-76. See generally Diane B. Paul, Is Human Genetics
Disguised Eugenics?, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY, supra note 34, at 536. "Eugenics, to
sociological humanists, raises the specter of Nazism and Mengele's concentration camp
experiments. Perhaps it should be countered that Stalin murdered some thirty million
Soviet citizens in an intellectual climate of benign environmentalism represented by
Lysenko." van den Berghe, supra note 11, at 276.
249 See, e.g., ROSE, supra note 11, at 207 n.19 (xenophobia); Joseph Alper et al., The
Implications of Sociobiology, in THE SOCIOBIOLOGY DEBATE, supra note 7, at 333, 336; Barker,
supra note 241, at 14-15, 26 (xenophobia).
250 See, e.g., Alper et al., supra note 249, at 336.
251 See, e.g., id. ("militarism"); Barker, supra note 241, at 14-15; Sociobiology Study Group,
supra note 76, at 280-81.
252 See, e.g., ROSE, supra note 11, at 296-97, 299.
253 See, e.g., PINKER, supra note 11, at 132-33; ROSE, supra note 11, at 297 ("It was not me, it
was my genes.").
254 See generally KITCHER, supra note 13; LEWONTIN, GENES, supra note 11, at 6-7, 18-24. "In
the critiques that some biologists have directed at sociobiology, two fears recur: that a
demonstrated evolutionary basis for a barbaric behavior would seem to justify it; and that a
demonstrated genetic basis for the behavior would imply the futility of attempts at
change." JARED DIAMOND, THE THIRD CHIMPANZEE 97 (1992); PINKER, supra note 11, at 139
(noting that the fears over human nature center on four concerns: the justification of
discrimination; the futility of improving the human condition; the challenge to moral
responsibility; and, the undermining of the meaning of life).
"General opinion-stated and restated-is that if you can name a morally or
ideologically offensive cultural value, you can be sure that it has been incorporated into
evolutionary thought at some point." RUSE, supra note 3, at 203. Ruse admits there have
been sorry chapters in the history of evolutionary biology, and that "this is a legacy which
persists," id. at 206, but then, in partial defense, he situates the prejudices of the earlier
biologists in their historical, cultural setting and finds liberality in some of their assertions
notwithstanding, see id. at 207-11, and sees a "sea-change" for the better in the last two
decades, see id. at 213-15, but still finds "antediluvian places" to criticize, "like Oxford, the
home of Richard Dawkins," id. at 215, though he concludes that, while not yet fully
cleansed of prejudicial values, "evolutionary theorizing is no longer the sort of thing which
could be morally objectionable," id. at 217.
255 Even among champions of sociobiology, those with liberal inclinations may attack
those with conservative ones, or at least their articles that have conservative overtones. For
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"left" do not denominate uniform belief systems. 256 Although they
expressly recognize Hume's chasm between "is" and "ought," the
example, Kingsley Browne, after writing an article contending that evidence of the "glass
ceiling" and the "gender gap" may be partially due to the naturally disposed
temperamental differences between men and women, see Browne, supra note 162, at 971,
was criticized by legal commentators with Darwinian orientations for providing
"ammunition to those who would perpetuate per se barriers to women's entry into areas of
society from which they have been barred in the past," Oliver R. Goodenough, Biology,
Behavior, and Criminal Law: Seeking a Responsible Approach to an Inevitable Interchange, 22 VT.
L. REV. 263, 287 (1997), and for taking a sexist position, see Cheryl Hanna, Ganging Up on
Girls: Young Women and Their Emerging Violence, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 93, 120 (1999), much to
Browne's chagrin, see Kingsley R. Browne, Law, Biology, Sex, and Politics, in LAW AND
EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY 73, 82-86 (Lawrence A. Frolik ed., 1999). See CAVALLI-SFORZA &
CAVALLI-SFORZA, supra note 206, at 268 (questioning the suggested agenda of HERRNSTEIN
& MURRAY, supra note 133, which supports the recommendation "cherished by more
extreme conservatives: reduce to the bone, if not cancel completely, social services,
affirmative action, welfare programs, federal intervention in education, etc."). "Politically,
the dichotomies in the sociobiology controversy were not necessarily clearly between the
left and the right, although it was often presented this way, ... [R]ather, [it was] between a
particular type of New Left activist on the one hand and traditional liberals and democrats
on the other." SEGERSTRALE, supra note 6, at 2-3.
256 While Tiger asserts that there is no "[logical] identification of biological-linked theory
with political reaction," Lionel Tiger, Biology, Psychology, and Incorrect Assumptions of
Cultural Relativism, in EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY, supra note 7, at 511, 519, a study published
in 1949 showed a correlation between a scientist's political beliefs and her belief in the
relative roles of nature and nurture in personal development, the conservatives
emphasizing genes and the liberals, environment, see Montagu, supra note 134, at 4 (citing
NICHOLAS PASTORE, THE NATURE-NURTURE CONTROVERSY (1949)). Montagu declares a
"besetting sin of sociobiologists" is that, "in confirming their anticipated findings," they
discover biological inputs in behavior through analogy, extrapolation, or misinterpretation.
Id. at 6. Gould specifies the framework of the political debate, though not without loaded
terminology (i.e., "determinism"): "Leftist scientists are more likely to combat biological
determinism just as rightists tend to favor this quintessential justification of the status quo
as intractable biology; the correlations are not accidental." GOULD, supra note 183, at 151.
But Gould rejects the correlation as simply a reflection of biases. If "biological
determinism" proved true, he would live with this "pernicious" discovery as one must
cope with death. See id. "We have campaigned vigorously against this doctrine because
we regard determinist arguments primarily as bad biology -and only then as devices used
to support dubious politics." Id. The dubious politics of "determinists" includes
"pernicious attempts to reintroduce racism as respectable science," "fob[bing] off the
responsibility for war and violence," and "blam[ing] the poor and the hungry for their own
condition -lest we be forced to blame our economic system or our government for an
abject failure to secure a decent life for all people." STEPHEN JAY GOULD, 77W Nonscience of
Human Nature, in EVER SINCE DARWIN, supra note 190, at 237, 239.
For introductions to the political background of the sociobiological debate, see CARL
N. DEGLER, IN SEARCH OF HUMAN NATURE 317-21 (1991); PINKER, supra note 11, at 103-35;
G.S. Stent, Introduction to MORALITY AS A BIOLOGICAL PHENOMENON, supra note 93, at 1. Of
course, there are many ways in which personal politics may motivate views of
sociobiology. See, e.g., John Maynard Smith, Science and Myth, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF
BIOLOGY, supra note 34, at 374, 378 ("[Mly own caution about applying to humans ideas
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proponents are often conservatives of one stripe or another.25 7 For
example, Wilson, the leading light of sociobiology, is said to be a
libertarian.258 The critics of sociobiology are often liberals who view
drawn from a study of animal societies .... probably arose because I grew up under the
shadow of Hitler and the Nazi theories of racial superiority and biological determinism,
and not because of anything internal to biology or sociology.").
257 Some insist that "conservative" is too moderate a term in describing sociobiologists.
See, e.g., Barker, supra note 241, at 9 ("It is a matter of more than passing interest that
reductionist biology [i.e., sociobiology] has been such a source of support for reactionary
political views."). Masters rebuts the contention that sociobiology is necessarily
conservative or reactionary and offers interesting views as to why it is said to be so. See
Masters, supra note 11, at 288. "In sum, there has been a tendency to simplify debate by
collapsing a series of parallel distinctions." Id. at 288.
258 See LEWONTIN, GENES, supra note 11, at 264 (citing an interview with E.O. Wilson by C.
Fischler, in LE MONDE, Feb. 24, 1980, at 15). But Wilson's political orientation has been
variously characterized. See also SEGERSTRALE, supra note 6, at 45 ("Wilson prided himself
on being a fairly liberal thinker- the sort of person who naturally falls to the left of center
politically."); Ullica Segerstr~le, Colleagues in Conflict: An "In Vivo" Analysis of the
Sociobiology Controversy, 1 BIOLOGY & PHIL. 53, 64 (1986) [hereinafter SegerstrAle, Colleagues
in Conflict]. While apparently espousing "conservatism," Wilson insists that "[bly that
overworked and confusing term I do not mean the pietistic and selfish libertarianism into
which much of the American conservative movement has lately descended. I mean instead
the ethic that cherishes and sustains the resources and proven best institutions of a
community." WILSON, CONSILIENCE, supra note 5, at 277. In his autobiography Wilson
describes his political leanings in diverse ways. "At my core I am a social conservative, a
loyalist. I cherish traditional institutions, the more venerable and ritual-laden the better."
EDWARD 0. WILSON, NATURALIST 25 (1994) [hereinafter WILSON, NATURALIST]. "[M]y
vaguely centrist political beliefs .... " Id. at 267. "I-a Roosevelt liberal turned pragmatic
centrist ...... Id. at 346-47. This does sound more like Burke than Nozick. One
commentator ascribes Wilson's moral outlook to his religiosity, see Segerstr~le, Truth and
Consequences, supra note 83, at 253, but also attributes the zeal of Wilson, a lapsed "born
again" Baptist, "to an old desire of his: to prove the (Christian) theologians wrong" so that
they cannot "impose arbitrary moral codes which would lead to unnecessary human
suffering," Segerstr~le, Colleagues in Conflict, supra, at 57. For another psychological profile
of Wilson, see RUSE, supra note 8, at 187-91. Indeed, sociobiologists are a mixed lot.
Charles Murray and Richard Herrnstein, who stirred up a tempest with claims of natural
differences in racial intelligences in THE BELL CURVE (1994), are known for their ideological,
libertarian positions. See, e.g., GOULD, MISMEASURE, supra note 138, at 376 ("conservative
ideologues"); Howard Gardner, A Multiplicity of Intelligences, 9 Sci. AM. PRESENTS 19, 21
(1998) ("like Herrnstein and Murray, who have an ideological ax to grind"). On the other
hand, one of the leading biological theorists of human behavior, Robert Trivers, has
identified himself with the left wing, see DE WAAL, GOOD NATURED, supra note 7, at 25 (self-
described "political liberal"); WRIGHT, supra note 8, at 40, as have other sociobiologists, see,
e.g., KAGAN, supra note 139, at xxi-xxii (characterizing himself as "an aging, politically
liberal social scientist" unable "to take unreserved satisfaction from the implications of
these last fifteen years of research" supporting a genetic mechanism beneath human
temperament); RUSE, supra note 113, at 247 (describing himself "as a person with somewhat
mushy left-wing sentiments"); Melvin Konner, One Man's Rainbow, 280 SCI. AM. 107, 108
(1999) (reviewing RICHARD DAWKINS, UNWEAVING THE RAINBOW: SCIENCE, DELUSION AND
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human nature as largely informed by environment and therefore
alterable and improvable by social design.2 9 For example, among the
THE APPETITE FOR WONDER (1998)) ("I happen to share [a liberal philosophy with Stephen
Jay Gould]."). "E.O. Wilson and most other leading sociobiologists are left-of-center
liberals or social democrats." Pierre L. van den Berghe, Sociobiology: Several Views, 31
BIOSCIENCE 406, 406 (1980) (reviewing SOCIOBIOLOGY EXAMINED, supra note 134); see
HOWARD L. KAYE, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MODERN BIOLOGY 157 (1986) ("With the
exception of Robert Wallace, the explicit political position of the leading human
sociobiologists is a reform-minded liberalism."). One group of commentators, apparently
seduced by the notion of group selection, see supra note 235, conclude that "[slince the
emphasis is on survival, and since it is the genotype and surely not the individual that
survives, sociobiology includes a distinctive bias against the individual," thereby
precluding serious entertainment of "conceptions such as fairness and individual rights,
since these would ... probably work[] against the survival of the genotype." Solomon et
al., supra note 93, at 262. On the other hand, Wilson asserts that "ethical standards are
innately pluralistic." WILSON, supra note 23, at 575.
259 Lumsden and Wilson describe some of the main, "well-meaning" critics as from the
"radical left," in particular, Marxism-Leninism. PROMETHEAN FIRE, supra note 5, at 39-40,
43. For supporting evidence, see, for example, JOHN BROCKMAN, THE THIRD CULTURE 60
(1995) (quoting Gould: "I had been brought up by a Marxist father."); BROWN, supra note
129, at 54-55 (Lewontin and Levins, formerly Wilson's friends and collaborators, as
Marxists who savagely attacked Wilson); PINKER, supra note 11, at 126-28 (Gould, Kamin,
Levins, Lewontin, and Rose as Marxists or Leninists); RUSE, supra note 8, at 144-46, 165-67
(Gould and Lewontin as Marxists); RUSE, supra note 83, at 520 (Lewontin and Levins wrote
that "as working scientists in the field of evolutionary genetics and ecology, we have been
attempting with some success to guide our own research by a conscious application of
Marxist philosophy."); Segerstrhle, Colleagues in Conflict, supra note 258, at 59 (Lewontin as
Marxist). Perhaps the critics are simply liberals driven by the immediate concern to protect
the political achievements of the 1960s. See Segerstr~le, Truth and Consequences, supra note
83, at 254. Some sociobiologists have been less gentle in counterattacking their critics. For
example, Robin Fox accuses the critics of the biological perspective of being lazy-minded,
"leftover, anti-system, left-liberal, chic-radical campus rebels and lumpen Marxists of the
1960s and 1970s." ROBIN FOX, THE CHALLENGE OF ANTHROPOLOGY 376 (1994), quoted in
WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 220. As another example, Alcock targets Stephen Jay Gould,
quoting John Maynard Smith, "one of the deans of the field," for the view among
evolutionary biologists that Gould's "ideas are so confused as to be hardly worth bothering
with." Alcock, supra note 135, at 322 (quoting John Maynard Smith, Genes, Memes, & Minds,
N.Y. REV., Nov. 30, 1995, at 46). Alcock then quotes Wright who, in responding to Gould's
criticism of his work as an "absurd example" of "pop psychology," declares that Gould is,
in the view of "top-flight evolutionary biologists, ... not just a lightweight, but an actively
muddled man who has warped the public's understanding of Darwinism." Id. at 322, 323
(quoting Robert Wright, Homo Deceptus, SLATE MAG., Nov. 27, 1996, at
http://www.slate.com). For other disparaging views of Gould's reputation among
evolutionists, see DE WAAL, SUSHI MASTER, supra note 7, at 86-87; RUSE, supra note 8, at 146-
52. But Alcock doesn't have to quote others for his own railings against Gould. See Alcock,
supra note 134, at 322-35. That the critics of sociobiology have sharply responded, see, for
example, FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 142, at 203-04; Gould, Fundamentalism, supra note 6,
at 37.
In summarizing the common political divide, Maynard Smith writes that the claim
that behavior is innate rather than acquired will be invoked to support the status quo,
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most vocal, even shrill, critics of sociobiology are Stephen Jay Gould,
R.C. Lewontin, and Steven Rose, who identify themselves as liberals,
even liberal communitarians. 260 With respect to examining the merits of
sociobiology, are politically influenced commentators deriving "is" from
"ought"? 261
"because social reform can hope to alter acquired characters but not innate ones. Radicals,
from the authors of the Declaration of Independence to Karl Marx, have tended to take up
an environmentalist stance, and conservatives from Plato onward, a hereditarian stance."
J. Maynard Smith, The Concepts of Sociobiology, in MORALITY AS A BIOLOGICAL PHENOMENON,
supra note 93, at 21, 26. For one desiring significant social change, the attractions of
environmentalism are substantial: "If all individual, group, and gender differences were a
matter of environmental circumstances, then everyone could reach social and economic
equality; social problems could be engineered away." THIESSEN, supra note 107, at 272; see
PINKER, supra note 6, at 47 ("The moral equation in most discussions of human nature is
simple: innate equals right-wing equals bad."); PETER SINGER, A DARWINIAN LEFT 5 (1999)
("Belief in the malleability of human nature has been important for the left because it has
provided grounds for hoping that a very different kind of human society is possible. Here,
I suspect, is the ultimate reason why the left rejected Darwinian thought.").
260 Gould denies that his rejection of current evolutionary psychology stems from his
political orientation. See GOULD, Cardboard Darwinism, supra note 187, at 40. Instead, it
derives from his studied rejection of the strict adaptationist tenet of contemporary
Darwinism. Id. It also derives from the "speculative literature [of sociobiology] that
reached conclusions about people so out of whack with my concepts of reality." Id. at 41.
"We must not trivialize an issue so central and important as adaptationism with the
cardboard notion that only base motives could inspire any opposition." Id. Presumably,
Gould's concepts of reality are independent of his political viewpoints. Yet Gould's
compatriot on this question, Lewontin, contends that scientific workers bring to a
particular scientific "issue deep-seated prejudices .... A scientist's present view of
difficult questions is chiefly influenced by the history of his intellectual and ideological
development up to the present moment." GLENDON SCHUBERT, EVOLUTIONARY POLITICS
137 (1989) (quoting RICHARD C. LEWONTIN, THE GENETIC BASIS OF EVOLUTIONARY CHANGE
28-29 (1974)). Similarly, one observer, after extensive interviews, attributes the fiery debate
between Lewontin and Wilson not to personality or politics, but rather to "a conflict
between long-term scientific-cum-moral agendas, with the 'reductionist program' as a key
issue." Segerstrale, Colleagues in Conflict, supra note 258, at 53. She also accuses Lewontin's
research of being reductionist itself. Id. at 60. On the other hand, the objection to the
adaptationist, "reductionist program" is grounded in Marxist theory. See infra note 336.
That contemporary Darwinism is not as strictly adaptationist as Gould and other critics
claim, see PINKER, supra note 6, at 165-67.
261 In this context, Bernard Davis refers to the "ideological fallacy: the belief that one can
derive an 'is' from an 'ought.' Surely that doctrine is at least as egregious as the naturalistic
fallacy of trying to derive an 'ought' from an 'is."' Bernard Davis, A Middle Course Between
Irrelevance and Scientisni, in THE SOCIOBIOLOGY DEBATE, supra note 7, at 315, 318. That some
critics had their own political reasons for attacking sociobiology, see SEGERSTRALE, supra
note 6, at 183-84. On the other hand, "[w]ith Francis Bacon, . . . I believe it is possible to
separate one's moral convictions from the study of nature and to let the natural phenomena
guide one's inferences." KAGAN, supra note 140, at 14. But, Sagan asks, "why does it
matter what biases and emotional dispositions scientists bring to their studies-so long as
Evolution, Politics and Law
Before turning to this question, one important distinction between
political and evolutionary theory must be identified. Political theory is
teleological in this sense: all the standard schools believe that political
bodies have a purpose. They diverge over the extent to which the
purpose is centered on the individual, the community, or even a higher
power, but all find there to be some purpose. Evolutionary theory, on
the other hand, rejects teleology. Certainly mainstream biologists do not
say that evolution is designed to produce a certain type of life form, such
as intelligent beings.262 That intelligence has evolved is purely a matter
of chance that may not recur upon a rerunning of the tape of deep
time.263 We cannot even say that survival or reproduction is the purpose
of evolution. Instead, evolutionary theory simply posits that if life is to
emerge and endure in a hostile and changing environment, it will have
certain minimal features. But it may not emerge or endure, nor is the
theory wrong or "thwarted" if it does not.
A. Political Orientations
In this section, I discuss the main features that distinguish the salient
strands in the broad range of contemporary political orientations. Since
this exercise is simply for heuristic purposes, the explication of each
strand is brief, hopefully not unduly so. I must emphasize that the
beliefs of those who sympathize with a particular political orientation,
wherever it falls on the spectrum, may not fully correspond to the
defining tenets I catalog below, but rather my categories identify
common strands through family resemblances. 264 Finally, an individual
may endorse views that embrace several orientations, as where she is a
laissez faire conservative on economics, a liberal or libertarian on human
rights, and a feminist communitarian on pornography.
First, let us turn to the right. Three primary strands of the political
right may be identified for heuristic purposes: Lockean conservatives,
extending into strong libertarianism, who emphasize the value of
individual liberty; Smithian conservatives, who stress the "invisible
they are scrupulously honest and other people with different proclivities check their
results?" SAGAN, supra note 241, at 257.
262 Some commentators, such as Aristotle, believe that nature does have particular ends
or purposes, from which moral norms can be implied. See, e.g., ARNHART, supra note 42, at
238-48.
263 See STEPHEN JAY GOULD, WONDERFUL LIFE (1989).
264 That it is notoriously difficult to classify political theories or doctrines, see Hillel
Steiner, Permissiveness Pilloried: A Reply to Etzioni, 7 J. POL. PHIL. 104, 104 (1999).
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hand" approach to political economy; and Burkean conservatives, who,
seeing the individual as largely a product of society, underscore the need
to conserve its traditions and values.265 While these three strands often
discover much to fight about among one another, there are aspects of
sociobiology that each finds agreeable.
Lockeans. It is with the Lockean conservatives that the claims of the
individual against the community (the group) reign most supreme.266 As
exemplified by libertarianism, the individual is said to be prior to the
state and thus has superior claims of liberty against the community. For
example, Nozick describes "[tihe night-watchman state of classical
liberal theory" that is disallowed from coercively interfering with strong
individual rights, and is "limited to the functions of protecting all its
citizens against violence, theft, and fraud, and to the enforcement of
contracts, and so on."267 Like those who call themselves libertarians, 268
Lockeans in general, for the sake of personal liberty, grow uneasy once
they contemplate moving beyond these restricted roles for the
government.269 Not only is state action in principle likely to interfere
with personal liberty, but also, even when designed to be noninterfering,
it often does in practice because of the self-interest of the state actors who
have their own personal agendas and foibles.270
265 For somewhat more detail on this tripartite division of the political right, see BAILEY
KUKLIN & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW 64-69 (1994). As an example of
an explication of conservatism that does not identify the lines drawn here, see ROBERT
NISBET, PREJUDICES 55-61 (1982) ("Conservatism").
266 For a discussion of the relationship between sociobiology and the "social contract"
tradition, represented by Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, see Masters, supra note 11, at 282-
86.
267 See NOZICK, supra note 64, at 26.
268 Among the libertarians best known in the legal literature are Randy Barnettand
Richard Epstein. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY (1998); RICHARD
A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS (1985).
269 But some libertarians will grant the government additional roles. For example, one
libertarian declares that "[i]n a libertarian regime, government would protect property
rights and provide true public goods but would do nothing else." Paul H. Rubin, The State
of Nature and the Evolution of Political Preferences, 3 AM. L. &ECON. REV. 50, 61 (2001).
270 One reason is that power corrupts. See, e.g., JOHN E.E.D. ACTON, ESSAYS ON FREEDOM
AND POWER 364 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., 1948); FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION
OF LIBERTY 449 n.4 (1960) (quoting Herodotus, Milton, Montesquieu, Kant, Burke, John
Adams, and Madison). Discretion is abused and subject to human fallibilities. See, e.g.,
ALLEN BUCHANAN, ETHICS, EFFICIENCY, AND THE MARKET 25 (1985) ("Government
regulation ... is devised and administered by fallible human beings ... and [may]
endanger civil and political liberties by concentrating too much power in the
government."); ROBERT H. FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND 245 (1985) ("The bureaucrats
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Liberty, the self-evident rally cry of libertarians, is one of the two
basic values usually identified as grounding a liberal democracy. The
other value is equality. To put into better perspective the disputes
between some conservatives and liberals, and their alignment with
Darwinism, these two political values are explored next.
The immediate and common observation is that liberty and equality
often conflict. To the extent the state advances equality, it may thereby
invade personal liberty. For example, as often heard in the protests of
objectors, laws enacted in the name of equality to prevent private
discrimination at the same time deny individuals the freedom to
discriminate, or, in less loaded terms, the freedom to associate with
whom they choose. But let us take a closer look at the idea of liberty.
Isaiah Berlin identifies two forms of freedom or liberty (the two terms
here taken as synonyms): positive and negative.27 ' To borrow from his
underlying idea, positive liberty is the freedom to act, while negative
liberty is the freedom from the acts of others. 272 In short, it is the
difference between "freedom to ..." and "freedom from ..." In the
example above, it is the difference between the freedom to associate with
whom one wants, and the freedom from discrimination by others. But
wait a minute! This discrimination example was mustered to show the
who regulate us will almost invariably attempt to expand their sphere of control . ). " , It
is better "to leave all causes to be measured by the golden and straight mete-wand of the
law, and not to the incertain and crooked cord of discretion." HAYEK, supra, at 169 (quoting
EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 51 (1642)).
271 See ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 121-34
(1970).
272 Schlag refers to "Berlin's distinction between negative liberty (in the sense of absence
of constraints) and positive liberty (in the sense of freedom to do X or conscious self-
direction) ...." Pierre J. Schlag, An Attack on Categorical Approaches to Freedom of Speech, 30
UCLA L. REV. 671, 682 n.39 (1983). "'Negative' liberty consists of the absence of external
social interference with one's chosen activities .... while 'positive' liberty consists of social
conditions allowing for effective exercise of one's faculties of judgment and choice in the
giving of direction to one's life." Frank I. Michelman, Voices of the People: Essays on
Constitutional Democracy in Memory of Professor Julian N. Eule: "Protecting the People from
Themselves," or How Direct Can Democracy Be?, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1717, 1730 n.44 (1998).
"'Negative liberty' is 'liberty from; absence of interference beyond the shifting, but always
recognizable, frontier.' ... 'Positive liberty,' by contrast, consists in freedom to; it refers to
the ability to be 'a doer-deciding, not being decided for, self-directed ... [and capable] of
playing a human role ....'" Pamela S. Karlan, Two Concepts of Judicial Independence, 72 S.
CAL. L. REV. 535, 535 (1999) (citations to Berlin's essay omitted). For other succinct
definitions, see, for example, Frank B. Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV.
857, 863 (2001); Peter Halewood, Lazw's Bodies: Disembodiment and the Structure of Liberal
Property Rights, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1331, 1371 (1996); Christopher H. Schroeder, Rights Against
Risks, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 495 (1986).
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conflict between liberty and equality, and now it has segued into the
difference between positive and negative liberty, with equality left out of
the calculus altogether. Let me have another shot at characterizing the
tradeoffs in the antidiscrimination law. It is the difference between the
freedom to associate with whom one wants (i.e., with whom the
discriminator wants), and the freedom to associate with whom one
wants (i.e., with whom the discriminatee wants). Now the tradeoff is
expressed in two forms of positive liberty! Enough of this verbal game.
The point I want to make is simply that the distinction between liberty
and equality may not be the strong dichotomy often attributed, but I do
not wish to deny that there are real differences between the two. 273 As
exemplified by the discrimination example, it can be seen that the
common understanding of the value of liberty is usually advanced by
keeping the state away and allowing individuals to act as they
personally choose, while the promotion of the value of equality often
requires state intervention to prevent individuals from being treated
unequally by others. It is here that Lockean conservatives depart from
liberals. The Lockeans, in the name of liberty, prefer to keep the state at
bay, while the liberals, in the name of equality, are more willing to bring
in the hounds.
One can easily see the distinct coincidence between Lockean theory
and evolutionary biology regarding the relationship between the
individual and the group. Just as evolution operates at the level of the
individual rather than the group,274 so should the body politic be
centered on the individual rather than the state. While this last assertion
surely violates the Humean caution against conflating fact and value, the
coincidence nevertheless offers, at a minimum, a powerful metaphor in
the propaganda wars with other political suasions, including other right
wing ones, such as Burkeanism. Perhaps even more importantly, the
operation of evolution at the level of the individual implies that any
contrary organization of collective endeavor will entail intrinsic costs,
perhaps insuperable, in overcoming the natural disposition for self-
273 Most English-speaking philosophers agree that "the concept of liberty is essentially a
'negative' one." Quentin Skinner, The Idea of Negative Liberty: Philosophical and Historical
Perspectives, in PHILOSOPHY IN HISTORY 193, 194 (Richard Rorty et al. eds., 1984). Cf RAWLS,
supra note 64, at 114 ("The distinction between positive and negative duties is intuitively
clear in many cases, but often gives way. I shall not put any stress upon it.").
274 Recall there may be some exceptions to this generality. See supra note 234.
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interest.275 On the other side of the ledger, the natural self-interest of the
state agents, unless severely curtailed, produces threats to the liberty of
the citizenry through overreaching and abuse of discretion. If moral
reasoning supports, or at least can support, an individualistic state, and
natural science suggests that this is the most simple and secure means of
public ordering, why look elsewhere for one's politics?
Although natural selection generally operates on individuals, not
groups, this can hardly be advanced by libertarians, other than
anarchists, as grounds for unfettered liberty. Along with the naturalistic
fallacy, libertarians must confront the claim that at least part of the role
proper for a government is legitimated because of the need to cope with
troublesome human behavior, some of which is partially driven by
biological dispositions. 276  While there may be other recognized
governmental functions, such as those to solve coordination problems
(e.g., whether to drive on the left or the right),2 7 and to facilitate public
goods (e.g., libraries and highways), 278 the central, irreducible functions
275 See John 0. McGinnis, The Original Constitution and Our Origins, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 251, 252-54, 257 (1996) (ascribing this Darwinian view of humans as self-interested to
the constitutional framers).
276 As Elliott writes, "it is the limitations of biology that create the opportunity for law.
This is not a new view. A similar point was made by Madison in the Federalist, that if men
were angels, there would be no need for government or law .... " Elliott, supra note 7, at
606 (also citing Augustine and Aquinas for parallel views). "Biology can teach us about
some of the characteristics of human beings that create the need for law." Id. at 607. Since
there is an "evolutionary lag," behavioral dispositions having evolved in prehistoric times,
this leads Elliott to "propose that law amounts to a kind of evolutionary prophesies - that is,
that law is useful to societies precisely to compensate for those areas in which biology does
not suit us to live in our current environment." Id. Yet, Elliott notices, the "evolutionary
lag" can be overcome by relatively rapid evolution in some circumstances, see supra note
194, and by cultural and other environmental developments in others. Id. at 607-08.
Locke himself would not grant that biological dispositions are a factor in troublesome
behavior. He found the mind to be a tabula rasa. See FUKUYAMA, supra note 50, at 154-55
(without citation).
277 Coordination problems could be worked out without government input, though most
likely less efficiently. For example, eventually a convention would doubtlessly arise as to
whether to drive on the left or the right. Those who flout the convention would be induced
to conform by likely social sanctions as well as imposed regulation. But society could still
muddle along without the regulation.
278 We might question whether the need for a government to produce public goods is
independent of biological dispositions. Public goods are those that are not consumed by
use, such as information as contrasted to food. Because the producer cannot prevent users
from passing along the goods to others without payment to the producer, the goods will
not be produced at an efficient level by private enterprise. See, e.g., BUCHANAN, supra note
270, at 22-23. Why is it that people are willing to pass along goods to others without
1210 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol.38
granted even by libertarians short of anarchists are necessary because of
vexatious human behavior. 279 Libertarians are rarely utopians who
believe that a proper environment alone will eliminate disruptive
conduct. National defense, for one, is necessary because of what appears
to be the universal, natural aggressiveness of humans in groups, men in
particular, in pursuit of personal gain.280 Natural dispositions to take
advantage of others for one's own benefit also necessitate the
establishment of the police to prevent private trades through force or
fraud and the political control of rent-seeking, exploitive factions.281 Of
course, culture and nurture may also reinforce aggressiveness and
advantagetaking, or the converse, but history, sociology, anthropology,
and ethology offer us little reason to believe that nature does not play a
substantial role in these traits.
For many libertarians, any submission to the necessities of
countering natural dispositions with government authority is
distressing. Because of the human nature of the citizenry, authority is
difficult to administer successfully, and because of the human nature of
the governmental agents, authority is difficult to administer properly.
The continued existence of political corruption and deplorable behavior
by government actors is a fact that does not require footnotes. This is
why some libertarians, such as Nozick, seeing the difficulties of
compensating the producers? And why is it that people are willing to freeride on the
efforts of others? Arguably the answers to these questions include a biological component.
279 See FUKUYAMA, supra note 50, at 218 ("Apart from the most extreme libertarians, most
people would agree that state intervention is often necessary to fix a range of problems that
are both morally serious and not susceptible to spontaneous correction.").
2W Allman denies that humans are innately violent. "Ironically, the biggest factor in
triggering group-against-group conflict in both chimpanzee and human foraging societies
is cooperation: In chimps and technologically primitive human societies, a group typically
attacks another group only if their side vastly outnumbers the other, so there is little risk of
physical harm to the attackers." ALLMAN, supra note 88, at 155. "It is this ability to form
close-knit coalitions and alliances among a group that makes possible violent attacks on
other groups." Id. See generally id. at 138-58 ("The Beast Within"). Furthermore, Montagu
is unaware of any unambiguous evidence that, during the Neolithic, humans engaged in
warfare. See Montagu, supra note 134, at 8. If, contrary to Montagu's belief, the tendency to
war is biologically disposed, then he opines that this would remove personal responsibility
for warfare. "Such has been the conclusion of all serious students of the subject." Id. A
strong determinism indeed to overcome the naturalistic fallacy.
281 For example, "[i]f our informal mores and formal laws always took into account what
was true in nature, adultery would not be a crime, for most primates, including
chimpanzees, are promiscuous." KAGAN, supra note 140, at 18. "Similarly, chimpanzees
and gorillas naturally deceive other members of their species .... " Id. at 293; see McGinnis,
supra note 275, at 254 (identifying the basic constitutional structures designed to control the
power of factions).
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governance as daunting, try to avoid the imposition of central authority
altogether through anarchist solutions to social problems. Even
moderate libertarians scrutinize human nature and find it so unruly as to
warrant extreme caution in authorizing directives. As between the
unruliness of the regulated and the unruliness of the regulators, the
latter is much more to be feared. For the regulators have powers much
beyond those of private citizens, and therefore their improprieties are
more likely to cause pervasive harm, more difficult to prevent. The
government must be kept on a short tether. 282 In the end, then, the
libertarian outlook follows from a decisive observation: it is costly in
many ways to counter human dispositions.
The Lockeans' problems with the premises of evolutionary theory
enter at the very place that provides support for opposing postulates.
While the acknowledgment of self-interested human nature grounds
their caution regarding the agents of government intervention, at the
same time it undercuts their precept of the free-standing individual.
Lockeans generally see the individual as prior to the state, and hence
with claims against the state, because they perceive her to be self-made,
as an internally-generated, autonomously-driven, rational being.283 Just
as the Lockeans must contend with the Burkeans and liberals who
dispute this understanding of the person by asserting that the individual
is not entirely self-made, but rather is significantly molded by the society
in which she is situated, so also in arguing that the individual is prior to
the state they must contend with the sociobiologists who maintain that
human character is biased by genetic predispositions. 284 Humans, the
282 See Bailey Kuklin, On the Knowing Inclusion of Unenforceable Contract and Lease Terms, 56
U. CIN. L. REV. 845, 882 (1988).
283 Locke would not agree with this tenet I ascribe to Lockeans. He does see individuals
as prior to the state, but this is because the state is a compact of free individuals possessing
natural rights derived from God. Humans are God-made, not self-made. See JOHN LOCKE,
Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690). (1
thank Joshua Foa Dienstag for clarifying this for me.) "The core of Locke's individualism is
the assertion that every man is naturally the sole proprietor of his own person and
capacities- the absolute proprietor in the sense that he owes nothing to society for them -
and especially the absolute proprietor of his capacity to labour." C.B. MACPHERSON, THE
POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM 231 (1962) (footnote omitted). For the
rational, autonomous, self-made man, we must turn to Kant. See KANT, GROUNDWORK,
supra note 63, at 120; IMMANUEL KANT, PROLEGOMENA TO ANY FUTURE METAPHYSICS 112-15
(Paul Carus ed., Open Court Publishing 1967) (1783). Recall that Nozick, the libertarian, is
a Kantian (as is Rawls, the liberal). See supra note 64.
284 One libertarian, contemplating the evolutionary influence on human behavior and
social patterns, concludes that ancient libertarian regimes would have been unstable. See
Rubin, supra note 268.
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antagonists assert, strongly reflect both nature and nurture. Yet both the
nurturists and the naturists are making factual assertions that must
transcend the chasm to values, as is also true of the Lockeans who, in
countering the demands for the state, depreciate both nonautonomous
influences on character. Whether a person is self-made, nurture-made,
or nature-made, or some combination thereof, political theory still has a
substantial burden in justifying prescriptions based on this.
Nevertheless, the Lockeans and Burkeans would seem to have an
intuitively easier case than would the strong naturists. Insofar as a
person is self-made, that easily leads to the proposition that she is prior
to the state with rights arising accordingly, and insofar as she is culture-
made, that suggests the state is prior to her, but to the extent she is
nature-made, the intuition regarding her relationship to the state
remains vague. The state cannot claim credit for her nature, as it might
for her enculturation, but neither can she. Perhaps the Lockean would
be satisfied with using the naturist argument to simply undermine the
state's claim. If the state cannot take credit for the individual's character,
it cannot ground obligations accordingly.
Smithians. The Smithian conservatives take their lessons from Adam
Smith's notion of the invisible hand. With their concerns centering on
economics, they typically elevate efficiency over individual liberty,
unlike the Lockeans. Efficient allocation of the factors of production
proceeds through the largely unfettered marketplace. Individuals
govern the allocation by means of their purchasing decisions. Demand
and supply interrelate. Yet there are limits to the free market. The
government must sometimes intervene, as where there are shortfalls
from ideal market conditions, thus justifying such regulations as
antitrust laws, 285 or where there are needs for public goods, such as
highways or national defense, that will not be met by the private market
alone because of, among other things, freerider and holdout problems.286
Concentrating on market principles, some economists see their discipline
295 See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 271-341 (4th ed. 1992).
For libertarian approval of antitrust regulation, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH
THE STATE 50-54 (1993); HAYEK, supra note 270, at 265-66.
286 See, e.g., EDWIN MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS 381-85 (3d ed. 1979). Some economists
are not happy about letting the government in this door, and are eager to keep the crack as
small as possible. See, e.g., BUCHANAN, supra note 270, at 22-26; Harold Demsetz, The
Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights, in THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS
362, 370-76 (Henry G. Manne ed., 1975). Hayek, the libertarian economist, would even
allow government intervention when production conditions are harmful. See, e.g., HAYEK,
supra note 270, at 224-25.
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as essentially applied utilitarianism. 287 In this, they entirely diverge from
Lockeans who elevate the justice claims of liberty above any regard for
social or private welfare.
From this brief description, it should be apparent that the
philosophical orientation of Smithians coincides with the worldview of
evolutionary biology. Both systems work in a bottom-up, individual-
oriented process, rather than the top-down approach of economic central
planning, as in collectivism, or a group-centered theory of evolution, as
was commonly conceived before the modern synthesis in biology. For
both Smithians and sociobiologists, the individual's self-interest is the
salient, controlling ingredient. 28 Individuals, by pursuing their own
affairs, ultimately govern the allocation of resources and the constitution
of the gene pool. Both mechanisms often lead to the same destination.
According to E. Donald Elliott, one of the founders of the law and
287 See FRANK H. KNIGHT, Some Notes on the Economic Interpretation of History, in FREEDOM
AND REFORM 246, 251 n.4 (1947) ("[Ultilitarianism and pragmatism virtually reduce all
ethics to economics.). Posner wrote: "Bentham's utilitarianism, in its aspect as a positive
theory of human behavior, is another name for economic theory." RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 356 (1972). While later editions of this book omit this
assertion, and Posner explicitly denies their identity, see Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism,
Economics and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 103 (1979), he does thereafter notice their
kinship. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 60-115 (1981); Richard A.
Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8
HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980) [hereinafter Posner, Efficiency Norm].
288 This is referred to as "methodological individualism." See FUKUYAMA, supra note 50,
at 161. Fukuyama observes that biological findings "in many ways undermine many of the
behavioral premises of economics." Id. at 161-62. This is because the evolutionary
advantages of some types of altruism, having become genetically predisposed, lead to
more cooperation than the game theoretic, self-interest economic models of economists
would suggest. See id. at 162. Elliott asserts that, while they "are at least first cousins," the
theory of human motivations in evolutionary biology is more complex than that of
economics, such as in its sophisticated theory of altruism. See E. Donald Elliott,
Evolutionary Models in Law: Pros and Cons, in LAW AND EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY, supra note
255, at 111, 119-20. The economist, Robert Frank, under his "commitment model," borrows
much from evolutionary theory to broaden the notion of self-interest to reach the
"irrational behavior" that economists have difficulty explaining. See FRANK, supra note 34;
Robert H. Frank, Economics, in THE SOCIOBIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION, supra note 7, at 91.
Frank observes that even Adam Smith used the moral sentiment of sympathy to explain
"irrational" failures of trading partners to defect at times. See Robert H. Frank, Regulating
Sexual Behavior: Richard Posner's Sex and Reason, in LAW AND EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY,
supra note 255, at 149, 156. Fukuyama looks to natural selection for the major thesis of his
book that disruptions in the social order, such as the ongoing one stemming from the
transition from the industrial age to the information age, are repaired by a bottom-up,
spontaneous process of evolving community norms. For a good synopsis and interesting
review, see Jones, supra note 197 (reviewing FUKUYAMA, supra note 50).
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biology movement, "[t]here are many areas in which 'Law and Biology'
and 'Law and Economics' overlap and would reach exactly the same
results in analyzing human motivations." 289  Law and economics
scholars often see parallels between efficiency and the theory of
evolution,290 as well as do biologists.2 91 Elliott anticipates a developing
synthesis between the two subjects, many of the early participants in the
law and biology movement being economists. 292 Stephen Jay Gould,
289 Elliott, supra note 7, at 610. Among the significant differences between the two, Elliott
identifies the analysis of preferences. Economists see them as exogenous and relatively
fixed, whereas biologists see them as dependent on the particular context. See id. at 610-11.
Hirshleifer ascribes to evolutionary theory the suggestion "that at least some aspects of
preferences are not accidental [as economists would have them], but have evolved as ways
of restraining freedom of choice where such restraint can conduce to advantageous
cooperation." Hirshleifer, supra note 32, at 36.
290 "The classical evolutionary paradigm has a strong grip on law and economics
scholarship. What survives is presumptively efficient: if it were inefficient, the practice,
the law, or the custom would be challenged by its more efficient competitors." Mark J. Roe,
Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 641 (1996). "It is clear that
an extensive analogy may be drawn between economic systems and biological systems,
with economic analogies of such notions as reproductive survival, adaptation, exploitation
of resources, predation, reproduction, mutations and diversification readily forthcoming."
VON SCHILCHER & TENNANT, supra note 18, at 115. "[A]t an early point in time, Hirshleifer
pointed out the parallels between biology and economics, e.g. competition, the battle for
survival, optimization, selection, reciprocity, adaptation and territorial behavior." Michael
Lehmann, Evolution in Biology, Economics and Law, in LAW AND EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY,
supra note 255, at 297, 305 (citing J. Hirshleifer, Economics from a Biological Viewpoint, 20 J.L.
& ECON. 1 (1977)); see, e.g., Fried, supra note 163; Masters, supra note 36, at 11 ("Properly
understood, therefore, the formal models in behavioral ecology or ethology are akin to
economic theories."); Posner, supra note 224, at 1647 ("Economics is a body of theory
closely related in both form and content to the theory of evolution; concepts of
maximization, competition, unconscious rationality, cost, investment, self-interest, survival,
and equilibrium play parallel roles in both theories."); George L. Priest, Tie Common Law
Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977); Paul H. Rubin, I/y Is
the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977). On the other hand, one commentator
argues "that Darwinian theory is a remarkably inappropriate model, metaphor, inspiration,
or theoretical framework for economic theory." ALEXANDER ROSENBERG, Does Evolutionary
Theory Give Comfort or Inspiration to Economics?, in DARWINISM IN PHILOSOPHY, SOCIAL
SCIENCE AND POLICY 172, 172 (2000).
291 See, e.g., ELDREDGE, supra note 11, at 93 ("Darwin's choices for the 'limiting factors' on
population size ... are exclusively economic in nature.... Though natural selection is a
filter of genetic information, most of that information pertains to the economic lives of
organisms.").
292 See Elliott, supra note 7, at 619. For a rich example of the interplay between economics
and evolutionary theory, see Hirshleifer, supra note 32. By way of criticism, Rose asserts
that "[s]ociobiological analysis in the hands of E.O. Wilson and others employs identical
mathematical models to those used by a particular school of monetarist economics based in
Chicago (and the compliment is returned by economists who have created a new discipline
called 'evolutionary economics')." ROSE, supra note 11, at 53. Rose finds that monetarism,
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who is certainly far from a Smithian conservative, sees a similar
parallelism: "I believe that the theory of natural selection should be
viewed as an extended analogy-whether conscious or unconscious on
Darwin's part I do not know-to the laissez faire economics of Adam
Smith." 293
Nevertheless, Smithians and Darwinians have some principles that
diverge. While the economic goal of efficiency can, in principle, be
grounded on deontological reasoning, as where the members of society,
through an actual or hypothetical social contract, unanimously agree to
embrace efficiency as the dominant social policy,294 more realistically, the
goal of efficiency is teleologically grounded. The Smithian does not see
the individual as the sole center of value, but instead believes that by
granting individuals autonomy, the social, consequentialist goal of
efficiency is best achieved. Posner's aim for wealth maximization reveals
this.295 But perhaps this perceived rejection of individualism is too
quick. To step back, the standard goal of market moves is the condition
of Pareto optimality. In this state, no person can be made better off
without making another person worse off.296 Pareto superior moves
towards optimality allow changes of resources in which at least one
person is made better off and no person is made worse off.297 Both of
these standards suggest deontology. The proscription against making
another person worse off implies that individual rights are respected. In
Kantian terms, no person is being used as a means only to another's (or
society's) ends. If left to Pareto standards, economics would look
Kantian. But many economists recognize that the Pareto standards are
.a cornerstone of Thatcherism and Reaganomics... and now, surrounded by the wreckage
of the economies it has destroyed, is largely discredited." Id.
29 STEPHEN JAY GOULD, Darwin's Middle Road, in THE PANDA'S'THUMB, supra note 31, at
59, 66. At the turn of the last century, conservatives embraced Social Darwinism for two
reasons, according to Hofstadter, the first being that the popular catchwords of Darwinism,
such as "survival of the fittest," "suggested that nature would provide that the best
competitors in a competitive situation would win, and that this process would lead to
continuing improvement." HOFSTADTER, supra note 2, at 6. This idea, not new as
economists would testify, "g[a]ve the force of a natural law to the idea of competitive
struggle." Id.
294 For example, Rawls, in his Kantian-based tract, considers whether the parties in the
original position behind the veil of ignorance would embrace classical utilitarianism. See
RAWLS, supra note 64, at 161-92. But he decides they would not, instead preferring his two
principles of justice. See id. at 183-84.
295 See POSNER, supra note 285, at 12-16. Posner equates wealth maximization to Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency. See id. at 13.
2' See JULES L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW 71-72,97 (1988).
297 See id. at 72, 97; POSNER, supra note 285, at 13.
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too stringent, as when producing public goods. For example, identifying
all the potential losers from a significant government project, such as the
construction of a military base or a highway, and fully compensating
them to their own satisfaction, is entirely unrealistic. Thus, economists
commonly advance the principle of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. Under this
standard, a move is efficient if all the winners could pay off the losers
and still come out ahead. While the winners need not actually pay off
the losers in practice, in principle they must be able to.298 This standard
is clearly utilitarian and not deontological. 299 If necessary, individual
interests will be sacrificed for the greater good, i.e., efficiency. B°° In sum,
then, Darwinians are individual-oriented, while most Smithians, at
bottom, are not.
Burkeans. The Burkean, communitarian conservatives see the social
contract as producing an obligation to one's ancestors, fellow citizens,
and descendants to maintain the traditions of society. As mentioned
above, the state's consideration for the contract is its predominant role in
shaping an individual's character. Far from being autonomously self-
made, a person from birth is embedded in, and defined by, her
communities, including the religious, social, and political ones. Her
perceptions and values are informed by her environment. She thinks of
herself in terms provided to her by the conceptions of her communities.
Value inheres in them. (Notice the leap over Hume's chasm.) With
respect to the political community, in recognition that a person's very
self-conception and outlook is rooted in her relationship to it, she must
accept the common aims of her society (the Good) and acknowledge its
legitimate claims against her.3° 1  (Another leap.) There can be no
2% See COLEMAN, supra note 296, at 98; POSNER, supra note 285, at 13-14.
299 In justifying Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, Posner tries to augment the reliance on
utilitarian principles by offering Kantian-based "consent" and "interest" arguments. See
Posner, Efficiency Norm, supra note 287, at 487, 488-97. For brief discussion, with criticism,
see RAYMOND A. BELIOTTI, JUSTIFYING LAW 109-13 (1992).
30 Hirshleifer observes that "potentially Pareto-preferred" changes may override dissent,
"open[ing] the gates even to rather brutal social processes." Hirshleifer, supra note 32, at 6.
301 Edmund Burke rejects the notion of natural rights. Burke's argument is that "we have
to support the institutions of society as they stand, as we have learned them-since these
are all we have. They are our rational bulwark against irrational (innate) passions." Fox,
supra note 88, at 46. Even if we find persons to be fully autonomous, rational, responsible,
free agents, they still may have obligations and duties to the innumerable social groups to
which they belong, often by chance, merely by virtue of their membership. See, e.g.,
NICHOLAS RESCHER, ihat Is a Person?, in HUMAN INTERESTS, supra note 145, at 6, 9-10.
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neutrality with respect to the Good. 3° 2 While the society may not be
ideal, it reflects the inherited wisdom and demonstrated values of
proven experience. 3° 3 Changes beyond the incremental are likely to have
unpredictable results, reverberating beyond the foreseeable to disrupt
and perhaps even destroy that which has proven itself of enduring value
in the unforgiving crucible of history. Yes, the culture, mores, laws,
traditions, and other normative institutions may be jerry-built in some
respects, erected without blueprints, but nevertheless they have endured
and made us what we are today. Leave well enough alone. Hence,
Burkeans are conservatives in the sense that they wish to conserve the
traditions of the community.
Unlike the neo-Darwinians, and for that matter, the Lockeans and
the Smithians, the Burkeans do not center their attention on the
individual and work bottom-up. Quite to the contrary, their attention is
focused on the community and its claims against the individual, or
rather, the obligations of the individual to the community, in a top-down
manner.3°4 Recall that under Darwinian theory, evolution operates at the
level of the genes, the process driven by the survival and reproductive
advantage of the individual, not the group. The effects of evolution on
302 There is no neutrality because, as mentioned, one's values arise from one's
community. See BRIAN BARRY, POLITICAL ARGUMENT 75 (1965) (the "sociologistic
theorem"); MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 11-14 (1984) ("the
sociological objection"). Furthermore, value neutrality is itself a normative theory about
the good. See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 191-92 (1986). Though perfect
neutrality may be impossible, "[wiriters in the liberal tradition, for example, Bruce
Ackerman and Ronald Dworkin, argue persuasively that the political decisions of a good
society are as neutral as possible among conceptions of the good life." Mark Sagoff, Values
and Preferences, 96 ETHICS 301, 310 (1986); see RAWLS, supra note 64, at 94, 325-32. Rawls
wrestles with the limits by distinguishing various definitions of "neutrality." See John
Rawls, Te Priority of Right and Ideas.ofthe Good, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 251, 260-63 (1988). See
generally James S. Fishkin, Can There Be a Neutral Theory of Justice?, 93 ETHICS 348 (1983);
Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1129
(1986).
M3 That institutions, social structures, legal procedures, and so forth, evolve in "a process
of variation and 'selection"' supports "a conservative plea for tolerance of the institutions
we have. For they may, in ways perhaps difficult to understand or 'read off,' embody an
evolutionary wisdom exceeding that attainable by a wise man in a normal lifetime." VON
SCHILCHER & TENNANT, supra note 18, at 114-15.
304 "True freedom, to a communitarian, lies not in the primacy of individual rights, but in
the capacity for self-rule, involving 'a willing identification with the polis on the part of the
citizens, a sense that the political institutions in which they live are an expression of
themselves."' Catherine Lu, Images of Justice: Justice as a Bond, a Boundary and a Balance, 6 J.
POL. PHIL. 1, 5 (1998) (quoting Charles Taylor, Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Connunitarian
Debate, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE 159, 166 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 1989)).
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the group is a mere by-product of individual self-interest, entirely
independent of the interest of the community as a group.30 5 Even moral
codes are said to be the product of the self-interest of those who have
been influential in formulating them, irrespective of their expressed
concern for the greater good of the community. 306 Arguably, then,
insofar as morals are "natural," they should be embraced with
skepticism, for behind them may well be special pleading. 3° 7 But for
those communitarian conservatives who are religious fundamentalists,
we need not worry about whether they understand the challenge of
evolution to their political beliefs. It sufficiently challenges their
religious beliefs to be well beyond the pale for them.308
While the Burkeans' elevation of the group over the individual
diverges from Darwinian mechanisms, other crucial planks in the
Burkean construct align with some of the central principles of
Darwinism. As evolutionists see the evolved organism as a satisficed,30 9
path-dependent cobbling together of available genomic materials coping
305 Cf. WRIGHT, supra note 8, at 257-58 (concluding that the evolutionary tendency for
social hierarchy cannot be advanced as a means to keep the group strong, thereby
justifying social inequality for the sake of the greater good, because the hierarchies result
from individual, not group, interest).
306 See id. at 361-62. Ruse posits that since our normal feelings are limited by the
evolutionary advantage of self-interest and immediacy, moral sentiments are biologically
needed as an inducement to cooperative actions (facilitating reciprocal altruism) and even
as "a spur to make us change a diaper in the middle of the night." RUSE, supra note 30, at
251.
37 See WRIGHT, supra note 8, at 361-63.
308 The religious fundamentalists strongly object to (many of the) implications that have
been found in Darwinism: the challenge to the literalness of the biblical creation story and
hence other biblical lessons, the threat to the notion of a soul, the death of God, the absence
of absolute moral principles, the contingency of moral feelings, the lack of complete
freewill, and the abyss upon death. See PINKER, supra note 11, at 128-32 (religious
fundamentalists and some neoconservative intellectuals); THIESSEN, supra note 107, at 382-
83. Even Dugatkin, a respected evolutionist and animal behaviorist with strong religious
beliefs, see LEE DUGATKIN, CHEATING MONKEYS AND CITIZEN BEES 32-33 (1999), is appalled
by the notion that the human emotions such as sympathy, guilt, and the sense of morality
may be partially a product of natural selection that may change with environmental
circumstances, see id. at 35-36. "This is an unacceptable thought for anyone with a sense of
absolute right and wrong." Id. at 36. Meaning, religious, moral scientists should avoid
such topics or research?
"0 The term "satisfice" was coined by Herbert Simon: "In the face of even moderate
uncertainty, it seems almost hopeless to strive for 'optimal' courses of action.... [In these
circumstances it] becomes somewhat easier if we adopt a satisficing point of view: if we
look for good enough solutions rather than insisting that only the best solutions will do."
HERBERT A. SIMON, REASON IN HUMAN AFFAIRS 85 (1983); see Michael Byron, Satisficing and
Optimality, 109 ETHICS 67 (1998).
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with environmental pressures, and without any aim for final ends
beyond reproduction, so do the Burkeans see society in a parallel
manner, at least for those aspects not driven by religious tenets. As
Darwin perceived the evolution of organisms to operate in a slow,
incremental process, so do the Burkeans see the evolution of society.310
And as Darwin discerned substantial mutations that spawned "hopeful
monsters" as overwhelmingly likely to emerge dead on arrival, or at
least, seriously maimed and degraded, 311 so do Burkeans consider
utopian society-building.
Before continuing, there is strand of politics, often, but not
exclusively, associated with communitarian conservatism, that should be
addressed at this point because of its occasional invocation of Darwinian
notions. I refer to a groupist, "we-they" mentality that typically
generates an intolerance or deprecation of members of another group
based on their race, religion, ethnicity, sex, class, sexual orientation, or
other salient distinguishing quality.312 A common justification for these
310 The second reason conservatives embraced Social Darwinism was because of the
"familiar idea in conservative political theory, the conception that all sound development
must be slow and unhurried." HOFSTADTER, supra note 2, at 6-7. The conservative
conclusions, whether pessimistic or optimistic, "suggested that all attempts to reform social
processes were efforts to remedy the irremediable, that they interfered with the wisdom of
nature, that they could lead only to degeneration." Id. at 6-7. Notice that these two reasons
stem from different, sometimes incompatible, schools of conservatism, an inconsistency
often neglected in the free fire zone of politics. But Hofstadter, without explicitly making
the distinctions among conservatives advanced here, notes that Social Darwinism lacked
qualities found in some conservative systems in its secularism and independence from
authority and emotion. See id. These are difficulties mainly for the Burkean, to a much
lesser extent the Lockean, and not at all for the Smithian. For Hofstadter's discussion of the
underlying differences, see id. at 8-11.
311 "Hopeful monster" is a term coined by the biologist Richard Goldschmidt to describe
a "megamutation" supposedly originating new major evolutionary groups. See, e.g., JOHN
T. BONNER, THE EVOLUTION OF COMPLEXITY 18 (1988); MAYNARD SMITH, supra note 76, at
316-19.
312 "[Vjarious 'we-regarding' motivations, such as ethnic pride and shame, patriotism,
and friendship ... do not sharply distinguish the welfare of the agent from the welfare of
the group." Elizabeth Anderson, Beyond Homo Economicus: New Developments in Theories
of Social Norms, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 170, 174 (2000). For the frightful ease at which humans
place themselves in groups and become biased against other groups, apparently with
evolutionary underpinnings, see DUGATKIN, supra note 308, at 137-39; RICHARD
WRANGHAM & DALE PETERSON, DEMONIC MALES 193-98 (1996). In the 1970s and 80s, the
National Front of England and the New Right of France embraced the authoritarian and
racist lessons they found in sociobiology. See PROMETHEAN FIRE, supra note 5, at 42;
Vincent S.E. Falger et al., Introduction to 6 RESEARCH IN BIOPOLITICS: SOCIOBIOLOGY AND
POLITICS, supra note 83, at ix, xiv-xv.
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attitudes is the claim that the other group is, as a matter of fact,
physically or morally inferior.
In making this claim of the inferiority of another group, the nurture
side of the nature-nurture dichotomy may ground the reasoning of the
denigrators. They might argue, for example, that another race or religion
is wanting because its members are socialized in an uncivilized or
Godless manner. As troubling and unwarranted as this contention may
be, at least it allows for the rebuttal that the "flaws" turn on historical
contingency that may be overcome by "proper" socialization in a
"civilized" or "God-fearing" environment. There is nothing inherently
inferior about the group members.
On the nature side of the ledger, there are two types of arguments
from the denigrators. First, they may contend that nature has pushed a
group beyond the point of no return to superior traits. Historic
circumstances and natural selection have produced inherent group
differences. 313 For example, women are said to be inferior in some ways
because of the prehistoric selection forces stemming from the different
reproductive investment requirements of male and female. They did not
develop sufficient aggressiveness or leadership qualities, say, because
they were anciently relegated to home base to nurture their children
while men were out in the greater world struggling against the
genetically refining forces that rewarded these qualities. Or, as another
example, another race or religious group evolved in an impoverished or
unchallenging environment that effected a deficient gene pool by
reducing the competitive pressure for superior traits.314 Second, another
type of denigrating Darwinian argument turns on the claim that a group
313 The denigrators may look to group selection for support. "Whether or not [group
selection] endowed us with generosity toward the members of our group, it would
certainly have endowed us with a hatred of the members of other groups, because it favors
whatever traits lead one group to prevail over its rivals." PINKER, supra note 11, at 259.
While negative emotions, or indifference, towards other groups may be predicted, Pinker's
ascription of "hatred" seems unnecessarily strong.
314 Hence, it is argued that intelligence increased as prehistoric peoples moved farther
out of Africa to increasingly challenging environments. See J. Phillippe Rushton, Race
Differences: A Global Perspective, in 6 RESEARCH IN BIOPOLITICS: SOCIOBIOLOGY AND POLITICS,
supra note 83, at 119, 134. One group of authors "speculatels] that the long alleles of the
DRD4 gene were selected by migration because they had adaptive value in migratory
societies," research having shown a linkage between the long alleles and "novelty-seeking
personality, hyperactivity, and risk-taking behaviors." Chuansheng Chen et al., Population
Migration and the Variation of Dopanine D4 Receptor (DRD4) Allele Frequencies Around the
Globe, 50 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 309, 320 (1999).
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is inferior because it does not follow "nature's way." For example, gays
are said to be defective because they are handicapped, or handicap
themselves, in the unrelenting race for reproduction. These arguments
and others based on the principles of Darwinian evolution are mustered
to justify, at worst, a disdainful declaration of inherent physical or moral
inferiority, or, at best, a supposedly wistful concession to the "true
realities" that explain why another group is beyond help or merit in
certain regards.
This strain of "we-they" politics cannot simply be bracketed as an
aberrant sport, because these latter, nature-based contentions are the
ones that evoke the shrillest responses from critics of sociobiology. The
first contention, that a group has not endured, and reaped the genetic
benefits of, extreme or particular evolutionary stresses, is a factual claim,
typically based on surmised or reconstructed prehistoric occurrences
leading to currently identified physical or mental differences. The
rebutters counter from various directions, including the following: First,
they assail the identified factual support for the claim of inferiority, or its
significance. The ongoing IQ controversy is the best example. 315 Second,
they challenge the supposed prehistorical circumstances as mere
unproven speculation or unfalsifiable "just-so" stories. 316 Third, they
assert that irrespective of the circumstances in deep time, humans are
pushed beyond these molding forces by the emergence of unique
qualities, such as intelligence or language.317 Finally, of course, the claim
being based on factual assertions, Hume's chasm reappears. The second
contention, that a group does not subscribe to "nature's way," commonly
evokes two responses: First, to the contrary, "nature's way" may well
have room for the behavior in question. One must simply uncover the
complex workings of nature. For example, homosexual behavior may
have reproductive value through kin selection principles.318 Second,
once again the thrust of the contention violates the naturalistic fallacy.
That nature might have a particular way does not mean that it, or we,
should pursue this way. But still, unfortunately, as mentioned above,
315 See, e.g., GOULD, MISMEASURE, supra note 138, at 283-85, 338-45; ROSE, supra note 11, at
286-88. Notice that at least some of the proponents of IQ differences are located in the
libertarian, not the communitarian, political camp. See supra note 132.
316 See infra note 354.
317 See supra note 14.
318 See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 23, at 343 ("The celibate monk, the maiden aunt, or the
homosexual need not suffer genetically. In certain societies their behavior can redound to
improved fitness of parents, siblings, and other relatives to an extent that selects for the
genes that predisposed them to enter their way of life.").
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the Humean chasm has never halted, or even perceptibly slowed, faulty
political or demagogic contentions.
To reconnoiter, I have identified two main features of natural
selection that correspond with versions of conservative political
groundings: the individual-centered, bottom-up mechanism; and the
glacial, jerry-built incrementalism. Lockeans and Smithians emphasize
the former, and Burkeans the latter. Liberals, it turns out, generally place
less value on either feature.
In sum, I am not contending that Lockeans, Smithians, Burkeans,
and Darwinians are all fellow travelers, nor indeed, even that all
subscribers to any one of these camps are in total agreement with one
another. Far be it. Indeed, it is one of the great wonders of practical
politics that the three political orientations are able to sleep together as
well as they do in the bed of Republican conservatism. Instead, I am
arguing that important aspects of their various weltanschauungs
overlap, thereby promoting, it seems, a proclivity for those with strong
conservative political orientations to champion sociobiology in its most
prominent incarnations. By bolstering particular versions or planks of
sociobiology, they reinforce the worldview supporting their own
political beliefs. Where does this leave liberals?
Liberals. In speaking of liberals, there is the same risk of
overgeneralization as is faced in describing conservatives. The
discussion here will cover communitarian liberalism, including Marxism,
but will emphasize the most commonly espoused variety of liberalism
today: the Rawlsian, welfare-state liberal. Perhaps the unifying feature
of liberals in general is, as opined by some, their belief that the worst vice
is cruelty. 319 Liberals distinguish themselves from Lockean and Smithian
conservatives in their greater other-regardingness.320 In the tradeoff
between liberty and equality, while treasuring the former, liberals
319 See RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY, at xv (1989); JUDITH N.
SHKLAR, ORDINARY VICES 7-44 (1984) ("Putting cruelty first"). Annette Baier places Hume
in this camp, but excludes Kant. See ANNETfE C. BAlER, Moralism and Cruelty: Reflections on
Hume and Kant, in MORAL PREJUDICES 268, 268-69 (1994); cf. SINGER, supra note 259, at 8
(Concern about "the vast quantity of pain and suffering that exists in our universe, and ...
[the] desire to do something to reduce it ... is what the left is all about.").
320 Liberals tend to be egalitarians. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 302, at 183, 205-13.
Sociobiology threatens their egalitarian streak. "Obviously the motivation behind a
stubborn defense of the idea that all humans begin life with essentially similar emotional
and behavioral biases is the wish to support the political imperative [for an egalitarian
society]." KAGAN, supra note 139, at 14.
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nevertheless grant more value to the latter than do these two strands of
conservatism.321 Yet, as is true among conservatives, since there are few
practicing ideologues, the actual political beliefs of people who identify
themselves as liberals may overlap with conservatives and other liberals
of different flavors. To alter the example before, one might be a Smithian
when favoring privatization in the belief that the marketplace can
produce goods and services more efficiently than can the government, a
Lockean when supporting human rights and First Amendment rights, a
Burkean or communitarian liberal when advocating the protection of
religious or cultural traditions, and a Rawlsian liberal when advancing
substantial welfare and subsidies to the arts. But still, as in examining
conservatism, it remains a worthwhile heuristic to separate out the
communitarian and welfare-state liberals.322
Communitarian liberals base their systems on a Burkean line of
reasoning that, like Burkean conservatism, challenges the notion that
individuals are autonomously independent of the community's molding
influences. 323 The group being substantially prior to the individual, each
member accordingly has obligations to her communities, familial,
political, cultural, or otherwise.324 The primary center of value is in the
321 Fukuyama puts it this way: "The question of when hierarchical authority ought to
intervene to correct a spontaneous outcome in the interests of justice or fairness constitutes
the central issue that has historically divided Left and Right." FUKUYAMA, supra note 50, at
217.
322 The radical left has also raised the flag of sociobiology. In France it was taken up by
the left "out of a 'neo-rousseauiste inspiration in an effort to integrate man in nature.'
DEGLER, supra note 255, at 319 (quoting CLAUDE LtVI-STRAUSS, LE REGARD ELOIGNE 57-58
(1983)). "There was even an anarchist version [of sociobiological political theory], under
Kropotkin, that saw as much mutual aid implied in evolutionary theory as 'nature red in
tooth and claw."' Fox, supra note 88, at 87. There is much in Darwin's writings to support
Kropotkin's interpretation. See HOFSTADTER, supra note 2, at 90-92. Kropotkin's and other
Russian biologists' views may be due to their perceptions of the Russian wilds, since
challenged, where humans are forced to unite to fight the elements, unlike highly
populated environments in which humans and other animals struggle against one another.
See RUSE, supra note 3, at 202, 209-10, 213; Adam Urbanek, Evolutionary Origin of Moral
Principles, in EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS, supra note 44, at 325, 326-27; see also GOULD, supra note
120, at 334-35 (noting that both Kropotkin and Darwin perceived two evolutionary
struggles: first, "organism against organism for limited resources"; second, "organism
against the harshness of surrounding physical environments").
323 See, e.g., Arnitai Etzioni, The Good Society, 7 J. POL. PHIL. 88, 94 (1999)
("Communitarians suggest that reasonable individuals cannot be conceived of outside a
social order; that the ability to make rational choices, to be free, presumes that the person is
embedded in a social fabric."); Michael Sandel, Morality and the Liberal Ideal, NEW REPUBLIC,
May 7, 1984, at 15, 17.
324 See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT 341-44 (1996).
1224 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 38
community rather than the individual, justifying a teleological,
consequentialist morality rather than a deontological, autonomy-
oriented one. Nevertheless, where liberal communitarians depart from
their Burkean conservative cousins is in their conviction that liberty
warrants substantial weight as a value. Personal obligations to the
traditional community are not all-encompassing.325 This is conspicuous
in the community values of a modem democracy. Thus, individuals
should be free to reconsider and develop the community's values, even
forming new ones, such as gay communities, if wanted.326 But still, value
inheres in the community and the individual's relationship to her
communities remains primary. 327  This variety of communitarian
reasoning has not gained more prominence, in my view, because its
proponents have not worked out a strong, coherent scheme to protect the
individual from the prospective overreaching of the group, and therefore
has scared off others of a liberal bent.328 Since the advocates of liberal
communitarianism have generally avoided the sociobiological debate,
their commonalities and differences with Darwinian principles will not
be discussed beyond noting that, insofar as it shares common threads
with Burkean communitarianism, Lockean libertarianism, and welfare-
state liberalism, it also shares similar pulls and pushes.
325 For a bugle call for liberal communitarians, see The Responsive Comniunitarian Platform:
Rights and Responsibilities, in RIGHTS AND THE COMMON GOOD 11 (Amitai Etzioni ed., 1995).
326 See Etzioni, supra note 323, at 94 ("[M]ost people in contemporary free societies are
able to choose, to a significant extent, the communities to which they are psychologically
committed, and can often draw on one to limit the persuasive power of another.").
327 Among the best known liberal communitarians are Amitai Etzioni, Michael Sandel,
Charles Taylor, and Michael Walzer. See, e.g., AMITAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY
(1993); SANDEL, supra note 302; CHARLES TAYLOR, MULTICULTURALISM AND "THE POLITICS
OF RECOGNITION" (1992); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983). Notice that insofar
as communities are formed of kin groups, the principle of kin selection would
evolutionarily favor commitments to them, the more so as the members are more closely
related. The principle of reciprocal altruism would support commitments even to groups
of nonkin. Driven by these principles alone, we might expect "[olur moral concern can
expand to ever-wider circles to include our extended kin, our clan, our group, our nation,
all of humanity, and perhaps even all life forms. But the expansion to the wider circles will
occur only in those cases where our provisioning of the inner circles is secure." ARNHART,
supra note 42, at 147.
328 See, e.g., Steiner, supra note 264, at 107-08. In private conversation, Michael Sandel
acknowledged to me that this was a problem that must be met by liberal communitarians.
For gallant attempts, see RIGHTS AND THE COMMON GOOD, supra note 325; Etzioni, supra
note 323, at 88.
Evolution, Politics and Law
Marxists, on the contrary, have been among the most vocal critics of
sociobiology, 329 and, ironically, among the most important founders.
33 °
The relevant tenets of Marxism include a metaphysics whereby matter,
not mind, is the basic substrate of reality. Matter evolves in a dialectic
process towards complexity and improvement by means of
revolutionary jumps. The norms and social structures of a society are
determined by the material conditions of life, that is, by the nature of its
productive forces and economic organization. Society has evolved
through the economic historical epochs of primitive communism, ancient
slave-ownership, feudalism, and capitalism. The internal contradictions
of capitalism will induce the proletariat to wrest control of the state from
the bourgeoisie, terminate capitalism, and thereby dissolve class
conflicts. The need for the state will then be eliminated and the people
will be liberated from the shackles created by the channeling forces of
the means of production, thus, free of economic determinism, being
empowered to consciously and rationally choose their own values and
life styles. The self-realization of every individual will lead to the
greatest flowering of mankind.331
While Darwin's ideas of a natural struggle and the absence of design
appealed to Marx's vision of a class struggle in a nonreligious world,332
from this brief description of Marxism, several differences with
Darwinism are readily apparent. First, in positing occasional
revolutionary jumps in the evolution of matter, Marxism rejects the
329 See Regina Karpinskaya, Marxist Thought, in THE SOCIOBIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION,
supra note 7, at 243, 244-47 (contending that Marxist thought does find some place for
natural propensities).
330 Rather than giving "ammunition to dangerous rightwing maniacs.... a review of the
politics of leading sociobiologists would lend more credence to the contention that
sociobiology is a Communist conspiracy." van den Berghe, supra note 258, at 406
(reviewing SOCIOBIOLOGY EXAMINED, supra note 134, and mentioning the ties to
Communism of J.B.S. Haldane and John Maynard Smith and to radical black politics of
Robert L. Trivers).
331 See JON ELSTER, AN INTRODUcTION TO KARL MARX 25, 4349, 194-95 (1986) (including
analysis and criticism).
332 "In a letter of 1861, Marx wrote that 'Darwin's book is very important and it suits me
well that it supports the class struggle in history from the point of view of natural science."'
CARTWRIGHT, supra note 7, at 322 (citation omitted). On the other hand, "[tlhe [Marxist,
Russian] revolutionaries regarded natural selection as tainted with capitalist notions of
competition." Id. at 325. Darwinism's "additional appeal for Marx was that it eliminated
teleology and design from nature. Marx saw that evolution could be used to undermine
his ideological enemy - organized religion." Id. at 322.
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undeviating incrementalism of Darwinism. 333  Second, contrary to
Marx's teleological precept of an inexorable march to human history,
nothing about Darwinism implies necessary superior fitness value in
complex life forms,334 nor that evolutionary changes are "improvements"
beyond the tautological sense of being better able to survive and
reproduce.335 Third, the Darwinian method of reductionist explanations
of the natural and social world runs counter to the ineluctable
complexity found to emerge from the Marxist dialectical process.336
Fourth, Marxists, with their utopian vision of the future, insist that
humans, under proper conditions, are entirely free of nature and
nurture, becoming self-directed, autonomous, free-willed persons.337
333 See NISBET, supra note 265, at 82 ("The Marxian concept of revolutionary change is
held by ... critics to be their model for criticism of Darwinian gradualism."). For example,
Gould and Eldredge advance a theory of punctuated equilibrium, whereby evolution is
said to go through long periods of stasis interrupted by concentrated episodes of
(revolutionary) branching speciation. See ELDREDGE, supra note 11, at 140-45; Niles
Eldredge & Stephen Jay Gould, Punctuated Equilibria: An Alternative to Phyletic Gradualism,
in MODELS IN PALEOBIOLOGY 82 (T.J.M. Schopf ed., 1972). This was suggested to Gould by
his Marxist background. See RUSE, supra note 8, at 144.
334 Gould here rejects his lessons from Marxism by championing the view that evolution
does not necessarily move towards complexity. See GOULD, supra note 76.
335 See, e.g., id. at 136 ("The basic theory of natural selection offers no statement about
general progress, and supplies no mechanism whereby overall advance might be
expected."). "[T]he gravest shortcoming of Darwin's theory from Marx's point of view was
its emphasis on the random and indeterminate nature of variations, which made progress
beyond the social world of brutes 'purely accidental' and not 'necessary,' as Marx desired
and his theory required." KAYE, supra note 258, at 25. See generally RUSE, supra note 83.
3M See PINKER, supra note 11, at 127-28; Segerstrale, Colleagues in Conflict, supra note 258, at
59-60.
337 Marx asserted that "if you can totally change the 'ensemble of the social relations,' you
can totally change human nature." SINGER, supra note 259, at 5 (quoting KARL MARX,
THESES ON FEUERBACH VI (1888)). "This claim goes to the heart of Marxism and of more
broadly marxist (with a small 'm') thinking. As a result, it affects much of the thought of
the entire left." Id.; see ALCOCK, supra note 13, at 20 (Because Marxism "is founded on the
premise of the perfectability of human institutions .... persons with Marxist views were
particularly unreceptive to the notion that an evolved 'human nature' exists, fearing that
such a claim would he interpreted to mean that human behavior cannot change."); PINKER,
supra note 11, at 155-58. But contrary to the neo-Marxist position, some "traditional Marx
readings are concerned with the human 'species being', obviously a fixed entity."
Segerstr~le, Colleagues in Conflict, supra note 258, at 84 n.53; see SEGERSTRALE, supra note 6, at
204-05. To summarize, "[a]lthough it does not go uncontested in Marxist writings, nor
even in Marx's writings, the 'official' Marxist position is that there is no universal human
nature, only the various human natures determined by specific historical-material
conditions." DONALD E. BROWN, HUMAN UNIVERSALS 60 (1991). A related problem with
natural selection for Marxists is that, "[blecause Darwin viewed the struggle in nature as in
large part between individuals, his theory seemed to undermine the very possibility of
class solidarity and the final elimination of human conflict." KAYE, supra note 258, at 25.
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The sociobiological contention that individuals have genetic
predispositions generates great heat among Marxist critics who,
overreading the asserted effects of natural predispositions, accuse
sociobiologists of being outright determinists. 338 On the other hand,
Marxists and Darwinians are both materialists who believe that reality is
undergirded by matter, rather than the mentalism of idealists. 339 But in
sum, unlike the Lockeans, Smithians, and Burkeans, several of the main
tenets of Marxism, if not of Marx himself, appear to conflict with
Darwinian principles.340
33 See supra Part III.B. "Marx's own views on human nature were ambiguous, but most
Marxists have adopted the view that human nature is plastic in the sense that 'being
determines consciousness.'" CARTWRIGHT, supra note 7, at 322. On the other hand,
Midgley finds Marxists with "an enthusiasm for determinism generally," even beyond
economic and social determinism. MIDGLEY, supra note 13, at 63 n.13. She quotes Engels:
"Freedom is the recognition of necessity.... Freedom does not consist in the dream of
independence of natural laws, but in the knowledge of these laws, and in the possibility
that it gives of systematically directing the work towards definite ends." Id.; see FREDERICK
ENGELS, ANTI-DOHRING [HERR EUGEN DOHRING'S REVOLUTION IN SCIENCE] 125 (Emile
Burns trans., C.P. Dutt ed., International Publishers 1939) (1894) (other translation). But,
she points out, Marx himself, "though he officially dropped the notion of human nature
and often attacked the term, relied on the idea as much as anybody else for his crucial
notion of Dehumanization." MIDGLEY, supra note 13, at xviii.
339 On the other hand, "[tihe materialist theory of history implies that there is no fixed
human nature. It changes with every change in the mode of production." SINGER, supra
note 259, at 23. Perversely, Trofim Lysenko, who Stalin put in charge of the Soviet
biological sciences, perpetuated grievous consequences on the Soviet economy and sciences
by ignoring Marxist materialism as applied to heredity, suppressing classical genetics, and
espousing an idealist, Lamarckian inheritance of acquired characteristics that led to
agricultural disasters. See SAGAN, supra note 241, at 261-63.
340 Thus the Soviets via Lysenko's mandate, disastrously for their genetic sciences,
vehemently rejected Darwinian principles in favor of Lamarckian ideas of acquired
characteristics. See, e.g., MORRIS, supra note 243, at 84-92; Smith, supra note 256, at 374, 378-
79. Lamarck's theory offered a teleology agreeable to Marxist views of progress that
Darwin's did not. See KAYE, supra note 258, at 25. Perhaps if Karl Marx had lived, it would
have gone differently. He contemplated dedicating Das Capital to Darwin, who demurred
in order to avoid the political labeling of his science. See GEORG BREUER, SOCIOBIOLOGY
AND THE HUMAN DIMENSION, at xiii (1982). Moreover, Nisbet declares it "comical to
present Marx and Darwin as at different poles." NISBET, supra note 265, at 82. "Marx had
vast admiration for Darwin's Origin and compared his own Capital to it, down to the very
details." Id. "The only striking difference between Marxian and Darwinian conceptions of
evolution is that Marx, in respect to social evolution, was very much the preformationist:
'higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions of their
existence have matured in the womb of the old society."' Id. at 82-83. Yet to Lysenko,
Lamarckian principles "seemed to accord better with Marxism than did the orthodox ...
Mendelian doctrine." Smith, supra note 256, at 378-79. For an introduction to the Marxist
reaction to Darwin, see SINGER, supra note 259, at 20-28.
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Turning to Rawls, he constructs his liberal, welfare-state vision on a
Kantian, and therefore individual-centered, framework. Placing
society's hypothetical founders behind a veil of ignorance to construct
the social contract, he finds that they would reject outright utilitarianism
and instead agree to two basic principles of justice: first, an equal right
to justice; and second, the "difference principle" whereby social and
economic inequalities are allowable only when they benefit the least
advantaged and derive from fairly equal opportunities. 341
While it might seem that Rawls's first principle would place him in
the camp of the Lockeans with the emphasis on individual justice, his
skepticism about personal claims of desert move him outside the core
Lockean campgrounds. Under Locke's labor principle of justice, one is
entitled to, that is, deserves, the fruits of one's labor.3 42 Rawls demurs to
this implicitly in terms that are familiar to the sociobiological debate:
nature and nurture. He contends that one's natural endowments and
nurtured virtues are largely a matter of "moral luck." That a person has
"good genes" or "bad genes" is not a result of anything that she or her
ancestors did in a manner that would support a claim of personal desert.
That she was raised in an environment that encouraged or discouraged
her worldly successes is again not anything that would support a claim
of personal desert. She was just plain lucky or unlucky to get what she
has. While there remains a place for one's due in this viewpoint, the
strong claims of personal desert, and the individual-centered orientation
it engenders, certainly recede from center stage. Hence, the
redistributive principles of the welfare state do not run afoul of any
strongly defensible, Lockean assertions based on personal desert.343
Equality is to be promoted without unduly weighing the counterclaims
of individual liberty. For the wherewithal to exercise one's liberty, for
example, wealth and power, is not simply the just reward for one's
desert. And the willingness of the welfare-state liberal to grant a
function to the government beyond that of the minimal nightwatchman
state and market protector reflects a comfort with top-down intervention
341 See RAWLS, supra note 64. For an evolutionary theory on the development of the
capacity to enter into contracts, including social contracts, see Cosmides & Tooby, supra
note 162, at 163. See also WILSON, CONSILIENCE, supra note 5, at 171 ("Contract formation is
more than a cultural universal. It is a human trait as characteristic of our species as
language and abstract thought, having been constructed from both instinct and high
intelligence.").
342 See LOCKE, supra note 283, at 170 ("Justice gives every Man a Title to the product of his
honest Industry").
343 See PINKER, supra note 11, at 151.
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to promote the flourishing of society that most Smithians, as well as
Lockeans, reject.344 For example, redistributive taxation and affirmative
action manifest policies advanced by liberals in the name of equality and
the general welfare despite the power and discretion they grant
government agents and their disparate impact on particular individuals.
Indeed, human foibles, whatever their source, raise the costs of
implementing government programs, such as by relying on "leaky
buckets" when redistributing wealth,345 but again the objecting cries of
liberty are perceived as muted by the realities of personal desert. Finally,
since the Rawlsian state is to remain, as much as possible, neutral with
respect to the Good,346 unlike the Burkean community, there is no clause
in its constitution preserving the status quo as reflecting presumptively
better values than what might be wrought by significant, considered
change.
Therefore, while the opening gambit of the Rawlsian is, by seeking a
hypothetical social contract, individualistic along Kantian lines, and
would therefore seem, like the Lockeans and Smithians, to fit
comfortably with the individual-centered principle of Darwinian
evolution, the Rawlsian, contesting a strong conception of personal
desert, retreats from granting dominant political value to personal
liberty. Equality and the interests of the community, the general welfare,
weigh heavily. There is a substantial role for the government which,
after all, is grounded on the supposed consent of the governed. Contrary
to the mechanisms of evolution alone, the group as a group is a major
player in the political arena. As far as the Burkean and Darwinian
principles of incremental, unplanned evolution, the Rawlsian seems
rather indifferent. Having much faith in the reason of the imagined
founders behind the veil of ignorance, and believing in the excellence of
the political processes channeled by the formal and substantive
constraints emerging from the social contract, the Rawlsian sees little
3" Most, perhaps, but certainly not all. There obviously are liberal economists. The
invisible hand is directed at the allocation of the factors of production, not at the
distribution of society's goods beyond this. For example, Adam Smith himself found room
in his system for welfare. See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 156-63 (Edwin
Cannan ed., Modem Library 1994) (1776) (complaining that the restrictive English poor
laws impeded the free circulation of labor and violated the poor's "natural liberty and
justice"). Even Hayek, chief guru of the conservative Austrian school of economics,
recognizes a place for redistributive government activity. See, e.g., HAYEK, supra note 270,
at 257-58.
345 See ARTHUR M. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY 91-95 (1975).
346 See RAWLS, supra note 64, at 395-99.
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reason to posit that the past, by virtue of its timing alone, has a political
wisdom greater than the present. Yes, they may have gotten it right back
then, but not just because it was back then. If, in fact, they got it wrong,
let us not hesitate to change it. Nor does the Rawlsian raise the red flag
when considering social change beyond the incremental. Though
substantial change requires rigorous analysis, the Rawlsian is not
dispositionally timid about the endeavor.
Liberals struggle with the self-interest of human nature found in
evolutionary analysis and libertarian precepts. While Rawls copes with
this by placing society's founders behind a veil of ignorance that keeps
from them knowledge of their own self-interest, once the social contract
is in place, the self-interest of government agents and private citizens
still must be managed. Insofar as human foibles are the product of
nature, they seem more difficult to counter. We are not about to
reprogram genes. Not yet, anyway. On the other hand, to the extent
that behavior is a product of nurture,347 then the maintenance of cultural
influences to counter antisocial conduct appears, intuitively, more within
reach. Not that environmental inputs to human development are easy to
control, but, on first impression, they seemingly are easier to affect than
are genetic inputs.348 In a proper environment, suitable behavior by
citizens and governmental agents will flourish.349
Elementary Rawlsian and evolutionary premises have little in
common. On the surface, the Rawlsian finds nothing about evolutionary
principles that particularly supports or parallels liberalism. As noted,
while Rawls begins his theory with a Kantian, individualistic premise,
347 While "[tihe nature-nurture problem is the central and essential issue that has to be
settled for every aspect of human behaviour and psychology," PLOTKIN, supra note 5, at 70,
the interrelationship between nature and nurture makes it misleading to refer to one or the
other factor in isolation, see id. at 36-71. In sum, as nested hierarchies "[n]ature and nurture
are inextricably enfolded within one another because nurture has nature, and yet nature
must be nurtured and nurture is a part-cause of nature." Id. at 68-69.
W This assertion is a bit conclusory. Since the beginning of the Darwinian revolution,
there have been commentators and politicians who claim, under the label of "eugenics"
("good genes"), that regulating whose genes remain in the gene pool is a realistic
undertaking. The most infamous of these persons is, of course, Hitler. With Hitler as the
best known champion, the eugenics movement is pretty much moribund. For an extended
elaboration of the often sorry, misguided mission of eugenics, see KEVLES, supra note 233,
for a brief summary, see POSNER, supra note 153, at 429-31, and for a nuanced examination
of the current pros and cons, see ALLEN BUCHANAN ET AL., FROM CHANCE TO CHOICE:
GENETICS AND JUSTICE (2000).
349 Later I question whether natural dispositions are always harder to temper than are
nurtured ones. See infra note 389.
2004] Evolution, Politics and Law 1231
thereby possibly implying a Darwinian individual-centered, bottom up
social structure, his social contract turns away from this orientation
towards egalitarianism and public choice. There is no special virtue in
historical solutions to social problems, or cautious, incremental change.
Nor does the Rawlsian believe that the overreaching of self-interested
governmental agents is so great a problem as to disable proper public
projects. On the other hand, a deeper examination of evolutionary
theory may well afford support for liberalism. For example, insofar as
group selection comes into play,350 or cooperation proves beneficial to
individual reproduction,351 liberalism may find grounding. But this
requires sophisticated analyses and extended arguments that appear
rarely, if ever, in the political wars fought in the popular media, where it
counts most. A ten second sound bite will not suffice. Perhaps it is
because liberals find so little in common with the basics of evolutionary
theory that they are the most vocal critics of sociobiology.
In the end, it seems that most politically sophisticated observers
have things to like and dislike about sociobiology.3 2 But some have
much more to like or dislike than others. To summarize, below is a chart
of the way in which the main threads of evolutionary theory relate to the
four general political orientations discussed above: Lockean
libertarianism, Smithian political economics, Burkean
communitarianism, and welfare state (Rawlsian) liberalism. Because
some of the leading critics are Marxist, this orientation, though
communitarian, is also charted, but separately. The main threads
identified are that selection takes place at the level of the individual or
gene, and that the evolutionary process is path dependent, satisficing,
jerry-built, and incremental. It will be seen that liberalism finds nothing
350 See supra note 235.
351 See, e.g., Buss, PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 8, at 254; FRANK, supra note 34, at 32.
Reciprocal altruism may drive cooperation. See, e.g., Buss, PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 8;
TRIVERS, supra note 19, at 361; WILSON, supra note 23, at 120-21. See generally CHRISTOPHER
BADCOCK, EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY 72-110 (2000) ("The Evolution and Psychology of
Co-operation").
352 Richards maintains that, though "evolutionary theory is not compatible with every
social and moral philosophy, it can accommodate a broad range of historically
representative doctrines." Richards, supra note 44, at 267. Hrdy, rejecting the view that
sociobiology is inherently sexist, or that its supporters are more so than other scientists,
cautions that "it is all too easy to forget, while quaking, that sociobiology, if read as a
prescription for life rather than a description of the way some creatures behave, makes it
seem bad luck to be born either sex." SARAH BLAFFER HRDY, THE WOMAN THAT NEVER
EVOLVED 14 (1981).
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particularly attractive in evolutionary theory, and Marxism has much to
dislike.
Threads of Evolutionary Theory
Individual Path dependent,
(gene) satisficing, jerry-built,
centered incremental
Political Orientations
Conservative
Lockean (libertarian) pro neutral
Smithian (economic) pro pro
Burkean (communitarian) anti pro
Liberal
Welfare-statist neutral neutral
(Rawlsian) (anti?)
Marxist anti anti
(communitarian)
B. Political Tactics
The main tactic employed by critics of sociobiology is to deny that
observed human behavior has been demonstrated to be a product of
Darwinian principles.3 3 Indeed, the critics may concede, sociobiologists
are talented at explicating in evolutionary, adaptationist terms particular
conduct, such as the statistical behavioral differences between men and
women, but these are simply "just-so" stories conveniently rationalized
to fit the perceived facts.35 4 If the facts turn out differently from those
353 In his sustained attack on sociobiology, Kitcher identifies the central theme: "The
dispute about human sociobiology is a dispute about evidence." KITCHER, supra note 13, at
8 (emphasis omitted); see, e.g., GOULD, supra note 14, at 244-45; LEWONTIN, supra note 90, at
94-100; Janna L. Thompson, Human Nature and Social Explanation, in AGAINST BIOLOGICAL
DETERMINISM, supra note 13, at 30, 35.
354 See, e.g., LEWONTIN, GENES, supra note 11, at 258-64. Sociobiologists, it is said, are too
quick to find behavior adaptive, when, instead, it may simply be neutral with respect to
evolutionary pressures, or even disadvantageous. For example, Rose accuses sociobiology
of "ultra-Darwinism" which includes, as one of its premises, that "[e]very observable
aspect of the phenotype of an organism-its biochemistry, its form, its behaviour-is in
some way adaptive." ROSE, supra note 11, at 210. For extended discussion, see id. at 209-49.
Especially since there have, indeed, been abuses, caution against overly adaptationist
explanations is proper. See, e.g., DENNETT, supra note 2, at 485-91; FAUSTO-STERLING, supra
note 142, at 168-73; FRANCOIS JACOB, THE POSSIBLE AND THE ACTUAL 20-21 (1982); Frans
B.M. de Waal, A Natural History of Rape, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2000, at 24 (Book Review
Section). But some critics, including Gould and Lewontin, have gone too far. See, e.g.,
ALEXANDER, supra note 163, at 17-19. "Just-so" stories have their place in evolution science.
See BONNER, supra note 163, at 61 ("The only rule that must be obeyed is to make clear one
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first theorized or observed, the evolutionary principles are flexible
enough to allow new predictions in conformance with the state of
knowledge. "You want an explanation? I've got one for you.... There,
now the principles fit the facts, just-so."
This criticism is frequently well based. Imaginative evolutionary
reasoning can often make scrutable the unpredicted or unassimilated. 355
In Wilson's words, "[p]aradoxically, the greatest snare in sociobiological
reasoning is the ease with which it is conducted." 35 6
Over this gambit of specious verification of sociobiology hangs the
specter of using the conclusions for unacceptable purposes. History
reveals that, if correct, sociobiology is "dangerous knowledge." 35 7
is making a hypothesis; there can be no certainty until one has provided some real
evidence."); DANIEL C. DENNETT, Julian Jaynes's Software Archeology, in BRAINCHILDREN,
supra note 155, at 121, 124-25. Even Gould is willing to support an admitted "just-so" story
if he finds it sufficiently persuasive, see STEPHEN JAY GOULD, Can We Truly Know Sloth and
Rapacity?, in LEONARDO'S MOUNTAIN OF CLAMS AND THE DIET OF WORMS 375, 384 (1998),
and "himself has spent much of his professional career producing such just so stories,"
David Hull, Historical Entities and Historical Narratives, in MINDS, MACHINES AND
EVOLUTION, supra note 222, at 17, 32. In sum, "[tihe 'just-so story' epithet is one of the most
successful derogatory labels ever invented, having entered common parlance as a name for
any explanation about behavior, especially human behavior, that some wishes to dispute."
ALCOCK, supra note 13, at 64; see id. at 64-73.
355 See, e.g., KONNER, supra note 18, at 18; Lewontin, supra note 18, at 213, 228-30. Even if
this is true, nothing crucial to the main thrust of sociobiology requires all traits to be
adaptive. Even if most behavior is nonadaptive, that which is in fact subject to
evolutionary pressures remains to be confronted.
356 WILSON, supra note 23, at 28. "[S]ociobiology has imprecise results that can be too
easily explained by many different schemes." Id.; see STUART A. KAUFFMAN, THE ORIGINS
OF ORDER 17 (1993) ("facile constructions of 'just-so' stories plausibly positing a use for a
feature in the face of no possible tests at all.... has truly been one of the major problems in
evolutionary biology"); GEORGE C. WILLIAMS, ADAPTATION AND NATURAL SELECTION 251-
73 (1966) ("The scientific study of adaptation"); Elliott Sober, Six Sayings About
Adaptationisni, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY, supra note 34, at 72, 80-82 (discussing the
saying that "Adaptationism is untestable; it involves the uncritical formulation of Just So
Stories").
357 See, e.g., GOULD, Cardboard Darvinisn, supra note 187, at 29-30 (quoting KITCHER, supra
note 13); LEWONTIN, GENES, supra note 11, at 236-43; WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 234 ("Each
time advances have been made in understanding of the biological links with behavior,
ideologues with extreme positions appear, cheer the new findings, then twist them to their
own political agendas."); 6 RESEARCH IN BIOPOLITICS: SOCIOBIOLOGY AND POLITICS, supra
note 83, at 229-81 (Part III: (Socio)Biology and Politics: The Public Debate of "Dangerous"
Ideas); Barker, supra note 241, at 11 ("[W]e have already seen the beginnings of
sociobiology being put to use in support of the Thatcherite backlash in Britain, and of the
anti-feminist backlash in America. And I have deliberately avoided mention of Nazism
and associated fascisms[!]. These ideas are weapons in the hands of activists .... ); Arthur L.
1234 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 38
Insofar as it is incorrect, it still is dangerous, possibly even more
dangerous. 358 Correct or not, it might well lead, as it has in the past, to
unjust, even fascistic, social policies aimed at "improving" the gene pool
or relegating genetic "defectives" to their "proper" place.359 A cursory
glance at the outrages of the eugenic movement that sprang up shortly
after Darwin's seminal tract demonstrate this threat.
This criticism is properly cautionary. But the genie of knowledge,
dangerous or beneficial, habitually pops out of the bottle, sooner or later.
Let us prepare for it. We are less likely to ignorantly pursue harmful
wishes.360 Furthermore, who does one want pulling at the cork? Only
those with objectionable political agendas?
Caplan, Introduction to THE SOCIOBIOLOGY DEBATE, supra note 7, at 1, 9; Jones, supra note 7,
at 275-77 (for example, Nazism and racism); Mary Midgley, Rival Fatalisms: The Hollowness
of the Sociobiology Debate, in SOCIOBIOLOGY EXAMINED, supra note 134, at 15, 26
("[S]ociobiology as a movement is a real menace, because it provides simple-minded
people who like the jargon of science with an exceptionally slick set of catchwords and
formulae for universal explanation."); Solomon et al., supra note 93, at 273. This concern
harkens back "to the exclamation of the wife of the Bishop Wilberforce, upon hearing of
Darwin's view of evolution, that we should pray that it not be true and if it be true pray
that it not become generally known." Richard D. Alexander, Biological Considerations in the
Analysis of Morality, in EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS, supra note 44, at 163, 189.
358 See, e.g., STEPHEN JAY GOULD, So Cleverly Kind an Animal, in EVER SINCE DARWIN, supra
note 190, at 260, 267 ("If you defend a behavior by arguing that people are programmed
directly for it, then how do you continue to defend it if your speculation is wrong, for the
behavior then becomes unnatural and worthy of condemnation."). See generally
SEGERSTRALE, supra note 6, at 386-90.
359 Short of this extremism, there are other concerns. For example, "[olne seeming danger
in questioning the potency of family experience is the possibility that parents will become
negligent if they learn that their daily behaviors are not the only, or the most critical,
influence on their children." KAGAN, supra note 140, at 15. Or, "[slome commentators
predict that when a majority believe that molecules in the brain have a major influence on
the experiences of love, joy, and sadness, these emotions will become less beautiful." Id. at
17.
3W Sagan opines that we are better off even with dangerous knowledge, "if we keep
before us a keen apprehension of the errors our interest group or belief system has
committed in the past." SAGAN, supra note 241, at 279. "And again, we are not wise
enough to know which lies, or even which shadings of the facts, can competently serve
some higher social purpose-especially in the long run." Id. Pinker welcomes the new
knowledge as "presentling] opportunities to sharpen our ethical reasoning and put our
moral and political values on a firmer foundation." Pinker, supra note 171, at 208. For
example, "[i]t is a bad idea to say that war, violence, rape, and greed are bad because
humans are not naturally inclined to them." Id. "These are bad ideas because they imply
that either scientists must be prepared to fudge their data or we must all be prepared to
give up our values." Id. at 208-09.
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True, the study of human nature is not physics. The weaknesses of
sociobiological reasoning and verification is endemic to the field.361 The
scientific probe of behavior cannot be refined by creating control groups.
Because we are dealing with humans, not rats, we cannot raise one
subject in a controlled environment and its twin in the same
environment less one input to see what behavioral differences eventuate.
Nor can we raise a number of humans, including separated identical
twins, in equivalent environments to examine the range of traits that
ensue. Many generations must be observed to discern the glacial
evolutionary process.362 In the nature of things, the exactitude of the
physical sciences is beyond reach.363 But with time and careful study,
3 Lewontin points out some of the main stumbling blocks. See LEWONTIN, supra note 90,
at 94-100.
362 In Gould's words, "Natural selection can be observed directly, but only in the unusual
circumstances of controlled experiments in laboratories (on organisms with very short
generations such as fruit flies) or within simplified and closely monitored systems in
nature." Gould, Fundamentalism, supra note 6, at 34.
363 See, e.g., BRADIE, supra note 87, at 130 (noting there are difficulties in treating humans
as scientific subjects for required studies); CARTWRIGHT, supra note 7, at 80 (distinguishing
"theory-down" from "observation-driven" approaches to science, sociobiology falling
within the latter); CAVALLI-SFORZA & CAVALLI-SFORZA, supra note 206, at 260; DANIEL C.
DENNETr, Self-Portrait, in BRAINCHILDREN, supra note 155, at 355, 360 ("It is only slowly
dawning on philosophers of science that biology is not a science like physics, in which one
should strive to find 'laws of nature,' but a species of engineering .... "); ELDREDGE, supra
note 11, at 119 ("[Natural selection is] a very different sort of scientific generalization, or
'law,' ... than what physicists, chemists, and geologists are accustomed to."); MAYR, supra
note 76, at xiii ("[Bliology [is] a quite different kind of science from the physical sciences; it
differ[s] fundamentally in its subject matter, its history, its methods, and its philosophy.");
VON SCHILCHER & TENNANT, supra note 18, at 2 ("Scientific theories are not all strongly
predictive, and do not all deliver deterministic laws. In the case of evolutionary theory in
particular, one is more concerned with inference to the best explanation."); WILSON,
NATURALIST, supra note 257, at 167 (Unlike the performance by most biologists of controlled
experiments, the evolutionary biologist "observes the results already obtained, as learned
from studies of natural history, and tries to infer the facts that operated in the past. Where
the experimental biologist predicts the outcome of experiments, the evolutionary biologist
retrodicts the experiment already performed by Nature; he teases science out of history.");
Hull, supra note 354, at 17. Gould writes that the most prominent reasons sociobiology is
amenable to "just-so" stories are: "(1) We have so little data about a slow-breeding species
that cannot be overtly manipulated for experimental purposes. (2) The nongenetic process
of cultural evolution often mimics the results of Darwinian (genetic) adaptation.... (3)
Our inordinate interest in Hotno sapiens .... " GOULD, Cardboard Darwinism, supra note 189,
at 33-34. This first reason, he states, creates a "particular dilemma" for studying human
sociobiology. Id. at 34. Yet one doubting critic notes that "the difficulty of a scientific
objective is not a warrant for its abandonment.... There are comparable, or greater,
difficulties with understanding such problems as speciation, the evolution of sex, and the
origin of life." ROSE, supra note 6, at 170. "[I]f enough care is taken, there is no
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one can make progress in determining the validity of sociobiological
principles, 364 just as it has been made in the other social and historical
sciences. Many sociobiological hypotheses are falsifiable, and others can
be challenged by unpredicted statistical anomalies.365 We must proceed
slowly with our conclusions, but still, for the sake of knowledge and the
fundamental scientific reason why human behavior cannot be discussed by evolutionary
biologists." Id.
364 Perhaps I should put the word "validity" in scare quotes, for arguably biology is
ultimately grounded on a coherence theory of truth, not a correspondence theory, see RUSE,
supra note 30, at 202, or perhaps on a combination of coherence and correspondence, see
RUSE, supra note 8, at 236-37. For a brief discussion of coherence, see Aleksander Peczenik,
Weighing Rights, in ENLIGHTENMENT, RIGHTS AND REVOLUTION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL AND
SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 175, 194-95 (Neil MacCormick & Zenon Bankowski eds., 1989). For
other limitations to biological reasoning, see ALEXANDER ROSENBERG, Limits to Biological
KnoWledge, in DARWINISM IN PHILOSOPHY, SOCIAL SCIENCE AND POLICY, supra note 290, at 58.
For a noted example of experiments supporting a sociobiological argument (i.e., that the
brain is not a general purpose calculating machine but rather a collection of specialized,
interrelated modules evolved to cope with recurring adaptive social problems), see
Cosmides & Tooby, supra note 162, at 163.
365 See ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 202-03 ("[Eivolutionary hypotheses can be tested, and,
of course, they only become useful when they become testable. Means of falsification exist
in many cases, and in others deviations from expectations on the basis of chance can be
shown to be highly significant. Both points are demonstrated in this book."); Michael Ruse,
Sociobiology: A Philosophical Analysis, in THE SOCIOBIOLOGY DEBATE, supra note 7, at 355,
364-66 (sociobiology is falsifiable). For an example of a falsifiable study of whether human
behavior predicted on Darwinian principles actually occurs, see LAURA L. BETZIG,
DESPOTISM AND DIFFERENTIAL REPRODUCTION (1986) (predicting that despotism and
polygyny will coincide). To overcome the snare of the "advocacy method of developing
science," Wilson advocates the employment of the "techniques of postulational-deductive
model building" and the utilization of "the procedures of strong inference." WILSON, supra
note 23, at 28. Lumsden and Wilson acknowledge the need for human sociobiology to
satisfy the three scientific services of, first, "deriv[ing] rigorous propositions that are the
unexplained axioms of other theories in the social sciences," second, "achievling] a level of
predictiveness and testability greater than that provided by other modes of explanation,"
or at least unifying the underlying assumptions of other social science disciplines, and
third, "suggest[ing] new questions and problems," along with "identify[ing] previously
unknown parameters and laws" that can be interwoven "into a network of verifiable
explanation from genes through the mind to culture." LUMSDEN & WILSON, supra note 150,
at 343. On the other hand, while Mayr points out that Popper's standard of theory
falsifiability "is particularly ill-suited for the testing of probabilistic theories, which include
most theories in biology," MAYR, supra note 76, at 49, "recent authors ... have shown not
only that the historical-narrative approach is valid but also that it is perhaps the only
scientifically and philosophically valid approach in the explanation of unique occurrences,"
id. at 64. "It is, of course, never possible to prove categorically that a historical narrative is
'true',... [ylet every narrative is open to falsification and can be tested again and again[!]"
Id. at 64-65. "In biology a plurality of causal factors, combined with probabilism in the
chain of events, often makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to determine the cause of a
given phenomenon." Id. at 68.
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benefits it may offer US,3 66 including the rebuttal of unjust moral
claims, 367 we must proceed.
368
Some critics go beyond the assertions that sociobiology has not been
demonstrated, perhaps cannot be demonstrated, and has dangerous
implications. They assert that human behavior, because of our power to
reason, is no longer subject to the evolutionary forces impinging on less
complex life forms. Our brains make us qualitatively different from
other organisms, freeing us from at least some of the relentless pressures
of evolutionary mechanisms.369 In response, it must be admitted that,
while one may doubt humans are qualitatively different from other
animals, 370 indeed this is possible. But the contention that Darwinian
forces impinge on the characteristics of all life forms on earth, perhaps in
W6' For example, the "behavioral genetics perceptions" "should change the way each of us
thinks about our wants, our decisions, our emotions, our responses -change the way we
view all the dynamic mechanisms that make us who we are. It might also have the
humbling effect of making us less quick to assume a purely rational basis to our every
thought, action, and emotion." WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 260. For other prospective
benefits, see infra notes 387-401 and accompanying text {antepenultimate paragraph).
367 See VON SCHILCHER & TENNANT, supra note 18, at 160 ("The proper antidote to neo-
fascist abuse of this new theory of human nature [i.e., sociobiology] ought surely to be a
fuller understanding of its scope and limits."); cf. PINKER, supra note 6, at 47 ("The debate
over human nature has been muddied by an intellectual laziness, an unwillingness to make
moral arguments when moral issues come up.").
W6 In response to the threat of the dangerous knowledge of sociobiology, one
commentator observes that "things are as they are no matter what we might wish. We
ignore facts and avoid controversy at our own risk." THIESSEN, supra note 107, at x. On the
other hand, Teiresias famously stated in Oedipus Rex, "Alas, how terrible is wisdom when it
brings no profit to the man that's wise!" SOPHOCLES, OEDIPUS THE KING 99 (David Grene
trans., 1942). Thiessen states that sociobiology is not "inherently malevolent" but merely
subject to misapplications similar to the environmental and ideological theories that have
brought us genocide and misery "for religious, moralistic, political, and ideological
reasons." Id. In general, "Darwin's Specter is neither an evil ghost, nor an angel. It is
instead an ambiguous and troubling apparition, from which we might learn much." ROSE,
supra note 6, at 4. Owen Jones observes that "the pre-Darwinian myths that Homo sapiens
sapiens differs from other animals in kind, not just in degree, and that the obvious influence
of human mind on behavior means that all human behavior obviously comes from mind"
creates a "comfortably closed" system that is convenient for the law. Owen D. Jones, Genes,
Behavior, and Law, 15 POL. & LIFE SCI. 101, 102 (1996); see GOULD, supra note 190, at 251, 258
("If genetic determinism is true, we will learn to live with it as well.").
369 See, e.g., GOULD, MISMEASURE, supra note 138, at 354 ("Human uniqueness resides
primarily in our brains. It is expressed in the culture built upon our intelligence and the
power it gives us to manipulate the world. Human societies change by cultural evolution,
not as a result of biological alteration.").
370 For doubts that humans are qualitatively different, see, for example, DONALD R.
GRIFFIN, ANIMAL MINDS (1992).
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the universe,371 except for the behavior of those that can reason, advances
an exception to the general rule that should carry with it the burden of
proof.372 This reminds one of planetary epicycles.373 Ockham's razor
and the aesthetics of parsimony must be parried. 374 The avowal that
371 That the principles of natural selection are universal, see, for example, GARY CZIKO,
WITHOUT MIRACLES: UNIVERSAL SELECTION THEORY AND THE SECOND DARWINIAN
REVOLUTION (1995); DAWKINS, RIVER, supra note 22, at 135-61; PLOTKIN, supra note 20, at 59-
101; Richard Dawkins, Universal Darwinism, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY, supra note 34,
at 15.
372 "'[S]pecies chauvinism' - the idea that evolutionary biology applies to every species
on the globe except for Homo sapiens sapiens -is the modern version of the belief that the
Earth is the centre of the universe." JEROME H. BARKOW, DARWIN, SEX, AND STATUS 41
(1989). As one of the leading biologists observes about supposed genetic influences on
human behavior, "it would be very odd indeed if this assumption were not true. In other
animal species, genetic variance for behavioral traits can be readily found, and I shall
assume that the same is true for man until a good reason is provided for supposing
otherwise." Maynard Smith, supra note 259, at 28. Another leading biologist asserts that,
like physical traits, "behaviours and emotions can also be homologous-that is, they can
have a common evolutionary origin from which continuous threads of their modification
lead to the examples we see. Practically none of our basic behaviour, perhaps only our
linguistic behaviour and even that uncertainly, is wholly unique to humans." W.D.
HAMILTON, Altruism and Related Phenomena, Mainly in Social Insects, in NARROW ROADS OF
GENE LAND, supra note 107, at 255, 259; see also LIONEL TIGER, MEN IN GROUPS 2 (1969) ("To
accept the existence of physical similarities [between humans and other primates] in fact
but to deny in principle the behavioural ones involves an unjustified divorce of physical
structure from behavioural function."); Jones, supra note 7, at 274 ("Yet while it is
theoretically possible that humans may somehow have evolved to the point where there is
no biological basis for any human behavior, there is no reason - none at all - to establish
this self-serving presumption. Deviation from the norm, not conformance with the norm,
bears explanation and justification."); Jones, supra note 17, at 1154 (Pure environmentalism
"requires a theory (to date unarticulated and suspiciously bootstrapping) that could
explain the process by which a species could evolve beyond the influence of the processes
that shaped it."). However, in elucidating these traits, Maynard Smith urges, in light of the
substantial environmental influences on behavior, "we must be modest." Smith, supra note
259, at 29. Even Kitcher, one of the harshest critics of sociobiology, concedes that "it is
possible that we might some day achieve justified conclusions about the evolution of some
aspects of human behavior." KITCHER, supra note 13, at 131.
373 Gould refers to this claim that critics of sociobiology fall into "the oldest of Western
cultural traps-the desire to keep humans apart from nature and free from her
mechanisms" but responds by noting that "Homo sapiens is not the only, simply the most
prominent, victim of pop sociobiology." GOULD, Cardboard Darwinism, supra note 187, at 34.
He cautions against "the deepest cultural prejudice of all: our almost desperate desire to
make humans special and superior among the animals of our earth." GOULD, Protagoras,
supra note 187, at 69. "We must recognize the elements of continuity that exist between the
social behavior of human and other animals .... Still, we cannot stretch our ladder of
extrapolation from amoebae to monkeys and up to people." Id. Culture makes us
different. Id.
374 Owen Jones raises this argument against those who dispute biological factors in rape.
See Jones, supra note 143, at 899. Elsewhere he contends that the continuation of the
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humans are unique suggests a "just-so" story, independent of
demonstrated fact, that seems to conveniently satisfies the claimant's
apparent hopes.375 It parallels and smacks of the religion-based claim
that humans are special because God made them so. Humans may well
be special,376 but the scientific method requires more authority than
ancient texts or wishful thinking provide.
Of course, all reputable political theorists, whatever their orientation,
assert that behavior is a product of both nature and nurture, but often it
is convenient to the persuasion, propaganda wars for conservatives to
emphasize nature and liberals to emphasize nurture. For this reason,
liberals perceive sociobiology as a threat.377  It pushes the natural
components of behavior into the spotlight. Nurture is not moved off
stage, but the quick inference from sociobiology is that nature is so
prominent as to very substantially raise the cost, perhaps to exorbitant
levels, of freeing or moderating certain human conduct.378
How, then, are liberals to defend their platform if the basic
sociobiological tenets prove, beyond reasonable debate, to be the case? It
historical influences of evolutionary processes on human behavior is "overwhelmingly"
probable. See Jones, supra note 17, at 1152-55. For the values behind scientific explanations,
see, for example, RUSE, supra note 8, at 32-34.
375 That it is also easy to make up anti-adaptationist "just-so" stories, see Sober, supra
note 356, at 82.
376 One sociobiologist insists that "the total combination of selective pressures has
produced an information-processing capacity in Homo sapiens which has emergent
properties not reducible to any theory of selective pressures." Barkow, supra note 185, at
180. This capacity facilitates the generation of cultures, "which themselves evolve in
historical processes that, while perhaps lawful, are not reducible to 'nothing but'
considerations of inclusive fitness." Id. For "emergent phenomena," see id. at 184-85. See
also STEWART & COHEN, supra note 137, at 64-65 (mind, consciousness and culture are
emergent phenomena not fully subject to reductionist analysis). For a specific rejection of
the irreducible, emergent quality of culture, see BONNER, supra note 139, at 7-9.
377 One commentator, in concluding a book on the sociobiological input to morality,
notes the relationship between scientistic sociobiology and conservatism, and opines that,
despite the moral disclaimers of sociobiologists, "on the whole, we had better watch out."
B.A.O. Williams, Conclusion to MORALITY AS A BIOLOGICAL PHENOMENON, supra note 93, at
275, 285.
378 Wilson believes that some behavioral modifications are infeasible. See WILSON,
SEARCH, supra note 83, at 94 (While "[g]enetic biases can be trespassed, passions averted or
redirected, and ethics altered ... , the mind is not infinitely malleable."). Even Kant, the
unmitigated deontologist, though he "warns political theorists against rejecting theories
simply because they appear infeasible, ... he agrees that, in the final analysis, a reasonable
political theory recommends only institutional arrangements that are possible and
practicable." Juha Raikk5, The Feasibility Condition in Political Theory, 6 J. POL. PHIL. 27, 27
(1998).
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seems to me that liberals must then acknowledge and address the
additional difficulties wrought by nature to using government regulation
and cultural channeling to control antisocial behavior, encourage
beneficial conduct, and facilitate individual autonomy, success, and
flourishing.379 In fact, much can be said for biting this bullet before the
scientific debate is settled. I say this, first, as one who believes that
sociobiology is likely to have much truth on its side. Overstatements
379 This is the clarion call of Singer's recent book. "It is time for the left to take seriously
the fact that we are evolved animals, and that we bear the evidence of our inheritance, not
only in our anatomy and our DNA, but in our behavior too. In other words it is time to
develop a Darwinian Left." SINGER, supra note 259, at 6. Wilson takes Rawls to task for this
failure: "While few will disagree that justice as fairness is an ideal state for disembodied
spirits, the conception is in no way explanatory or predictive with reference to human
beings. Consequently, it does not consider the ultimate ecological or genetic consequences
of the rigorous prosecution of its conclusions." WILSON, supra note 23, at 562. For Singer's
Darwinian left platform, see SINGER, supra note 259, at 60-63.
Thomas Nagel, acknowledging that "[tlhere may be biological obstacles to the
achievement of certain kinds of moral progress," as there are psychological ones, concludes
that this does not make the obstacles insurmountable. T. Nagel, Ethics as an Autonomous
Theoretical Subject, in MORALITY AS A BIOLOGICAL PHENOMENON, supra note 93, at 196, 204.
"They must be recognized and dealt with by any moral theory that is not utopian." Id.
"[M]orality, like any other process of cultural development, must reckon with its starting
points and with the nature of the materials it is attempting to transform." Id. Alice Rossi
states that "[ilgnorance of biological processes may doom efforts at social change to failure
because we misidentify what the targets for change should be, and hence what our means
should be to attain the change we desire." DEGLER, supra note 256, at 320 (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Alice S. Rossi, Gender and Parenthood, 49 AM. SOC. REV. 1, 11 (1984)); see
also SINGER, supra note 259, at 15 ("[Aln understanding of human nature in the light of
evolutionary theory can help us to identify the means by which we may achieve some of
our social and political goals, including various ideas of equality, as well as assessing the
possible costs and benefits of doing so."); Elliott, supra note 7, at 606 ("It may be that judges
should understand what is built into the biology of the species because it is going to be
more difficult, or take more social energy, for the law to go against what is build into us as
a species."); Jones, supra note 7, at 280 (Even if society chooses to ignore the
sociobiologically predicted fact that stepparents are less nurturing than natural parents,
"we would by virtue of an evolutionary perspective more accurately perceive some of the
potential costs of inaction .... ). On the other hand, Susan Oyama is unimpressed with
such urgings, fearful of the hidden agenda beneath them. She finds that, partially to
dissociate themselves from the reactionary strands of biopolitics, theorists commonly
"declare their liberal values, deny that biological treatments are necessarily either
deterministic or conservative, and emphasize that biological explanation is not the same as
moral approval. Then the theorists typically call on us to know our natures in order to
transcend them." Susan Oyama, Essentialism, Women, and War: Protesting Too Much,
Protesting Too Little, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY, supra note 34, at 414, 417. "At the
same time, they often warn against trying to challenge the boundaries and constraints our
genes set for us.... They advise us to learn what the limits are, and to set our goals with
them .... " Id. Touch6. But Oyama does not reject the biological approach to human
behavior, she simply counsels caution and comprehensiveness. See id. at 420-21.
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and incorrect tenets have doubtlessly been championed by
sociobiologists, but this is to be expected within a new discipline,
especially one focusing on the human condition with political
overtones.380 Past excesses and mistakes do not justify throwing out the
baby with the bathwater.38' Human nature, and evolution in general, as
historically situated, cannot be studied with the scientific objectivity and
controls of physics, but that does not mean they cannot be studied
successfully. 3 2 Psychology has also gone through Freudian, behaviorist,
and other excesses over the last century, but nevertheless progress has
been made in understanding the human psyche. Similarly,
anthropology, sociology, and other social sciences lack the predictability
and falsifiability of the physical sciences, but they remain valuable
sciences still. 383 The strands of Gordian, human behavior are bound to
be difficult to unravel, but resort to the sword leaves much potentially
useful knowledge in shreds.38 4 Second, as pure political strategy, it
380 See supra note 129.
381 See Jones, supra note 7, at 271.
382 "[E]volutionary explanation is of its nature historical, and historical explanation is not
like explanation in physics or chemistry. It deals with the singular and the unrepeatable; it
is thus necessarily incomplete." Ernan McMullin, Evolution and Special Creation, in THE
PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY, supra note 34, at 698, 724. "An evolutionary explanation can
never be better than plausible; the real problem lies in discriminating between different
degrees of plausibility." Id. Gould refers to "an unfortunate tradition of self-hate among
scientists who deal with the complex, unrepeatable, and unpredictable events of history."
STEPHEN JAY GOULD, Eight Little Piggies, in EIGHT LITLE PIGGIES 63, 77 (1993). Though
unable to meet the standards of "hard science," "historical science proceeds by
reconstructing a set of contingent events, explaining in retrospect what could not have been
predicted beforehand. If the evidence be sufficient, the explanation can be as rigorous and
confident as anything done in the realm of experimental science." Id.
W In defending the science of evolution, including geology and most of astronomy,
against an attack based on the supposition that scientific knowledge is limited by
controlled experiment, Gould contends that "[s]cience is a pluralistic enterprise, validly
pursued in many modes.... Historical science ... uses methods ... [that include] search
for an underlying pattern among unique events, and retrodiction (predicting the yet
undiscovered results of past events) . GOULD, supra note 191, at 234 (reviewing RIFKIN,
supra note 191).
384 See Runciman, supra note 129, at 2.
[Tihe more complex the pattern of behaviour, the more difficult it is
likely to be to disentangle the effects of genetic, ecological,
demographic, and cultural variables. But in social, no less than in
biological, anthropology, it is a matter of finding evidence which will
enable competing hypotheses to be tested against one another.
Id. Like economists who explicitly or implicitly challenge the critics of economics to come
up with a more predictive model, see, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive
Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 3, 15, 41 (1953); POSNER, supra note 285, at 16-
18; Lionel Robbins, The Nature of Economic Generalizations, in PHILOSOPHY AND ECONOMIC
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seems foolish to base one's entire attack on a particular opponent on the
basis of a factual assertion that may well, as some critics concede,3 5 be
incorrect. Should sociobiological principles prove correct, the
retrenchment of the liberal position would then appear to be a
rationalization aimed simply at bolstering a weakened foundation. It
would be easy to portray this retrenchment as a "just-so" story designed
to justify a stubborn viewpoint established prior to an understanding of
the facts.
As is true of subscribers to any political strand that disagrees with
Darwinian principles, in my view, the wary liberals should now confront
the political implications of sociobiology head on. One approach echoes
the discussion above. Yes, the fact that some personality traits are
genetically predisposed complicates the process of coping with them.
But this simply should harden the resolve of society to take on the task
when sufficiently important:
First, even though there are genetic behavioral dispositions, the
antisocial ones raising the specter of illiberal government responses, 386
THEORY 36 (Frank Hahn & Martin Hollis eds., 1979), we may challenge the critics of
sociobiology to do likewise. See VON SCHILCHER & TENNANT, supra note 18, at 154
("Anyone who has ever read Freud or Marx or Sartre, to name a few of the more influential
theorists [of human naturel, at least one or two of whom were mildly concerned with the
problem of empirical evidence, would perhaps agree that sociobiology does not fare too
badly.").
385 The best-known critics of sociobiology do not claim that nature plays no role in
establishing human traits. Instead, in accordance with the old nature-nurture controversy,
they admit to the inputs of nature, but downplay it in favor of the dominant influence of
nurture. They may assert that the role of nature has not been adequately demonstrated by
the sociobiologists, instead it has been merely espoused by "just-so" stories, and hence
imply that enlightened souls would stick to the problems of nurture. See, e.g., LEWONTIN,
GENES, supra note 11, at 243-90. When explicitly addressing the question of the magnitude
of the influence of nature, even sympathetic critics of the immoderate sociobiologists who
claim that nature plays a role of up to 80% in determining human traits, see, e.g.,
HERRNSTEIN & MURRAY, supra note 133, at 105-08 (IQ between 40% and 80% heritable), will
find some role for nature, see, e.g., CAVALLI-SFORZA & CAVALLI-SFORZA, supra note 206, at
272 (30%). See supra note 186 (heritability). Even positing a small role for nature is enough
to bring to center stage the general claims of sociobiologists. Some scientists argue that the
interrelationship between nature and nurture is so intertwined as to render meaningless
the controversy over the relative inputs of nature and nurture. See ANTONIO R. DAMASIO,
DESCARTES' ERROR 110-13 (1994); GOLDSMITH, ROOTS, supra note 20, at 86-87; see also
CAVALLI-SFORZA & CAVALLI-SFORZA, supra note 206, at 272-76 (discussing "the imbroglio of
heritability").
386 For example, Dreyfuss and Nelkin foresee the enhancement of the punishment of the
"genetically disordered" because their prospect for reformation may be reduced, or the
imposition of "extreme therapeutic measures such as psychosurgery," in effect creating "a
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many or even most of the dispositions may well be of enduring social
value. 387  A deeper understanding of them may enable their
reinforcement.
Second, some of these dispositions are probably no longer even
beneficial to individuals. They were fired in the prehistoric kiln of small-
group life on the savanna, and now that the human environment has
greatly altered, they may prove maladaptive even to individuals, let
alone social groups. The better one understands the origins of socially
detrimental behavior, beneficial to the individual or not, the better one
can cope with it.388
sort of status offense." Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Dorothy Nelkin, The Jurisprudence of
Genetics, 45 VAND. L. REV. 313, 330-31 (1992); see RIDLEY, supra note 128, at 268-69.
387 For example, Pinker points out that biological urges for bad behavior can be
counteracted by other biological urges, such as those "to avoid punishment, condemnation,
loss of reputation, loss of self-esteem, and mistrust or abandonment by allies and loved
ones." Pinker, supra note 171, at 203.
3W See ALEXANDER, supra note 163, at 9-10; W.D. HAMILTON, Selection of Selfish and
Altruistic Behaviour in Some Extreme Models, in NARROW ROADS OF GENE LAND, supra note
107, at 185, 191; KONNER, supra note 18, at 406; WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 259; N.A.C. & W.I.,
supra note 246, at xvi; Roger D. Masters, A/hy Study Serotonin, Social Behavior, and the La7V?,
in THE NEUROTRANSMITTER REVOLUTION: SEROTONIN, SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, AND THE LAW 3, 4
(Roger D. Masters & Michael T. McGuire eds., 1994); Michael T. McGuire, Evolutionary
Theory and the Limits of Law, in LAW AND EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY, supra note 255, at 27, 28.
Owen Jones is a leading legal scholar advocating this message. See Jones, supra note 17, at
1124; Jones, supra note 9, at 285-89; Jones, supra note 143, at 853, 907, 909-10, 927-29; Jones,
supra note 197, at 2072-74, 2098-2101 (reviewing FUKUYAMA, supra note 50); Owen D. Jones,
The Evolution of Irrationality, 41 JURIMETRICS 289, 312 (2001) (positing "the law of law's
leverage" that "predicts that less legal intervention will be necessary to shift a behavior in
ways that tended to increase reproductive success in ancestral environments than will be
necessary to shift behavior in ways that tended to decrease reproductive success in
ancestral environments"). Jones asserts that evolutionary analysis, carefully handled, "can
serve to: 1) refine behavioral models; 2) generate new legal strategies for regulating
behaviors; 3) improve the cost-benefit analyses by which society often prioritizes social and
legal goals; and 4) suggest important and promising new areas of research." Jones, supra
note 17, at 1125. For his model of how this works, with the example of child abuse, see id.
at 1157-1240. Another interesting example relates to males who, without resources or
status, have difficulty attracting mates and therefore engage in risky behavior to improve
their reproductive prospects. Insofar as this behavior is antisocial, understanding that its
"cause" is not simply inflated levels of hormones admits the prospect of modifications
through aiding the males to obtain additional resources and status. See Charles Crawford,
Psychology, in THE SOCIOBIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION, supra note 7, at 303, 307-09. On the
down side, similar reasoning suggests that sexual harassment and inequality in the
workplace may be particularly difficult to root out. See id. at 315; Browne, supra note 162, at
971.
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Third, even regarding predispositions that remain beneficial to the
individual, the interests of society as a whole do not begin and end with
the individual in isolation. Of course, human flourishing is the linchpin
of social action, but the modern, crowded, diverse world requires
cooperation and coordination that may interfere with a person's
particular desires. Even in a simple world, group defense and policing
are recognized by nearly everyone as necessary checks on human
behavior. Modern realities necessitate more.
Fourth, even when behavior nonconducive to human well-being is a
product of nurture rather than nature, it still may be hard to modify. As
a rule, natural dispositions may be no more difficult to manage than
nurtured ones. 389 Some natural traits may be fairly tractable, as, perhaps,
the primal urge to procreate, 390 while some nurtured traits may be
M9 Gould provides a prime example: "A twenty-dollar pair of eyeglasses from the local
pharmacy may fully correct a defect of vision that is 100 percent heritable." GOULD,
MISMEASURE, supra note 138, at 34; cf. AVISE, supra note 22, at 146 ("[H]igh heritability does
not imply unchangeability."); GOULD, supra note 186, at 326 ("Heritability simply isn't a
measure of flexibility or inflexibility in the potential expression of a trait."). But cf. PETER B.
NEUBAUER & ALEXANDER NEUBAUER, NATURE'S THUMBPRINT 176 (1990) ("Freud held that
those pathological states caused by environmental influences, by trauma for instance,
yielded better to therapeutic intervention than those determined by biological disposition,
which were unchangeable by analytic therapy."). In light of the malleability of human
nature, Beckstrom opines that "sociobiologists have little to offer on the issue of what social
goals are unachievable because of human behavioral limitations...." JOHN H. BECKSTROM,
EVOLUTIONARY JURISPRUDENCE 39 (1989) [hereinafter BECKSTROM, JURISPRUDENCE]. But
then he notes that "[nlo goal is achieved without cost, however. Here is where
sociobiological accounts of natural science can clearly make a contribution to social
planning-by suggesting costs of any contemplated social programs that planners may
want to weigh before embarking on the programs." Id.; see ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at
220; JOHN H. BECKSTROM, DARWINISM APPLIED 2 (1993); BECKSTROM, JURISPRUDENCE, supra,
at 36; John H. Beckstrom, Law, in THE SOCIOBIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION, supra note 7, at 41, 41
(sociobiology could be "facilitative").
390 "The fact that evolution has given us a particular food preference leaves entirely open
the degree to which eating behavior may be modified environmentally... . [Tihere is no a
priori reason to assume that the taste must always be more compelling than the [culturally
fostered desire for health]." SOBER & WILSON, supra note 220, at 302-03. (These authors
may not have noticed the recent statistics on the increase in obesity.) "The same point
applies to parental care." Id. at 303 (discussing the variability of the desire of parents that
their children do well). See R.L. Cliquet, Below-Replacement Fertility and Gender Politics, in 6
RESEARCH IN BIOPOLITICS: SOCIOBIOLOGY AND POLITICS, supra note 83, at 91, 99-100
(discussing authors puzzling over reproduction levels in industrial societies below that
predicted by evolutionary principles); Wilson, supra note 95, at 431 ("Some epigenetic rules
are relatively rigid, in other words insensitive to variation in early experience; the
avoidance of sibling incest is an example. Others, such as choice of diet, are less rigid and
can be altered in desired directions by appropriate training."). Browne points out that the
natural urge is for reproductive behavior, not producing children per se, which until the
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difficult to counter, as, say, the criminal tendencies of those raised in a
household and neighborhood of dire poverty, despair, drugs, and
prostitution.
Fifth, to the extent that personalities and talents are genetically
disposed, it becomes easier to promote a meritocracy that ignores the
underprivileged and unusual backgrounds of individuals. 391
Sixth, while there may be genetic components of important traits for
human flourishing, such as intelligence, environment nevertheless plays
a substantial role in reducing variations, thereby still grounding liberal
programs, such as welfare or Head Start.392
Seventh, whether particular behavior is largely a product of nature
or nurture, its management may well be largely unaffected. For
example, irrespective of the causes of antisocial behavior, successful
existing preventives, curatives, incentives, and sanctions should remain
in place. Indeed, as the origins of antisocial behavior become clearer,393
new means of coping with it are likely to emerge, but it is hard to foresee
modern availability of birth control was closely tied to spawning children. See Browne,
supra note 162, at 1003-05. Wilson contends that the more broadly a pattern of traits is
found among primates, the more it is resistant to change. See WILSON, SEARCH, supra note
83, at 91.
391 The genetic component of personality "means there is no excuse for discriminating
against people from underprivileged backgrounds, or to be wary of people brought up in
unusual families." RIDLEY, supra note 128, at 86. Furthermore, "if you want to live in a
meritocracy, then you had better not believe in nurture alone, or you will give all the top
jobs to those who went to the top schools." Id. at 262. In other words, "in a world where
everybody gets the same education, the best jobs will go to those with the most native
talent." Id. at 263.
392 For example, Ridley refers to a study that "found that the heritability of IQ depends
strongly on socioeconomic status.... Among the poorest children practically all the
variability between individual IQ scores was accounted for by shared environment and
none by genetic type; in the richer families, the opposite was true." Id. at 90. "In other
words, living on a few thousand dollars a year can severely affect your intelligence for the
worse. But living on $40,000 a year or $400,000 a year makes little difference." Id. at 90-91.
393 Thiessen asserts that there are no "criminal genes." THIESSEN, supra note 107, at 355.
"Rather, there are genes for high-risk behaviors, impulsiveness, hyperactivity, poor
judgment, mental dullness, hypersecretion of hormones, low enzyme activity, low anxiety,
epilepsy, high or low neurotransmitter activity, poor glucose metabolism, and a number of
other conditions that predispose individuals toward erratic, careless, and aggressive acts."
Id. "Although a hard pill to swallow, it is probably the case that many deviant behaviors of
today are only distortions of adaptive responses of yesterday." Id. at 360. Now that these
behaviors are no longer adaptive, not-so-bitter pills for the antisocial would seem to
increase their fitness. On the other hand, perhaps those with low reproductive qualities
gain fitness by antisocial behavior. See supra text accompanying note 24.
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a wholesale rejection of current, demonstrably effective methods
resulting from the nature or nurture etiology alone. Hardened
dispositions will be difficult to influence irrespective of their causes.
394
Eighth, because the sociobiology genie is out of the bottle, like it or
not, deeper investigation and education are needed to resist
misunderstanding and misapplications. 395
Ninth, from a political point of view, social responses to biological
dispositions may coincidentally align with the liberal agenda, as where
the apparent male disposition towards aggressiveness might be
countered by granting women some of the highest diplomatic and
military positions.396
394 See MARGARET GRUTER, LAW AND THE MIND: BIOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF HUMAN
BEHAVIOR 20-21 (1991); Jones, supra note 143, at 926 ("Quite simply, when the law
encourages behavior to which the human brain is already predisposed, it will be more
easily successful than when it attempts the opposite.").
395 For example, Dreyfuss and Nelkin worry about the misconstruction of the scientists'
use of statistical correlation by lawyers who reduce it to legal "cause," "thereby losing the
probabilistic feature of the scientific claim" and turning it into a material status condition
independent of whether the risk will materialize. Dreyfuss & Nelkin, supra note 386, at 342.
Distinguishing predictive uses of genetic information from explanatory applications, they
express concern that simple predictions, such as of dangerousness and ineducability, could
"create self-fulfilling prophecies by labeling asymptomatic individuals as 'predisposed."'
Id. Although, in contrast, explanatory use of the information may be helpful, as by revising
the notion of culpability (e.g., regarding homosexual sodomy laws), and by fostering the
alteration of the environment to aid those with biological susceptibilities. Id. at 342-43.
396 See KONNER, supra note 18, at 420; WRANGHAM & PETERSON, supra note 312, at 233
("Among humans and chimpanzees, at least, male coalitionary groups often go beyond
defense (typical of monkey matriarchies) to include unprovoked aggression, which
suggests that our own intercommunity conflicts might be less terrible if they were
conducted on behalf of women's rather than men's interests."). Some early feminists
asserted that if women got the vote, their natural peaceableness would change the political
landscape, see FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 142, at 124, though the natural differences in
aggressiveness between men and women can be challenged, see id. at 141-43; R. PAUL SHAW
& YUWA WONG, GENETIC SEEDS OF WARFARE 179-80 (1989) ("Humanity's propensity for
warfare is equally prevalent among women and men."). Of course, the range of the
naturally disposed aggressiveness of men and women doubtlessly overlaps, so that the
most aggressive women far surpass the least aggressive men. Konner further suggests, as
illustrations merely to show that social responses may be liberal rather than conservative,
that research into the genetics of intelligence may offer the naturally unlucky the best hope
of overcoming their learning disabilities, and that the wealthy and powerful who achieve
their success partially through exploiting their natural predispositions should be denied
the opportunity to pass their wealth and status to their lesser endowed offspring by means
of confiscatory inheritance tax. See KONNER, supra note 18, at 420-21. Finally, the liberal
agenda regarding family affairs may be bolstered by the genetic influences on human
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Tenth, by learning that altruism has a genetic component, the sense
of justice is given a solid grounding in human nature. 397
Eleventh, understanding that certain undesirable behavior is
predisposed rather than simply environmentally induced may help the
person surmount it,398 as where it was found that telling people that they
were naturally shy helped them to overcome it.3 99
Finally, there are silver linings for liberals in the lessons of
sociobiology, including the rationale for greater tolerance and
benevolence regarding hurtful behavior, less blame of caregivers for
their maladjusted wards, and decreased personal guilt for those with
certain behavioral problems.4°° Better self-understanding may benefit
the individual and those around her.401
temperament: "Decades of studies have shown that, all things being equal, children turn
out pretty much the same way whether their mothers work or stay at home, whether they
are placed in daycare or not... , and whether they have two parents of the same sex or one
of each." PINKER, supra note 11, at 386.
397 Trivers made this observation. See id. at 111. Trivers, a political radical, also took
comfort that the insight that people, including politicians, are disposed to act self-
interestedly puts others on guard and that the evolutionary advantages of self-deception
"encourages self-scrutiny and helps undermine hypocrisy and corruption." Id. "Trivers
had argued that sociobiology is, if anything, a force for political progress." Id.
39 See id. at 165.
399 See RIDLEY, supra note 158, at 166-67.
400 Jerome Kagan, "an aging, politically liberal social scientist, trained to believe in the
extraordinary power of the social environment," is occasionally saddened by the lessons of
recent years about genetically disposed temperaments, seeing it as "unfair" to those who
must struggle against their inclinations, but finds himself more forgiving of the moods and
idiosyncracies of friends and family members, and pleased to find reason to counter the
"undeserved guilt and sporadic anger" of the schizophrenic, depressed and panic-stricken,
and their families, arising from the ascription of the ailments to inadequate caregiving.
KAGAN, supra note 140, at xxi-xxiii. Pinker observes that "sometimes left-wing positions
are right because the denial of human nature is wrong," as where wartime killing is justified
because the enemy does not value individual lives, or when mothers are blamed for the
dysfunction of their children. PINKER, supra note 6, at 48; see GAZZANIGA, supra note 157, at
202 ("Extreme environmentalism is cruel because it suggests to the parent that their
[imperfect] child has been warped by something they did."); PINKER, supra note 11, at x-xi
(The denial of human nature has, among other things, anguished parents and distorted city
planning by ignoring human needs.); SEGAL, supra note 143, at 314 (reporting that while
genetic effects on behavior can be deplorable and frightening for parents attempting to
change their children's behavior, it "can also be welcome-even comforting-to people
learning that their child's depression or timidity may be linked to genes, as well as to
parenting."); WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 256, 259 (pointing out that among the benefits "to
broad acceptance of the genes-behavior dynamic could be greater acceptance of human
differences" and the "potential for dispelling guilt on both the part of those with behavioral
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IV. CONCLUSION
Predictably, because sociobiology is perceived to be more useful to
some political orientations than to others,40 2 there is a general alignment,
oftentimes reflexive, between particular political and sociobiological
beliefs. But when the moral overtones of sociobiology are studied with
objective care, ideology loses much of its power to steer any normative
conclusions.40 3  Pragmatism will, one would suppose, become the
predominant lesson. The aim of the law, regardless of the politics that
drives it, is to smooth the path to human flourishing. The first requisite
is to understand the nature of the human condition. 4°4
problems and on the part of parents who, in the environmental paradigm, have been
wrongfully accused of causing it"). Early on, one of Wilson's aims was to "help diminish
guilt feelings in parents, making them realize that the eventual outcome [of children's
behavior] is a product of both their upbringing and the child's own genetic endowment."
SEGERSTRALE, supra note 6, at 193. There may be a dark lining behind this silver cloud.
With the increased sophistication of prenatal screening and testing techniques,
"responsibility for the social harm [the genetically disordered] cause may lie with those
who brought these individuals into being." Dreyfuss & Nelkin, supra note 386, at 331.
401 For example, Buss reports that "men say that knowledge of evolutionary psychology
helps them remain faithful. One told me, 'When I find myself attracted to another woman,
I realize that it's just my evolved desire for sexual variety; it doesn't mean I don't love my
wife."' David M. Buss, Where Is Fancy Bred? In the Genes or in the Head?, N.Y. TIMES, June 1,
1999, at F5.
402 "The April 21, 1997, issue of U.S. News and World Report quoted Leon Kamin as saying
that the simplest way to discover someone's political leanings is to ask his or her view on
genetics. Old myths die hard." WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 255 n.*. That sociobiology can
support both liberal and conservative politics, see Steven A. Peterson & Albert Somit,
Sociobiology and Politics, in THE SOCIOBIOLOGY DEBATE, supra note 7, at 449, 454-55.
403 See ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 98 ("I had always regarded Darwinism as essentially a
way of interpreting history, rather than as a basis for ideology. But if its application to
human affairs is widely misinterpreted or misused, then it unavoidably becomes
ideological in its effect even if not in the purpose of its practitioners."); WRIGHT, supra note
8, at 363.
404 See Elliott, supra note 7, at 612 (also cautioning against "the Panglossian fallacy: to think
that biology can explain everything").
